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Summary 
At the beginning of the 21st century the global 
fight against absolute poverty is seen as a joint 
international task, its urgency and magnitude 
made particularly clear by the UN Millennium 
Declaration. Today the post-Communist countries 
of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
are among those increasingly affected by poverty. 
In the transition countries of Central Asia in par-
ticular poverty is one of the main problems. Four 
of the Central Asian countries – Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – are partner 
countries of the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ). In many 
respects they have similar social problems to 
those of "classical" partner countries in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. Unlike them, however, 
they are equipped with social policy institutions to 
which only ten years ago the whole population 
had access and which are to some extent still in 
operation today. 
This study examines the specific poverty profile of 
post-Communist Central Asia and considers the 
potential of the existing social policy institutions 
for improving human development in the region. 
Although it is not disputed that successful poverty 
reduction is of the utmost importance for the stabil-
ity of the whole region and for the cohesion of 
society, very few analyses have been made of the 
specific Central Asian poverty problem or of the 
social policy efforts made in the region. The study 
seeks to close a significant gap in the available 
literature and to lay the foundations for increased 
involvement of development cooperation in the 
social policy sphere. 
Poverty and poverty reduction in the devel-
opment policy context 
Because of its complexity there is no generally 
valid definition of the concept of poverty, and its 
meaning has changed significantly in recent dec-
ades. While income-related definitions predomi-
nated in the past, a more comprehensive view 
based on a multidimensional approach to poverty 
is now being taken in German and international 
development cooperation. The poverty reduction 
guidelines adopted by the Development Assis-
tance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
in April 2000 refer to five dimensions of human 
well-being: 
• the ability to earn an income (economic capa-
bilities); 
• access to health care, education, clean water, 
adequate nutrition and appropriate housing 
(human capabilities); 
• human rights and opportunities for political 
participation (political capabilities); 
• the possibility to participate as a valued mem-
ber of a community (socio-cultural capabili-
ties); 
• the ability to withstand economic and other 
shocks (protective capabilities). 
While the worldwide fight against absolute pov-
erty is seen as the main global objective today, far 
less attention was paid to this challenge in the 
initial years of development policy. In the 1950s 
and 1960s poverty reduction was not regarded as a 
separate goal of development policy, as the em-
phasis lay on economic development. The 
McNamara speech in Nairobi in 1973 is widely 
regarded as a milestone on the road to a paradigm 
change. It was to be 1995, following widespread 
criticism of the inadequacy of the measures taken 
to cushion the impact of the structural adjustment 
programmes of the 1980s, before the World 
Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen 
succeeded in focusing international attention on 
the subject of poverty reduction. Finally, in 2000 
the UN Millennium Summit adopted a list of eight 
development goals and 48 specific indicators, 
which is topped by the eradication of extreme 
poverty and hunger. 
As these supranational efforts were being made, 
the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank began to take a greater interest in poverty 
reduction issues. The international financial insti-
tutions thus accepted the call for non-economic 
development objectives to be upgraded. The road 
to the Post-Washington Consensus entailed the 
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adoption of a new set of instruments, which were 
all launched in 1999: the Comprehensive Devel-
opment Framework (CDF), the modification of 
the Highly Indebted Poor Countries Initiative 
(HIPC II) and the Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs). On the one hand, the new in-
struments include the conceptual transition from 
the adding on of poverty reduction to its main-
streaming; on the other hand, they set the scene 
for the South to assume more responsibility for 
the development of economic and social strate-
gies. 
Social policy as an instrument for reducing 
poverty 
For a long time analyses undertaken from the 
social and development policy angles were carried 
out without any mutual points of contact. This 
duality was based on the explicit or implicit as-
sumption that developing countries could not "af-
ford" social policy institutions – an assessment 
that is increasingly questioned. The far greater 
interest taken by the development community in 
aspects of social policy in the past decade is very 
largely due to the debate on poverty reduction 
described above. 
Following on from the 20/20 initiative adopted in 
Copenhagen, such basic social services as primary 
health care, elementary education, nutrition and 
the supply of clean water are regarded as funda-
mental elements of poverty reduction. With a 
view to better preventing and alleviating such 
risks as illness and old-age poverty, however, the 
promotion of social policy institutions is today a 
fixed component of poverty reduction pro-
grammes, including the federal German govern-
ment's Programme of Action 2015. The OECD/ 
DAC guidelines on poverty reduction emphasize 
the dual nature of social development as a sepa-
rate human right and as an instrument for reducing 
poverty. 
Special conceptual efforts have been made by the 
World Bank in recent years to incorporate social 
policy into a comprehensive poverty reduction 
strategy. Within the tripartite "opportunity, em-
powerment and security" strategy proposed in the 
World Development Report 2000/2001, social 
protection is placed under the "security" heading. 
For this sphere Social Risk Management has been 
developed, a special concept for the prevention, 
mitigation and management of risks that pose 
particular challenges for the poor. The World 
Bank concept draws attention to the wide range of 
risk management strategies to be seen in develop-
ing countries. It also makes it clear that social 
policy can make an important contribution to risk 
management in developing countries. 
In the past decade, the growing realization that 
social policy also matters in the development pol-
icy context was accompanied by a greater appre-
ciation of the different forms of protection sys-
tems to be found in developing countries. Five 
types can be distinguished: traditional, informal, 
cooperative, private and publicly provided social 
systems. In Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union comprehensive, publicly provided social 
systems were developed in the Communist era, 
with other forms playing little or no part. The 
social systems inherited from the Communist past 
need to be reformed if they are to meet today's 
greater and different requirements. 
Transformation and development in Central 
Asia 
The first development agenda for Central Asia 
dates back to Soviet times. The declared objective 
was to raise the socio-economic level of a region 
regarded as backward to the average for the Soviet 
Union and to bring about the political, economic 
and cultural integration of the Central Asian peo-
ple into the Soviet Union as a whole. The undis-
puted achievements of the Soviet past include the 
development of a health care system, and consid-
erable progress was also made in the educational 
sphere. By the late 1960s illiteracy was a thing of 
the past in Central Asia, and secondary school and 
university systems had similarly been installed.  
In the economic and cultural spheres, however, 
criticism is levelled at the Soviet development 
agenda and its implementation. The Central Asian 
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Soviet republics were integrated into the Soviet 
economy solely as suppliers of raw materials. In 
return for the raw materials they delivered, how-
ever, the Central Asian republics received exten-
sive financial transfers from Moscow, which were 
used to build economic and infrastructure capaci-
ties and social policy institutions in Central Asia. 
The attempt to create a common Soviet identity 
was equivalent de facto to the Europeanization of 
Central Asia. Practice of the Islamic religion was 
seriously restricted in Soviet times. Even gauged 
by its own objectives, the implementation of the 
Soviet development agenda for Central Asia can 
be regarded as no more than a limited success, 
since after seven decades it had ultimately proved 
impossible to overcome the significant regional 
disparities within the Soviet Union. 
The year 1991 marks the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, which caused the Central Asian Soviet 
republics to declare their independence. None of 
these newly established countries had previously 
been an independent state. Because of the ap-
pointment of strong presidents with an autocratic 
style of leadership, the absence of democratic 
standards in the elections that have been held and 
widespread violations of human rights, the Central 
Asian countries are now the target of international 
criticism. The re-Islamization currently to be ob-
served in Central Asia has been interpreted as a 
means of constructing political legitimacy and 
forging links to a cultural and religious heritage. 
Human rights groups also report that accusations 
of Islamism and terrorism are deliberately used 
against religious and secular opposition groups. 
The challenges associated with the change from a 
planned to a market economy were greater in Cen-
tral Asia than in many other transition countries: 
• The existing economic structures were in no 
way prepared for national sovereignty. 
• The trade and transport routes previously used 
by the land-locked Central Asian countries 
were interrupted. 
• Independence was accompanied by an abrupt 
end to the budget transfers from Moscow. 
• An added factor was a brain drain, as more 
than a million Russians – including many 
highly qualified specialists – left Central Asia 
after independence. 
Economic reform was slower and far more diffi-
cult in the former Soviet periphery than in other 
transition countries of Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. It was accompanied by a 
steep economic decline, very high rates of infla-
tion, extensive job losses and a sharp drop in real 
wages. After seven decades of a de facto guaran-
tee of full employment available coping strategies 
were limited. Major poverty problems are there-
fore emerging throughout Central Asia today. 
Poverty in Central Asia 
Income poverty in the Central Asian region can-
not be ascribed solely to transformation, since it 
reaches back into the Soviet era. The income of a 
large proportion of the Central Asian population 
fell below the absolute minimum subsistence level 
as early as 1988, this being especially true of Ta-
jikistan (59 %) and Uzbekistan (45 %), but also of 
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan (37 % in each 
case). Measuring poverty was taboo in the Soviet 
Union before the glasnost period. The incomplete 
nature of the data on poverty in the post-
independence period indicates that income pov-
erty is still a politically sensitive subject in most 
Central Asian countries. 
The available indicators suggest that the change of 
system was followed by a considerable worsening 
of income poverty. Hardest hit in the late 1990s 
was Tajikistan, followed by Kyrgyzstan. In these 
two countries 96 % and 84 % of the population, 
respectively, had an income of less than US $ 4.30 
a day. In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – the re-
gion's wealthiest countries – on the other hand, 
only 31 % and 35 % of the population had so low 
an income. The regional disparities in all the Cen-
tral Asian countries are, however, enormous. The 
regions that have been particularly affected by 
poverty include Gorno-Badakhshan (Tajikistan) 
and Karakalpakstan (Uzbekistan). 
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In view of the rapid loss of importance of depend-
ent employment Central Asians were forced to 
resort to the combination of sources of income 
that has long been common in countries of the 
"classical" periphery. The available information 
on this process of diversification indicates that 
survival is ensured by income from dependent 
employment, self-employed activity, agricultural 
production, subsistence farming and publicly pro-
vided benefits (especially pensions). The patterns 
of diversification differ according to social stra-
tum and region, urban and rural area. The success 
of such coping strategies, however, has been lim-
ited. There is a particularly close link in Central 
Asia between poverty and the number of children 
in a family. Except in Tajikistan, the risk of pov-
erty also correlates with the labour market status 
of the head of household. If he or she is unem-
ployed or retired, there is a higher than average 
risk of poverty. Rural households and refugees 
are, moreover, particularly affected by income 
poverty. 
If a multidimensional approach to poverty is 
adopted, an analysis of the specific poverty profile 
of Central Asia cannot be confined to income-
related dimensions: it must also extend to the hu-
man development and social situation of the Cen-
tral Asian people, which can be examined with the 
help of a few common indicators. If the Human 
Development Index is taken as the basis, the Cen-
tral Asian countries have lagged well behind the 
average for the transition countries. Although 
Central Asia is in a far better position than the 
average for the developing countries, with almost 
completely literate populations, a comparatively 
high life expectancy and a high level of education, 
its per capita income is still very low. In 2000 
Tajikistan achieved only 30 % of the average per 
capita income for the developing countries. The 
only Central Asian country not to reach the aver-
age life expectancy for the developing countries, 
on the other hand, was Kazakhstan, economically 
the farthest advanced. Life expectancy in Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan also fell in the first decade 
of independence. 
The coincidence of a rapidly growing population 
and a shrinking economy due to transformation 
has increased the pressure on the existing social 
policy institutions in the Central Asian countries. 
The first decade of transformation was accompa-
nied, for example, by a deterioration in most 
health indicators. The food situation also wors-
ened. In Tajikistan in particular it became so 
acute, primarily because of the civil war, that al-
most half its population was suffering from under-
nourishment in the late 1990s. The available edu-
cation indicators reveal a sharp decline in nursery, 
primary and secondary school and university at-
tendance in almost all the Central Asian countries. 
The significant drop in primary school attendance 
is likely to lead to a revival of illiteracy in the 
region in the near future. 
Fiscal scope for social policy 
The transition from planned to market economy, 
which was accompanied by a serious economic 
crisis and high rates of inflation, resulted in seri-
ous fiscal imbalances in all transition countries. 
These imbalances are primarily due to the diffi-
culty of mobilizing government revenue under 
transformation conditions, under which the 
planned-economy premises of generating revenue 
have become obsolete. Although Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan have recently suc-
ceeded in slowly raising the public revenue ratio, 
in Central Asia as a whole it is still well below the 
average figures for Central and South-east Europe 
and the Baltic States. Extractive capacity – the 
ability to generate public revenue – has slumped 
in the past decade throughout the Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS), where the capacity 
for government action is severely limited. 
On their way to becoming independent nation 
states, however, the Central Asian countries faced 
not only the implications of the change of eco-
nomic system but also the cessation of the ex-
tensive intra-Soviet financial transfers. As late 
as 1989 the grants from Moscow, which even 
then were regarded as completely inadequate, 
amounted to 12 % of Kazakhstan's GDP, 20 % of 
Uzbekistan's national budget and almost 50 % of 
Tajikistan's public revenue. The erosion of the 
revenue side was bound to have an impact on 
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expenditure, and social spending was no excep-
tion. 
The available data reveal sharp reductions in ex-
penditure in the areas of health, education and 
old-age security in the first half of the 1990s. 
Most of the cuts amounted to more than two thirds 
of 1991 expenditure. The comparatively smallest 
reductions were made in Kyrgyzstan, the most 
extensive in Tajikistan. In all areas of social pol-
icy, per capita expenditure in the latter half of the 
1990s was highest in Kazakhstan, followed by 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In contrast, social 
spending per inhabitant in Tajikistan was, at US $ 
2 (health) to US $ 4 (education), extremely low in 
1999. At a time of rapid population growth in 
Central Asia, these reductions entail particularly 
far-reaching cuts in social services, which are 
unparalleled on this scale in other transition coun-
tries. The extremely low levels of social spending 
in the Central Asian countries have even been 
criticized by the international financial institutions 
as being inadequate. 
Areas of social policy action 
In the past decade, the Central Asian population 
has been exposed to a wide variety of risks from 
the macro, meso and micro levels, for which it 
was totally unprepared. The potential that social 
policy has to offer should not therefore be ig-
nored. It can contribute to the prevention, mitiga-
tion and management of many risks to which 
those affected or threatened by poverty are ex-
posed. Many of the social policy structures of the 
Soviet era still exist and can be used as the basis 
for reform efforts. The study considers the core 
areas – social assistance, retirement pensions, 
health and education. 
Social assistance: Owing to the poverty problem 
described, income transfers in the form of social 
assistance seem appropriate in all the Central 
Asian countries. It should be pointed out that in 
Soviet times the subsidized or free supply of the 
most important everyday goods and services (pri-
marily foodstuffs, rents and electricity) largely 
replaced such transfers to specific target groups. 
In the last decade, on the other hand, the cost of 
living rose sharply. In view of the shortage of 
financial resources social assistance payments are 
currently restricted to a relatively small group of 
beneficiaries. Targeting is a basic challenge in this 
context. Income testing in Central Asia is difficult 
because of the variety and lack of transparency of 
the types and sources of income. The following 
options are available: 
• In the case of proxy means testing, needs are 
assessed on the basis of household features 
which are relatively easy to observe, such as 
rights of disposal over land, water and elec-
tricity supply, ownership of consumer dur-
ables, occupation and family structure. 
• Categorical targeting is based on certain fea-
tures of the household or individual. Transfer 
payments can be concentrated on households 
in which risk groups (e.g. children, the eld-
erly) are particularly strongly represented. 
• Self-targeting can be operationalized, for ex-
ample, by means of job creation programmes 
in which the participants receive less than the 
market wage or are even rewarded in kind 
(food-for-work). 
• Community-based targeting decentralizes the 
allocation of social benefits, with advantage 
taken of locally available social capital. Its 
success depends, however, on the ability of a 
local community to ensure effective monitor-
ing and to prevent corruption. A prominent, 
though controversial, example of community-
based targeting is to be found in the Uzbek 
mahallas. 
Retirement pensions: The old-age security 
schemes that exist in Central Asia are a further 
source of monetary transfers within the usually 
multigenerational households of Central Asia. The 
available data show that retirement pensions cur-
rently make a far larger contribution to household 
incomes than social assistance payments. In the 
course of the 1990s, however, the purchasing 
power of pensions fell sharply. As the high em-
ployment ratios in Soviet times mean that almost 
all the elderly are now entitled to a pension, the 
existing retirement pension schemes can be re-
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garded as an implicit variant of categorical target-
ing. 
The optimum design of retirement pension 
schemes is the subject of an international debate, 
which largely focuses on the question whether a 
pay-as-you-go or a fully funded system is more 
appropriate for financing. Kazakhstan changed 
completely to a Chilean-style funded system in 
1998. In view of limited state regulatory capaci-
ties and the rudimentary nature of the capital mar-
ket, the Kazakh reform has largely attracted criti-
cism. Following the Kazakh precedent, other 
countries in the Central Asian region have also 
shown an interest in following the Chilean prece-
dent, but it is generally agreed that their capital 
markets are even less well equipped for a reform 
of this nature. Their reform efforts have therefore 
focused on the parameters of the public pay-as-
you-go system. The greatest challenge for the 
contribution-funded systems in the Central Asian 
context is the steady fall in employment in the 
formal sector, which will result in a sharp rise in 
system dependency rates and the erosion of what 
has hitherto been an almost universal entitlement. 
Health policy: In the health sector too an interna-
tional comparison reveals a wide variety of organ-
izational forms differing not least in the roles al-
lotted to the state, the market and the individual. 
The health system inherited from Soviet times is a 
tax-funded form of universal health care, the 
medical factors of production being state-owned. 
However, per capita government spending on 
health in all the Central Asian countries except 
Kazakhstan is so low that not even basic medical 
care can be guaranteed. At present, patients and 
their families therefore have to make informal 
payments to be sure of medical treatment. The 
attempt to convert these payments into formal fees 
as an additional source of finance for the health 
sector has largely failed. Formal fees now have to 
be paid in addition to informal payments, making 
it far more difficult in the current situation of 
growing income poverty to obtain medical care. 
In the past ten years most of the Central Asian 
countries have attempted to reorganize the exist-
ing health system. In the rationalization measures 
so far taken nothing has been done to ensure that 
the resources saved are reinvested in the health 
sector. Nor, at a time of limited government ex-
tractive capacity and a growing informal sector, 
have the attempts of some Central Asian countries 
to establish a health insurance system led to the 
tapping of substantial financial resources. Health 
experts estimate that substantial cost savings 
could be achieved if the range of services was 
redesigned – if, for example, greater emphasis 
was placed on basic general medical care and 
preference was given to out-patient care over in-
patient treatment. The whole system of budgeting 
and financing health services in Central Asia 
should, moreover, be so reorganized as to create 
incentives to improve performance and to control 
costs. 
Education policy: Universal access to education 
and the literacy of the entire population were 
among the accomplishments of the Communist 
era. Access to educational facilities decreased 
significantly in almost all the Central Asian coun-
tries in the first decade of their independence, and 
sensitive financial cuts were made. Salaries in the 
education sector are so low today that many 
teachers are having to earn a living elsewhere. 
The financial resources available are often insuffi-
cient to heat and maintain the school building, and 
schoolbooks can no longer be provided in suffi-
cient numbers. The serious cuts in the funding of 
education have resulted in formal and informal 
payments now being on the agenda in this sector 
too. Moreover, access to education for the chil-
dren of poor families is far from a matter of 
course these days. 
Provided that they are capable of paying, it may 
be perfectly appropriate for parental fees to be 
used to improve the education provided. But if 
they result in the children of the often large fami-
lies in the lower income brackets being excluded 
from education, as is increasingly the case in Cen-
tral Asia, adjustments to current education policy 
are needed. It is generally agreed that, when re-
sources are scarce, primary and secondary educa-
tion should have absolute priority, whereas opin-
ions on the relevance of pre-school care differ. At 
a time of high youth unemployment vocational 
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education is also very important, although there is 
very little demand for it in its present form. The 
aim should therefore be to tailor vocational school 
curricula to the requirements of the market econ-
omy and to the newly emerging occupational ar-
eas and to open them up to young women too. The 
educational reforms pending in Central Asia  also 
extend to redesigning schoolbooks and curricula 
and teaching interactive, less fact-centred teaching 
methods and new syllabi, for which comprehen-
sive teacher training will be necessary. The Cen-
tral Asian policy-makers must also face up to the 
reality of a multiethnic population that is to be 
found in all the countries of the region. 
Conclusions and recommendations for devel-
opment policy 
The worsening of income poverty and the savage 
cuts in social services currently to be seen in Cen-
tral Asia are in danger of causing a downward 
spiral affecting all five of the dimensions of hu-
man well-being distinguished by the OECD/DAC. 
The deficiencies in the case of economic and hu-
man capabilities exacerbate one another: people 
with a low income in the Central Asian countries 
do not at present have sufficient access to educa-
tion and health care. Poor education and health, 
however, reduce their chances of earning an ade-
quate income. There is also considerable interac-
tion between health status and level of education. 
The two dimensions referred to above are closely 
linked to two others, since people affected by 
poverty, illness and poor education have fewer 
opportunities to participate in social life as re-
spected members of society (socio-cultural capa-
bilities) or to withstand economic and external 
shocks (protective capabilities). Furthermore, the 
people of all the Central Asian countries currently 
suffer from major human rights violations and a 
lack of opportunities for political participation 
(political capabilities). 
As the various dimensions of poverty in Central 
Asia are exacerbating each other at present, there 
is an urgent need for action. A key role in this will 
be played by the fight against income poverty and 
a reform of the existing social policy institutions. 
This will primarily necessitate the mobilization of 
additional financial resources. At present, how-
ever, the available budget resources plus the con-
tributions and informal payments that can be mo-
bilized are far from enough, especially in the re-
source-poor countries of the region, to protect the 
population against income poverty and to main-
tain universal access to the social system. This is 
particularly true of Tajikistan. 
If the serious underfunding of the core areas of 
social assistance, retirement pensions, health and 
education is not to be perpetuated, the only solu-
tion in the short term is external transfers. The 
resources required should be mobilized as part of 
an internationally coordinated donor initiative. A 
possible forum for this is the recently launched 
CIS-7 Initiative of bi- and multilateral donors, in 
which the Central Asian countries with low per 
capita incomes (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbe-
kistan) are involved. The external transfers 
should, however, be subject to a time-limit, since 
the real challenge is to create a sustainable finan-
cial base for the Central Asian social policy insti-
tutions. However, this objective can be achieved 
only in the medium term, since the basic require-
ment is a distinct improvement in government 
extractive capacity in Central Asia. Steps should 
also be taken to prevent the increasing crowding 
out of social spending by the growing burden of 
debt servicing or by military spending, of which 
there are clear signs in the region at present. 
Greater efficiency in the use of available resources 
could be achieved if the currently modest adminis-
trative capacities were strengthened. In keeping with 
social institution-building, the aim in this context 
should be to develop, train and equip a function-
ing service-providing administration. If the effec-
tiveness of Central Asia's social systems is to be 
increased, the flow of information will need to be 
improved, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In 
the political dialogue it should be made clear that 
the social situation cannot be improved if the pov-
erty problem is treated as a taboo. Where living 
standards surveys based on international rules do 
not satisfy the technical and professional require-
ments, they should be improved within the 
framework of technical cooperation. 
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Donor-coordinated technical cooperation also has 
an important role to play in the area of advice on 
social policy. At present, the World Bank, the 
ADB and WHO are particularly active in this 
sphere. There is, however, still a major need for 
the existing social systems to be reformed. In the 
four core areas of social policy – social assistance, 
retirement pensions, health and education – there 
is a wealth of international experience from which 
the Central Asian countries can benefit, but there 
are very few patent remedies. The goal should 
rather be to begin with a careful analysis of the 
specific economic and socio-cultural environment 
and then to increase the effectiveness of the social 
systems in the Central Asian countries. Special 
attention should be paid in this context to a reduc-
tion of the interregional disparities and to groups 
particularly affected by poverty, such as children, 
the elderly, refugees and the rural population. As a 
reversion to nomadism is evident in Kazakhstan 
and Kyrgyzstan in particular, social instruments 
tailored to the specific needs of the people con-
cerned should be developed. 
Social policy can make a major contribution in the 
Central Asian context to the prevention, mitiga-
tion and management of risks relevant to poverty. 
Yet in this region too the multidimensionality of 
poverty requires complex problem-solving ap-
proaches that go beyond conventional areas of 
social policy action. Some Central Asian govern-
ments have therefore recently developed broader 
concepts for poverty reduction, sometimes at the 
suggestion or with the support of international 
donors. The need for a broad agenda of economic, 
structural and institutional reforms to be pursued 
in the Central Asian countries is emphasized both 
in the national poverty programmes and PRSPs 
that have been submitted and in the CIS-7 Initia-
tive. The ten goals of the federal German govern-
ment's Programme of Action 2015 rely, however, 
on an even more comprehensive poverty reduction 
strategy, which would be completely justified in 
Central Asia. 
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1 Introduction 
Poverty reduction has been one of the main com-
ponents of German development cooperation for 
many years and continues to be one of its greatest 
challenges. The Millennium Goal set by the inter-
national community of halving extreme poverty by 
2015 has again demonstrated the urgency and 
magnitude of this joint international task. While the 
concept of poverty tended to be dominated by in-
come in the past, a more comprehensive analysis of 
the problem has now gained acceptance. It is also 
reflected in a more complex package of strategies, 
as the Programme of Action 2015 presented by the 
Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) shows.2 
Poverty today is, however, a serious problem not 
only in the "classical" developing countries but 
also in the former Communist countries which 
have been assisted by the federal German gov-
ernment since the early 1990s. While the empha-
sis in these countries was placed on economic and 
political change in the first few years of transfor-
mation, the major social implications of the sys-
temic change soon became apparent. Today there 
is no mistaking the fact that poverty and social 
disparities in the post-Communist region are more 
than just a temporary phenomenon. The reform of 
the social policy institutions inherited from the 
Communist era has therefore attracted greater 
attention in recent years.3 At the same time, it is 
obvious fourteen years after the annus mirabilis, 
1989, that the political and economic upheaval in 
eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has 
had extremely heterogeneous implications for the 
                                                     
1  DfID (Department for International Development) (2000), 
p. 4. 
2 See BMZ (2001a). 
3 See, for example, World Bank (2000a) and (2000c). 
region. The European Union's eastward enlarge-
ment, which is by no means open to all the transi-
tion countries, is a clear example of the processes 
of intraregional differentiation and the varying 
degrees of success with which transformation has 
been undertaken. 
It is becoming increasingly clear in this context 
that the social and economic situation in the five 
newly established countries of Central Asia is 
particularly serious: not only geographically do 
they form the periphery of the post-Communist 
region.4 It was, however, only a few months ago 
that the spotlight of world politics was shone on 
the previously rather marginalized Central Asian 
region as a result of its geographical proximity to 
Afghanistan.5 Four of the Central Asian countries 
– Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbeki-
stan – are now BMZ partner countries. In many 
respects their social problems are similar to those 
of the "classical" partner countries in Africa, Asia 
and Latin America. Unlike them, however, the 
Central Asian countries are equipped with social 
policy institutions to which only ten years ago the 
whole population had access and which are to 
some extent still in working order today. 
This study looks into the specific poverty profile 
of post-Communist Central Asia at the beginning 
of the 21st century and examines the potential the 
existing social policy institutions have today for 
improving the alarming social situation in Central 
Asia. The pivotal importance of successful pov-
erty reduction for the stability of the whole region 
and for societal cohesion in the various Central 
Asian countries is undisputed: "The deepest 
                                                     
4 Some of the countries of the Caucasus and Southern 
Europe are in a similar situation. See Müller (2002c). 
5 See Brill Olcott (2001). The Central Asian countries were 
promised increased foreign aid in return for their logisti-
cal support of the military intervention in Afghanistan. 
"The causes and consequences of poverty in this region 
will only become clearer with improved statistical and qualitative information. 
There is, therefore, limited knowledge of the impact of past policy initiatives on poverty, 
or of the policy changes needed to reduce poverty. It is fairly clear, though, 
that the major causes of increasing poverty have been general economic decline 
and the fragmentation of social welfare systems which, in Soviet times, 
provided some minimum standard of living for all."1
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source of internal instability throughout the re-
gion is neither religious extremism nor ethnic 
conflict but poverty."6 Nonetheless, few analyses 
of the specific issue of Central Asian poverty have 
so far been undertaken, and little is known of the 
state of the social policy institutions in the region. 
An attempt is therefore made in this study both to 
close a gap in the available literature on the region 
and to lay the foundations for an increase in the 
involvement of development cooperation in the 
social policy sphere. 
The study is broken down into six chapters. Chap-
ter 1 – the introduction – is followed by two brief 
chapters on the background, which lead on in 
thematic (Chapter 2) and regional terms (Chapter 
3) to the subject of the investigation. To this end, 
the position of poverty and social policy in Ger-
man and international development cooperation is 
defined in Chapter 2, which begins with a brief 
overview of the change that has occurred in the 
understanding of poverty in the past two decades. 
The status of and strategies for poverty reduction 
in the development policy context are then pre-
sented. This is followed by a discussion of social 
policy's potential contribution to poverty reduc-
tion, the different social policy institutions in de-
veloping and transition countries also being con-
sidered. Chapter 3 seeks to provide the necessary 
basic understanding of the specific regional con-
textual factors, the region, after all, forming part 
of both the post-Communist and the Islamic 
world. The specific development problems facing 
the Central Asian region are outlined in the light 
of the Soviet legacy and the subsequent decade of 
transformation. Political, socio-cultural and eco-
nomic aspects essential for an understanding of 
the causes of poverty and of the options for and 
limits to coping strategies in the Central Asian 
countries are discussed in this context. 
Chapter 4 seeks to paint as accurate a picture as 
possible of human development, the social situa-
tion and income poverty in post-Communist Cen-
tral Asia, using the available data. Following on 
from Chapter 2, this is based on a multidimen-
                                                     
6 See Rasizade (2002), p. 99. 
sional image of poverty, one that also includes 
dimensions unrelated to income. As far as the 
available statistics allow, both a comparative and 
a country-related perspective is adopted. Chapter 
5 considers social policy and poverty reduction in 
Central Asia, focusing first on the sharp reduction 
in the fiscal scope for social policy and then pre-
senting the existing social policy institutions and 
the reforms undertaken in recent years in the areas 
of social assistance, provision for old age, health 
and education to the extent that they are described 
in the literature. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of some of the more broadly based 
approaches to poverty reduction in Central Asia, 
which, though including social policy compo-
nents, are not confined to them. 
The recommendations for development policy 
deduced from this study are set out in Chapter 6. 
As the information and data available are inade-
quate in some important respects, the recommen-
dations cannot be highly detailed. They primarily 
concern ways of helping to reduce poverty in Cen-
tral Asia by supporting and reforming the existing 
social policy institutions in the region. It is also 
emphasized, however, that such action needs to be 
complemented by more comprehensive ap-
proaches to poverty reduction. The priority areas 
specified by the BMZ in the Programme of Action 
2015 are also taken up in this context. 
The study is largely based on the available litera-
ture in English and German. In addition, numer-
ous background discussions were held with social 
policy experts based in Astana, Almaty, Bishkek 
and Tashkent in October 2002. Active support 
was provided particularly by Yanyl Koyo-
muratova, Zharkin Kakimzhanova, Elvira Pak and 
Michael Gerlich. I received detailed feedback on 
the first version of this study from Elke Herrfahrdt, 
Irina Kausch, Markus Loewe and Imme Scholz. 
Kathrin Berensmann, Jörn Grävingholt, Susanne 
Neubert, Gesa Walcher, Jürgen Wiemann and 
Hans-Helmut Taake also made a number of im-
portant suggestions. My thanks to them all. 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 3 
2 Poverty and Social Policy in the 
Development Context 
2.1 Changing Definitions and Concepts of 
Poverty 
It is impossible to give a generally valid definition 
of the concept of poverty because of its complex-
ity, especially as its meaning has changed signifi-
cantly in recent decades.7 While the principal 
definition tended to be dominated by income in 
the past, a more comprehensive analysis of the 
problem has now gained acceptance in German 
and international development cooperation. In the 
BMZ paper "Main Elements of Poverty Reduc-
tion" drawn up ten years ago poverty was still 
being defined as follows: "People are poor if they 
do not have the minimum of monetary or non-
monetary income needed to cover their need for 
food and other basic needs."8 The federal German 
government's recently presented Programme of 
Action 2015, on the other hand, states: "Poverty 
does not just mean that people have low incomes 
but also that they are faced with limited opportu-
nities and have inadequate means of taking part in 
political and economic life, that they are particu-
larly exposed to risks, their human dignity is not 
respected, their human rights are abused and that 
                                                     
7 See Bundesregierung (2001). 
8 BMZ (1992), p. 2. 
they lack access to resources."9 This change of 
meaning will be described in the following with 
the aid of a number of common definitions and 
concepts of poverty.10 
• Poverty as a problem of physically ensuring 
subsistence: According to the concept of abso-
lute, extreme or primary poverty, anyone 
without sufficient resources to ensure his or 
her physical subsistence is poor. This ap-
proach dates back to Benjamin Seebohm 
Rowntree's historic study of poverty in the 
English city of York11 and is widely used to-
day, particularly in the cost-of-basic-needs 
method. Differences of dietary habits and 
ways of life make it difficult, however, to de-
fine, measure and compare subsistence levels. 
To measure extreme poverty in an interna-
tional comparison, the World Bank therefore 
uses, in a "dollar a day", a purely income-
related headcount method (see Box 1).12 
However, poverty can be measured not only 
indirectly through income but also directly by 
reference to levels of consumption. The aim 
                                                     
9 BMZ (2001a), p. 2. 
10 See Sen (1981, 1989), GTZ (1998) and Kanbur / Squire 
(2001). 
11 See Rowntree (1901). 
12 The income limit set by the World Bank for measuring 
extreme poverty is now US $ 1.075 at 1993 purchasing 
power parities (PPPs). See World Bank (2001e), p. 17. 
Box 1:  Some Standard Methods of Quantitative Poverty Measurement 
Headcount index: In this case the number of poor people is related to the total population. This frequently used 
method does not, however, show how far people are living below the poverty line. A deterioration in the situation of 
the poor, for example, would not be covered by this indicator unless the situation of the rest of the population wors-
ened. Nor does it provide any information on income distribution among the poor as a group. When using this indica-
tor, political decision-makers may be tempted to focus on the people living just below the poverty line. 
Poverty gap and severity of poverty: The poverty gap is an aggregate indicator of the extent to which the income of or 
consumption by a population group defined as poor falls below the set poverty line. Its significance is due to the fact 
that the poverty situation in two countries may differ widely even though they have the same percentage of poor 
people. A poverty gap of 10 means that on average the poor consume 10 % less or have an income 10 % lower than 
the poverty line. This indicator does not, however, show how many people are poor or how income is distributed 
among the poor as a group. The World Bank attempts to cover the latter aspect by calculating the severity of poverty, 
a method which has yet to be generally recognized. 
Source:  Ravallion (1994); GTZ (1998); World Bank (2000c) 
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then is to measure the actual degree of basic 
needs satisfaction rather than the possibility of 
available resources being used to ensure sub-
sistence.13 The two most common methods 
here are the food-energy method, which is 
based on the minimum calorie requirement 
defined by the World Health Organization 
(WHO), and the food-share method, which is 
based on Engel's Law.14 Depending on the 
purpose of the research and the opportunities 
for conducting surveys, it may be appropriate 
to refer to the individual or the household in 
the measurement of poverty. In the latter case 
a distinction is often made between the size of 
the household and its composition.15 Some 
special risk groups, such as the homeless and 
street children, are not, as a rule, covered by 
poverty statistics ("the missing poor").16 
• Poverty as a problem of relative standards of 
living: In the concept of relative poverty the 
emphasis is on the shortage of physical re-
sources that exists by comparison with the 
prevailing standard of living in the society 
concerned and is also known as "relative dep-
rivation".17 In the EU context relative poverty 
is said to exist at an equivalized income of 
less than 60 % of the national median level.18 
In the calculation of poverty lines19 for de-
veloping countries many different concepts 
are encountered, multidimensional methods 
                                                     
13 See Atkinson / Micklewright (1992), p. 184. 
14 See Ravallion (1994). According to Engel's Law, spend-
ing on food as a proportion of total expenditure rises as 
income falls. 
15 It can be assumed that economies of scale occur in 
consumption by larger households. It is also assumed 
that children consume less than adults. Atkinson / 
Micklewright (1992) refer to methodological differ-
ences in the calculation of equivalence scales, which 
make comparisons of poverty difficult. 
16 Ackland / Falkingham (1997), p. 82. 
17 See Sen (1981), p. 31. 
18 See Eurostat / European Commission (2002), p. 93. 
19 For the political economy of official poverty lines see 
Atkinson (1998). 
being increasingly used.20 Relative poverty 
indicators are best suited to complementing 
an absolute poverty indicator. Taken on its 
own, the concept primarily provides informa-
tion on existing social inequality and so 
measures distribution rather than the poverty 
situation, although the two are closely 
linked.21 
• Poverty as the absence of a share of societal 
resources: Unlike a food- or income-centred 
approach, this more broadly based concept of 
poverty, largely established by Amartya Sen, 
proceeds from entitlement relations.22 The 
rights of disposal of resources legitimized in 
the society concerned consequently determine 
the ownership and use of goods. These result 
from the use of one's own labour, from trade 
and from production, but they are also deter-
mined by transfers between the individual 
and other people or the state. In a later work 
Sen interprets poverty as the "deprivation of 
basic capabilities",23 as reflected in, say, low 
life expectancy, poor health, undernourish-
ment and illiteracy. In this context, Sen de-
fines the central term "capabilities" as "the 
substantive freedoms [a person] enjoys to 
lead the kind of life he or she has reason to 
value."24 Sen emphasizes that, although a low 
income is instrumentally significant within 
the framework of poverty reduction strate-
gies, it does not have any intrinsic relevance. 
While there is a close link between the level 
of income and the chances of avoiding pov-
erty, it is influenced by the age, gender and 
circumstances of the individual, which he or 
she is only partly able to control and which 
have a major influence on his or her ability to 
attain an adequate income. 
                                                     
20 For a comparative discussion of various methods see 
Boltvinik (1999). 
21 See Ravallion (1994); Grub / Suprinovic (2002). 
22 See Sen (1981), pp. 45 ff. For a critique see, for exam-
ple, Devereux (2001). 
23 Sen (1999), p. 20. See also Anand / Sen (1997). 
24 Sen (1997), p. 87. 
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It is now widely recognized that poverty is multi-
dimensional. This insight cannot, however, be 
easily converted into quantitative indicators, like 
those traditionally used for defining the problem 
with the aid of a poverty profile, for conceiving 
measures to be taken and for conducting the sub-
sequent reviews of progress. The problem is illus-
trated, for example, by the efforts to establish a 
Human Poverty Index (see Box 2). However, 
mention should be made in this context not only 
of the inadequacy of the data in many developing 
and transition countries but also of the difficulty 
of finding suitable measurable variables for some 
of the non-monetary dimensions of poverty.25 
Recently, there has therefore been a greater ten-
dency to include qualitative, multidisciplinary 
methods in the analysis of poverty, an example 
being the World Bank's Participatory Poverty 
Assessment (PPA).26 
Within the development community it is now 
recognized that poverty may assume many differ-
ent forms and requires complex problem-solving 
strategies. Thus the World Bank's World Devel-
opment Report 2000/2001 defines poverty as 
                                                     
25 See, however, World Bank (2001e), pp. 16-21. 
26 See Narayan et al. (2000a, 2000b), Robb (2000) and 
Narayan / Petesch (2002). The participatory approach 
to the analysis of poverty dates back to the concept of 
subjective poverty established in the Netherlands in the 
1970s. 
"pronounced deprivation in well-being" and op-
erationalizes this as income poverty, lack of ac-
cess to health care and education, exposure to risk 
and absence of opportunities for participation.27 
The proposed poverty reduction strategies are 
geared in particular to improving the physical 
opportunities of the poor (opportunity), strength-
ening their political participation (empowerment) 
and eliminating risk (security). The poverty reduc-
tion guidelines adopted by the Development As-
sistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) in April 2000 refer to five dimensions of 
human well-being, with gender and environmental 
aspects also taken into account in each case: the 
ability to earn an income (economic capabilities), 
access to health care, education, clean water, ade-
quate nutrition and appropriate housing (human 
capabilities), human rights and opportunities for 
political participation (political capabilities), the 
possibility of participating in social life as a re-
spected member of society (socio-cultural capa-
bilities) and the ability to withstand economic and 
external shocks (protective capabilities).28 
The programme statement recently formulated by 
the federal German government on poverty reduc-
tion, the Programme of Action 2015 presented in 
                                                     
27 World Bank (2000e), p. 15. 
28 See OECD (2001) and OECD (2002). 
Box 2:  The Human Poverty Index 
This index, which has been calculated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) only since 1997, is a 
response to the criticism levelled at the Human Development Index (HDI), which is afflicted with serious aggregation 
problems and fails to take account of important aspects of human development. Like the HDI, the Human Poverty 
Index (HPI) attempts to measure three basic dimensions of human development – long life, comprehensive education 
and adequate standard of living – but with particular regard for poverty-specific indicators. In this a conceptual dis-
tinction is made between developing countries on the one hand and OECD and transition countries on the other (HPI-
1 and HPI-2). 
HPI-1 covers the likelihood at birth of not reaching the age of 40, adult illiteracy, the percentage of the population 
having no access to clean drinking water and the percentage of underweight children under five years of age. HPI-2 
takes account of the likelihood at birth of not reaching the age of 60, adult functional illiteracy, the percentage of the 
population living below the poverty line and the long-term unemployment rate. 
However, this attempt to operationalize the more broadly based concept of poverty reveals its own practical limits. 
The actual availability and quality of the empirical data often make it impossible to calculate the HPI. This is espe-
cially true of all the post-Communist transition countries, for which only HDI figures are available 
Sources:  UNDP (20020; Anand / Sen (1997) 
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April 2001, also refers to the many causes of pov-
erty and therefore relies on a comprehensive strat-
egy, placing the emphasis on ten priorities: in-
creasing the economic dynamism and active par-
ticipation of the poor, ensuring the right to food 
and undertaking agricultural reforms, creating fair 
trade opportunities for developing countries, re-
ducing indebtedness and financing development, 
guaranteeing basic social services and strengthen-
ing social security, ensuring access to vital re-
sources and promoting an intact environment, 
ensuring respect for human rights and core labour 
standards, promoting gender equality, ensuring 
the participation of the poor and strengthening 
responsible governance, resolving conflicts peace-
fully and promoting human security and disarma-
ment.29 The Programme of Action 2015 thus em-
phasizes that poverty reduction measures should 
not only be taken in the partner countries but also 
necessitate a change of policy in Germany and at 
international and multilateral level.30 
2.2 The Status of Poverty Reduction in 
Development Cooperation 
While the worldwide fight against absolute pov-
erty is seen as the main global objective today – at 
the beginning of the 21st century – far less atten-
tion was paid to this challenge in the initial years 
of world development policy efforts. In the 1950s 
and 1960s poverty reduction was not regarded as a 
separate goal of development policy. Instead, the 
emphasis in the modernization efforts of the 
"golden age of economic growth"31 was placed on 
increasing gross national product and capital ac-
cumulation.32 The de facto equation of economic 
growth with development attracted mounting 
criticism, however, especially as the hope that a 
                                                     
29 BMZ (2001a), pp. 3-7 and 16-39. See also Hofmann 
(2001). 
30 For a critical appraisal of the Programme of Action 
2015 see Eberlei / Fues (2001), Gsänger (2001) and 
VENRO (2001). 
31 Roland-Holst / Tarp (2002), p. 6. 
32 See Thorbecke (2000), Meier (2001a) and Meier 
(2000b). 
trickle-down effect would result in large sections 
of the population benefiting proved deceptive in 
many places.33 The speech given by World Bank 
President Robert McNamara in Nairobi in 1973, 
in which he declared poverty alleviation to be one 
of the main tasks, is seen as a milestone on the 
road to a change of development policy paradigm. 
The Cocoyoc Declaration in 1974 and “Employ-
ment, Growth and Basic Needs”, the programme 
of action published by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO) in 1976, laid the foundations 
for the poverty- and target-group-oriented basic 
needs strategy which bi- and multilateral donors 
subsequently nailed to their masts.34 The 1980s, 
however, were completely overshadowed by debt 
crises and structural adjustment programmes, and 
"poverty alleviation somehow slipped out of view 
in mainstream agendas for economic reform."35 
The sometimes serious social effects of the macro-
economic stabilization programmes triggered wide-
spread criticism and protests, which eventually 
resulted in measures being taken to cushion the 
social impact.36 
The World Summit for Social Development held 
in Copenhagen in 1995 enabled international at-
tention again to be focused on the subject of pov-
erty. Poverty alleviation was seen in Copenhagen 
as an ethical, social, political and economic im-
perative for humankind. This led to the adoption 
of a coordinated and concentrated approach, 
which was reaffirmed at a special UN General 
Assembly held five years later ("Copenhagen + 
5") with the setting of a specific target: between 
1990 and 2015 the proportion of people having to 
manage on US $ 1 a day or less is to be halved.37 
The setting of this ambitious target harks back to 
the programme document "Shaping the 21st Cen-
tury", which was introduced into the international 
debate by the OECD's Development Assistance 
                                                     
33 See Menzel (1995). 
34 See ILO (1976) and Streeten et al. (1981). 
35 Roland-Holst / Tarp (2002), p. 7. 
36 See Sautter / Schinke (1994). 
37 See Gsänger (1996), BMZ (2000) and BMZ (2001c). 
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Committee in 1996.38 Finally, in September 2000 
the UN Millennium Summit adopted a list of eight 
development goals and 48 specific indicators for 
the measurement of progress achieved. The list is 
topped by the eradication of extreme poverty and 
hunger.39 
As these supranational efforts were being made, 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank began to take a greater interest in 
poverty reduction issues.40 The 1990 World De-
velopment Report had already been devoted to the 
subject of poverty. In the 1990s it had also be-
come clear that in many of the countries which 
were achieving impressive growth rates under 
economic policies guided by the “Washington 
Consensus” the social indicators had not improved 
significantly.41 The Copenhagen World Social 
Summit had therefore endorsed the wide-ranging 
criticism of the structural adjustment pro-
grammes.42 Furthermore, it had become clear dur-
ing the debate on the Asian crisis that the neglect 
of social policy mechanisms leads to forms of risk 
management that delay economic recovery and 
undermine human development.43 The interna-
tional financial institutions also accepted the call 
for non-economic development objectives to be 
upgraded. Recently, the World Bank has even 
adopted the overriding slogan "Our Dream is a 
World Free of Poverty" for its activities.44 
Beyond the level of debate, the road to the Post-
Washington Consensus also entailed the adoption 
of a new set of instruments, which were all 
                                                     
38 See OECD (1996), p. 9. 
39 See the World Bank's detailed website: http://www.de-
velopmentgoals.org/About_the_goals.htm, 21 August 
2002. 
40 See Jakobeit (1999). 
41 For a differentiated discussion of the effects of eco-
nomic growth of poor population groups see Ravallion 
(2002). 
42 See Eberlei (1999). 
43 See Norton / Conway / Foster (2002). 
44 See the World Bank group's homepage: http://www. 
worldbank.org/, 21 August 2002. 
launched in 1999. They include a conceptual tran-
sition from adding on to mainstreaming poverty 
reduction.45 It was also envisaged that the South 
would assume more of the responsibility for the 
development of economic and social policy 
strategies.46 The Comprehensive Development 
Framework (CDF) marked the beginning. The 
concept developed at nation state level is to be 
committed to a long-term, results-oriented and 
holistic approach that covers structural, social, 
institutional and macroeconomic aspects of the 
development agenda.47 Despite the need for coor-
dination with the IMF and World Bank, they em-
phasize the room for manoeuvre created by the 
new instrument.48 In addition, the Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative launched in 1996 
was so modified that debt cancellations are to be 
used specifically to reduce poverty, with the re-
sources released by the debt relief operations spent 
on poverty-reducing measures in the future.49 
Finally, in the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) an instrument has been created that pro-
vides for developing countries to establish on their 
own responsibility, but in partnership with donors, 
a multidimensional poverty reduction strategy 
geared to the long term and with the participa-
tion of civil society ("participatory, partnership-
oriented, country-driven").50 In the meantime, 
                                                     
45 This had been demanded in UNICEF's adjustment-
with-a-human-face approach as early as 1987; see Cor-
nia / Jolly / Stewart (1987). See also Elson (2001) and 
Norton / Conway / Foster (2002). 
46 See Eberlei (1999). 
47 See the World Bank's background information: 
http://www.worldbank.org/cdf/, 21 August 2002. 
48 See Wolfensohn / Fischer (2000): "The CDF, however, 
is not a blueprint. It is voluntary, and each country 
must decide on, and own, its priorities and programs." 
See, however, Schmidtkunz (2002).  
49 See IMF / IDA (1999) and the World Bank's back-
ground information: http://www.worldbank.org/hipc/, 
21 August 2002. 
50 See the World Bank's background information: 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/, 21 Au-
gust 2002. See also Development Committee (1999), 
BMZ / GTZ (2002) and IMF / World Bank (2002d). 
For a critical analysis of the PRSP approach see Herr / 
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considerable pressure has been brought to bear on 
the partner countries to agree to a PRSP process.51 
The establishment of a PRSP recognized by the 
IMF and World Bank is now a requirement both 
for debt cancellation under HIPC II and for con-
cessionary loans from the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (PRGF), which has replaced the 
former Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF).52 The new instruments are now being 
used in some countries of eastern Europe and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Kyrgyzstan and Romania were CDF pilot coun-
tries, and by mid-2001 Albania, Armenia, Azer-
baijan, Georgia, Moldavia and Tajikistan had also 
established CDFs. All these countries except Ro-
mania have meanwhile initiated a PRSP process. 
None of the transition countries has so far bene-
fited from an HIPC debt cancellation; in principle, 
Kyrgyzstan and Moldavia would, however, qual-
ify.53 
2.3 Social Policy as an Instrument for 
Reducing Poverty 
For a long time analyses undertaken from the 
social and development policy angles were carried 
out without any mutual points of contact. This 
duality was based on the explicit or implicit as-
sumption that developing countries could not "af-
ford" social policy institutions – an assessment 
that is increasingly questioned.54 The far greater 
                                                                                  
Priewe (2001), McGee / Barnard (2001), Richelle 
(2001) and Eberlei (2002). 
51 See Heidbrink / Paulus (2000). PRSPs are currently 
being established in 46 countries and prepared in many 
others. 
52 For the relationship between CDFs and PRSPs see 
World Bank (2001a), p. 23: "For low-income countries, 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is the 
principal vehicle for operationalizing CDF principles." 
53 See the IMF's background information: http://www.imf. 
org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp, 21 August 2002, and 
http// www.imf.org/external/np/hipc/index.asp, 21 Au-
gust 2002. See also World Bank (2001a), World Bank 
(2002a), IMF / World Bank (2002c). 
54 See, for example, Ahmad / Drèze / Hills / Sen (1991) 
and Devereux (2002). A similar line is taken in the 
interest taken by the development cooperation 
community in aspects of social policy in the past 
decade is very largely due to the debate on pov-
erty reduction described above.55 Following on 
from the 20/20 initiative adopted in Copenhagen, 
the strengthening of such basic social services as 
primary health care, elementary education and 
nutrition and the supply of clean water are re-
garded as fundamental elements of poverty reduc-
tion.56 With a view to better preventing and allevi-
ating such risks as illness and old-age poverty, 
however, the promotion of social policy institu-
tions is today a fixed component of poverty reduc-
tion programmes, including the federal German 
government's Programme of Action 2015.57 The 
OECD's DAC guidelines on poverty reduction 
place social policy strategies primarily in the 
spheres of "human capabilities" and "protective 
capabilities" (see Chapter 2.1). They emphasize 
the dual nature of social development as a sepa-
rate human right and as an instrument for reducing 
poverty.58 
Special conceptual efforts have been made by the 
World Bank in recent years to incorporate social 
policy into a comprehensive poverty reduction 
strategy. The tripartite "opportunity, empower-
ment and security" strategy proposed in the World 
Development Report 2000/2001, reflecting the 
                                                                                  
ILO's Global Social Trust initiative, which proposes 
that a contribution should be made to poverty reduction 
through the development of sustainable social policy 
institutions by means of a partnership between industri-
alized and developing countries. See http://www.ilo. 
org/public/english/protection/socfas/research/global/ 
global.htm, 31 January 2003. 
55 See, for example, Gsänger (1993), FES (1996) and 
Conway / Norton (2002). 
56 The initiative urges interested industrialized and 
developing countries to agree bilaterally that the former 
should spend 20 % of public development cooperation 
funds and the latter 20 % of their national budgets on 
basic social services. See UNDP et al. (1998) and Ker-
kow (2000). 
57 See BMZ (2001a), pp. 26-28. See also BMZ (2002a), 
p. 8. "However, the conceptual ranking of social secu-
rity in poverty reduction needs to be more clearly re-
flected in practical development cooperation." 
58 See OECD (2001), p. 10. 
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multidimensionality of poverty, has already been 
discussed briefly in Chapter 2.1. As part of this 
complex approach, the World Bank assigns to so-
cial security an important place under the heading 
of "security".59 This was made more specific by the 
concept of Social Risk Management (SRM) devel-
oped by the World Bank's Social Protection Unit. 
The SRM concept seeks to highlight the wide range 
of risks that may arise in the areas of nature, health, 
life cycle, society, gender, economics, politics and 
the environment at micro, meso and macro level 
(see Table 1).60 For the poor, who are more vulner-
able, these risks usually pose a particular chal-
lenge.61 
The aim of the SRM concept is to indicate the 
many possible strategies for preventing, mitigat-
ing and coping with risks ("Helping the Vulner-
                                                     
59 See World Bank (2001e). 
60 See Holzmann / Jørgensen (1999), Holzmann / Jørgensen 
(2000) and World Bank (2001c). For a critique of the 
SRM concept see McKinnon (2003). 
61 For the concept of vulnerability see, for example, 
Holzmann (2001) and Heitzmann / Canagarajah / Siegel 
(2002). 
able Manage Risk").62 In this the World Bank 
makes a distinction between the individual and 
household levels, the market and the state, four 
areas in which risk management may be needed 
(see Table 2). This reveals the large number of 
different actors who may be involved in risk man-
agement – individuals, households, communities, 
non-governmental organizations, the private sec-
tor, local, regional and national government au-
thorities and international organizations.63 The 
World Bank concept thus draws attention to the 
wide range of risk management strategies to be 
found in developing countries, many of them not 
based on social policy in the narrower sense. 
Table 2 similarly reveals, however, that govern-
ment social policy can also make a major contri-
bution to the prevention, mitigation and manage-
ment of risks in developing countries, the alterna-
tive coping strategies at household level often 
being, after all, child labour and nutritional cut-
backs. This analysis is applicable not only to the 
                                                     
62 See Social Protection Unit (2000). 
63 For application to the Jordanian case see Loewe et al. 
(2001). 
Table 1: The Risk Concept of Social Risk Management  
 Micro level 
(individual or household  
affected) 
Meso level 
(household groups or communi-
ties affected) 
Macro level 
(regions or countries affected) 
Nature  Rain, landslides, 
volcanic eruptions 
Floods, drought, 
storms, earthquakes 
Health Diseases, accidents, invalidity Epidemics  
Life cycle Birth, old age, death   
Society Crime, domestic violence Terrorism War, internal unrest 
Gender Control over household re-
sources 
Social acceptance of gender-
specific violence 
Discrimination against women 
enshrined in law 
Economy Business failure Unemployment, resettlement, 
harvest failure 
Recession, balance-of-payments, 
financial and currency crises,  
terms-of-trade shocks 
Politics Ethnic discrimination Riots Reductions of social benefits, 
coups d'état 
Environment  Pollution, deforestation,  
nuclear disaster 
 
Source: World Bank (2001c), p. 12, and World Bank (2001e), p. 136 
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"classical" partner countries but also to the trans-
formation process, which is described in a World 
Bank paper as a "unique catastrophic event" that 
is accompanied by numerous correlated and co-
variant shocks.64 These shocks affect a large pro-
portion of the population particularly in the coun-
tries of the former Soviet Union, from which it 
can be inferred that social policy institutions have 
an important role to play as coping mechanisms. 
2.4 Protection Systems in Developing and 
Transition Countries 
The growing realization in the past decade that 
social policy institutions can also play an impor-
                                                     
64 See Dobronogov (2003), p. 11. 
tant role in the development policy context was 
accompanied by a greater appreciation of the 
many different forms of protection systems to be 
found in developing countries. Five types can be 
distinguished: traditional, informal, cooperative, 
private and publicly provided social systems.65 
Traditional protection systems are supported by 
solidarity communities often limited to specific 
localities or regions and are based on reciprocal 
arrangements among relatives, neighbours or 
members of religious and/or ethnic groups, and 
they usually manage without formalized rules. 
                                                     
65 While the SRM concept presented in the previous 
section is particularly wide-ranging in this respect, a 
more conventional approach to social policy is adopted 
here. See Ahmad / Drèze / Hills / Sen (1991), Klemp 
(1992), Gsänger (1993) and BMZ (1999). 
Table 2: Risk Management Options 
 Informal mechanisms Formal mechanisms 
 Individual/household Group Market State 
Risk prevention 
 
 
 
 
 
 Preventive health 
care 
 Migration 
 More secure in-
come sources 
 
 Collective infra-
structure invest-
ment 
 Common prop-
erty 
 
 
 Economic policy 
 Environment policy 
 Education policy 
 Health policy 
 Infrastructure policy 
 Labour market policy 
 
 
Risk mitigation 
 
- Diversification 
 
 
 
 
- Insurance 
 
 
 
 
 Crop and plot 
diversification 
 Income source 
diversification 
 Investment in 
human and physi-
cal capital 
 Marriage, extended 
family 
 Share-cropping 
 Storage 
 
 
 Occupational 
association 
 ROSCA 
 
 
 
 
 Investment in 
social capital 
 Transfers 
 
 
 
 Savings account at 
financial institu-
tion 
 Microfinance 
programmes 
 
 
 Pension fund 
 Accident and life 
insurance 
 Other insurance 
 
 
 Agricultural exten-
sion 
 Trade liberalization 
 Protection of prop-
erty rights 
 
 
 Compulsory pen-
sion, sickness and 
unemployment in-
surance 
 
 
Coping with 
shocks 
 
 
 Sale of assets 
 Borrowing from 
money-lender 
 Child labour 
 Poorer nutrition 
 Temporary migra-
tion 
 
 
 Transfers within 
solidarity net-
works 
 
 
 
 Sale of financial 
capital 
 Bank loan 
 
 
 Social assistance 
 Workfare 
 Subsidies 
 Social fund 
 Transfers 
 
Source:  World Bank (2001e), p. 141 
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Informal forms of security, such as savings clubs 
and soup kitchens, are based on communal self-
help efforts, they are usually of recent vintage, 
and they do not have a common-law status. Col-
lectively organized solidarity systems, such as 
cooperatives and trade unions, offer their mem-
bers legally formalized benefits, which are meant 
to afford communal protection based on solidar-
ity. Private insurance schemes, which now play a 
significant role primarily in the areas of pension 
and health insurance, similarly provide for risk-
pooling through legally formalized contractual 
relations, but operate on a commercial basis. Pub-
licly provided social systems are collectively or-
ganized solidarity networks of a legally formal-
ized nature, to which the whole population ideally 
has access. As a rule, however, social insurance 
schemes presuppose a dependent employment 
relationship and regular contributory payments. 
Transfer systems organized by the state are not 
bound by such requirements and, unlike insurance 
schemes, often generate no entitlements. 
The extent to which the population of a develop-
ing country has access to these five forms of secu-
rity is intertemporally and regionally very differ-
ent. In the course of the extensive processes of 
urbanization and modernization, traditional pro-
tection systems are breaking up in many places, 
and only part of their protective function can be 
performed by informal types of security and co-
operatively organized solidarity systems. Protec-
tion systems run by government or the private sec-
tor are not as a rule open to the bulk of the rural 
population or people working in the informal sec-
tor. In large parts of Africa and Asia publicly pro-
vided social insurance schemes play no more than a 
limited role, whereas in many Latin American 
countries they are comparatively well developed, 
but here too they are complemented to a significant 
degree by other forms of protection. In eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union comprehen-
sive, publicly provided social systems were devel-
oped in the Communist era, with other forms and 
bodies playing a subordinate role. 
The guarantee of comprehensive social security 
was regarded as an important achievement of 
Communism by a large proportion of the popula-
tion of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Un-
ion.66 Yet experts are predominantly critical of 
Communist social policy. Economists have de-
scribed it as "lavish" and argue that "it was impos-
sible to finance all these entitlements."67 Social 
experts have, however, pointed out that access to 
some social benefits presupposed a recognized 
employment relationship: members of society who 
were classified as unproductive or disloyal were 
excluded on the ground that they were "undeserv-
ing poor".68 The two lines of argument agree, how-
ever, in their criticism of the paternalistic nature of 
Communist social policy. 
The creation of unemployment insurance schemes 
aside, the existing social policy institutions at first 
survived the change of system largely intact. The 
nature and scale of the reform of the social policy 
institutions were far more contentious than the 
economic and political changes.69 Neoliberal 
economists argued that the system of protection 
"from the cradle to the grave" slowed the dyna-
mism of economic growth and should therefore be 
severely curtailed.70 Voices from the social policy 
camp, on the other hand, assigned a key role in the 
transformation process to social security, since 
they believed it could counteract political opposi-
tion by compensating the losers in the reforms. 
Social policy should therefore be regarded as a 
requirement for successful transformation.71 
Twelve years after the change of system in eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union began the 
differences of opinion have become less pro-
                                                     
66 See Ferge (1994). Hamilton (1989) and Adam (1991) 
refer in this context to an implicit social contract be-
tween the regime and the people in the Communist 
countries, which was, however, disintegrating in the 
1970s and 1980s as the economic difficulties mounted. 
67 Sachs (1996), p. VII. 
68 Ferge (1991), p. 134. 
69 For old-age security reform see Müller (1998) and 
Müller (1999). 
70 Krumm / Milanovic / Walton (1995), p. 27. See also 
Kopits (1994) and Chu / Gupta (1996). 
71 See Offe (1994), Hedtkamp (1995) and ILO-CEET 
(1996). 
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nounced. On the one hand, the high social costs of 
the change of system are undisputed today; on the 
other hand, there is just as little doubt that the 
social policy institutions inherited from the Com-
munist past need to be reformed if they are to 
meet today's greater and different requirements.72 
At the same time, increasing differentiation is 
occurring in the post-Communist region. The east-
ern European candidates for EU membership have 
already undertaken extensive economic and social 
reforms and today spend far more on social policy 
than most of the successor states to the former 
Soviet Union, where the economic collapse went 
deeper and many reforms have yet to be 
launched.73 The persistence and scale of the 
poverty occurring during the transformation proc-
ess were underestimated for a long time, as the 
World Bank has admitted in a recently published 
study.74 While it had originally been expected that 
poverty would be a transitional phenomenon that 
could be overcome through an early return to a 
growth path, the need for government intervention 
in the social policy sphere is now emphasized. The 
situation in the Central Asian countries is particu-
larly serious in this respect, as a glance at com-
monly used development indicators reveals (see 
Chapter 4). 
3 Transformation and Development in 
Central Asia 
3.1 The Soviet Development Agenda 
The Central Asian region, having come under 
Tsarist rule in the 19th century, became part of the 
Soviet Union after the October Revolution.75 In a 
                                                     
72 See, for example, Heller / Keller (2001) and World 
Bank (2002). 
73 See World Bank (2000a), EBRD (2001) and Müller 
(2002c).  
74 See World Bank (2000c). 
75 Central Asia here means the territory of the present 
republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. The geographical defini-
process lasting several years and accompanied by 
the harsh persecution of "ultra-nationalism" and 
"pan-Turkism" internal territorial reorganization 
along existing ethno-linguistic borders was initi-
ated.76 At first, only Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
were declared Soviet republics (1924), while an 
Autonomous Tajik Republic was established 
within the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic and 
Kazakh and Kyrgyz Autonomous Republics were 
established within the Russian Federation. Some 
years later Tajikistan (1929), Kazakhstan and 
Kyrgyzstan (1936) were also declared full Soviet 
republics. 
There was already a development agenda for Cen-
tral Asia in Soviet times. The declared objective 
was to raise the socio-economic level of a region 
regarded as backward to the average for the Soviet 
Union and to bring about the political, economic 
and cultural integration of the Central Asian peo-
ple into the Soviet Union as a whole.77 The undis-
puted achievements of the Soviet past include the 
development of a health care system. In 1913 
there were only 400 doctors and 900 other medi-
cal personnel in the whole of Central Asia, or only 
one medically trained worker for every 10,000 
inhabitants. By 1940 the number of doctors had 
been increased sevenfold, and by 1960 it had al-
                                                                                  
tion of the Central Asian region has, however, changed 
in the course of history. While the Kazakh Republic 
was not considered part of the Central Asian region 
during the Soviet era, even Afghanistan and the Xinji-
ang Autonomous Region (People's Republic of China) 
are sometimes regarded as parts of Central Asia today. 
See Mayhew / Plunkett / Richmond (2000). 
76 See Nove / Newth (1966) and Rashid (1994). Akiner 
(2002) describes the process known as National De-
limitation as having been relatively successful; 
Deutschland (1993), on the other hand, refers to an 
"arbitrary drawing of borders" (p. 1). The Tajik Re-
public included only 63 % of all Tajiks, and Samarkand 
and Bukhara were claimed by both Tajiks und Uzbeks 
– a continuing source of conflict, as was the division of 
the Ferghana Valley among the Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Ta-
jik Soviet Socialist Republics. 
77 Contemporary western observers also saw the Central 
Asian region as an "economically and culturally back-
ward area"; see Nove / Newth (1966), p. 14. 
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ready risen to 31,400.78 Considerable progress 
was also made in the educational sphere.79 During 
the 1926 census literacy rates in Central Asia were 
found to be between 2 to 3 % (Uzbeks) and 7 % 
(Kazakhs). In 1928 there were no more than 4.1 
teachers per 1,000 inhabitants in urban areas and 
only 0.9 in rural areas. A general bilingual educa-
tion system was then gradually established, and by 
the late 1960s illiteracy was a thing of the past.80 
These efforts, which were explicitly extended to 
include girls and women, were not confined to 
elementary education. By 1955 all Central Asian 
children were receiving at least seven years of 
education, and vocational and university training 
and the development of research institutes were 
also being promoted. 
In the economic and cultural spheres, however, 
criticism is levelled at the Soviet development 
agenda and its implementation.81 The economic 
policy measures were initially aimed at the estab-
lishment of an industrial base. In the 1920s and 
1930s the emphasis was placed on the develop-
ment of heavy industry and the exploitation of 
available mineral resources. In addition to the 
chemical, mining, oil and natural gas sectors, in-
vestments also began to be made in the expansion 
of cotton-growing in the late 1950s. Between 
1960 and 1990 the area given over to cotton dou-
bled, primarily in Uzbekistan and largely at the 
expense of food crops. As in the other Soviet re-
                                                     
78 See Nove / Newth (1966), pp. 87 f. In other parts of the 
Soviet Union the rates of growth in medical personnel 
were many times higher. 
79 See Nove / Newth (1966), pp. 67-75, and Akiner 
(2002), pp. 15-17. 
80 See Nove / Newth (1966), p. 71: "This astonishing 
improvement in education standards has not been 
achieved without constant pressure on the part of the 
authorities." It should be pointed out that even now il-
literacy has not been overcome in neighbouring coun-
tries. In 1997 65.3 % of population over 15 years of age 
were unable to read and write in Afghanistan, 26.6 % in 
Iran and 17.8 % in China. Comparative statistics can be 
found on the website of the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNES-
CO): http://www.unesco.org/ education/information/ 
wer/WEBtables/Ind2web.xls, 21 August 2002. 
81 See Akiner (2002). 
publics, agriculture was collectivized in Central 
Asia in the late 1920s. The nomadic way of life 
which had been dominant in the desert and steppe 
regions of Central Asia – and especially in Kazakh-
stan and Kyrgyzstan – was brought to an end de-
spite considerable resistance in some cases. In view 
of the ecological conditions, however, transhu-
mance, a form of nomadic pastoralism, was re-
tained. In spite of the efforts to industrialize, the 
economic structure of Central Asia continued to 
be largely dominated by agriculture. In 1990 agri-
culture accounted for about a third of the gross 
domestic product (GDP) of the Central Asian 
Soviet republics.82 Urbanization too was less pro-
nounced in Central Asia than the average for the 
countries of eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
In 1991 the urban population accounted for 31 % 
of the total population in Tajikistan, 38 % in Kyr-
gyzstan, 40 % in Uzbekistan and 45 % in Turk-
menistan, but 58 % in Kazakhstan.83 The Soviet 
economy featured a distinct North-South divide.84 
The main criticism voiced in the literature is that 
the Central Asian Soviet republics were integrated 
into the Soviet economy solely as suppliers of raw 
materials, which were processed elsewhere.85 
Rather than the development of decentralized, 
self-sufficient structures in the various Soviet 
republics, the Soviet economic model provided 
for regional specialization and complementarity.86 
The role allotted to Central Asia in this model has 
been compared to the integration into the world 
market of many states on the "classical" periphery 
and even led to the central government in Moscow 
being accused of colonialism.87 In return for the 
                                                     
82 The percentage was between 27 % (Kazakhstan) and 
34 % (Kyrgyzstan). See World Bank (2002f), pp. 209 f. 
83 In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union the equivalent 
figure was 64 % of the population. See UNDP (1993), 
p. 206. 
84 See Ahlberg (1990), p. 1172, who also refers to the 
"underdevelopment of Central Asia compared to the 
industrialized parts of the Soviet Union". 
85 See Akiner (2002). 
86 See Deutschland (1993). 
87 See, for example, Gumpel (1990) and Pomfret (1999). 
For a detailed discussion of the accusation of colonial-
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raw materials they supplied, however, the Central 
Asian republics received extensive financial trans-
fers from Moscow, which were used to build eco-
nomic and infrastructure capacities and  social 
policy institutions in Central Asia.88 
Today there is, on the other hand, no denying the 
damage to the environment caused by the inten-
sive efforts to increase the limited area of agricul-
tural land by means of large-scale irrigation pro-
jects. As a result, the lower reaches of the only 
two rivers flowing into the Aral Sea, the Amu-
Darya and the Syr-Darya, and so huge areas of 
what was once the fourth largest body of inland 
water in the world have dried up. This has led to 
serious salinization and contamination of water 
and soil in the Aral region, which has caused ma-
jor health problems, the destruction of the local 
fishing and canning industry, growing desertifica-
tion and climate changes.89 The soil and water 
pollution due to the large-scale use of pesticides 
and artificial fertilizers in the growing of cotton as 
a monoculture has primarily affected Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In Kazakhstan the 
environment has also been polluted by the Bai-
kanur space centre, radioactive fall-out from the 
Chinese province of Xinjiang and a series of nu-
clear tests carried out in the area of Semipalatinsk 
(now known as Semey) from 1949 to 1963.90 
The cultural integration of the Central Asian re-
publics into the Soviet Union as a whole is also 
criticized today as a "truly massive feat of social 
engineering".91 The changes intended as part of 
the Soviet development agenda affected all as-
                                                                                  
ism already being voiced at that time see Nove / Newth 
(1966), pp. 113 ff. 
88 See McAuley (1994), Capisani (2000) and Murthi / 
Pradhan / Scott (2002). 
89 Since 1960 the Aral Sea has decreased by 75 % in area 
and by 91 % in volume; see Giese (2002). Further 
background information can be found on the website of 
the Aral Sea programme of Médecins Sans Frontières: 
http://www.msf.org/aralsea/asa_dis.htm, 21 August 
2002. 
90 See Ahlberg (1990), Götz / Halbach (1996) and Repub-
lic of Kazakhstan (2002). 
91 Akiner (2002), p. 15. 
pects of human life, from architecture, clothing 
and leisure activities through family and employ-
ment structures to religion, language and writ-
ing.92 The attempt to create a common Soviet 
identity (homo sovieticus) was equivalent de facto 
to the Europeanization of Central Asia. This pro-
cess was exacerbated not least by the massive 
influx of Slav Soviet citizens, who accounted for a 
large proportion of the political and economic 
elites until the early 1990s.93 In addition, the So-
viet Union's external frontiers were sealed, which 
for Central Asia meant not only the interruption of 
traditional trade routes but also the end of cultural 
exchanges with neighbouring countries in the 
region – Iran, Afghanistan and China – and isola-
tion from the rest of the Islamic world. Practice of 
the Islamic religion was seriously restricted in the 
Soviet Union; there were, however, major re-
gional and intertemporal differences in the treat-
ment of Islam.94 
                                                     
92 In the area where the Turkic languages are spoken, the 
Arabic script gave way to the Latin alphabet in the late 
1920s, as in Turkey. From 1938, the Cyrillic alphabet 
was introduced throughout the Soviet Union. See Capi-
sani (2000), pp. 155 f. 
93 Akiner (2002) points out that even then there was no 
more than a partial change of elites, since many tradi-
tional political leaders were coopted into the Commu-
nist Party and education also did a great deal to open 
the way for social  advancement. 
94 After a wave of repression in the 1920s Stalin gave the 
Muslims their own religious administration, the mufti-
ate, in 1945. Under Khrushchev a further wave of anti-
Islamic repression occurred. In the Brezhnev era Uz-
bekistan, where the muftiate for Central Asia and Ka-
zakhstan was located, was declared a model of "Soviet 
Islam", while a de-Islamization campaign was simulta-
neously being conducted in Kyrgyzstan. A timetable of 
the events in Uzebekistan can be found in Herrfahrdt 
(2001), p. 138. 
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Even gauged by its own objectives, the implemen-
tation of the Soviet development agenda for Cen-
tral Asia can be regarded as no more than a lim-
ited success, since after seven decades it had ulti-
mately proved impossible to overcome the re-
gional disparities within the Soviet Union.95 From 
1940 to 1989 only the population of the Kazakh 
Soviet Republic succeeded in improving its rela-
tive income position from 88 % to 90 % of the 
average income in the Russian Federation.96 For 
all the other Central Asian Soviet republics the 
income disparities relative to the Russian Federa-
tion grew in this period. This process was particu-
larly pronounced in Tajikistan, where the average 
income fell from 108 % (1940) to 73 % (1989) of 
the level in the Russian Federation. The incidence 
of poverty was also far higher in the Central Asian 
republics in 1988 than in the Russian Federation. 
Central Asia accounted for half of all the poor in 
the Soviet Union, but for only 17 % of its popula-
tion (see also Chapter 4.2).97 Until the Soviet Un-
                                                     
95 See Hamilton (1989) and Atkinson / Micklewright 
(1992). 
96 Atkinson / Micklewright (1992), pp. 292 ff. 
97 See Falkingham (2002). 
ion collapsed, Central Asia, like the Caucasus, 
continued to belong to the periphery among the 
Soviet republics. 
3.2 The First Decade of Transformation 
after Communism 
The attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991 
aimed at restoring Communism was the immedi-
ate trigger for the collapse of the Soviet Union. At 
a time when Russia had already left the Union the 
Central Asian Soviet republics also declared their 
independence: Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan on 31 
August 1991, Tajikistan on 9 September 1991, 
Turkmenistan on 27 October 1991 and, finally, 
Kazakhstan on 16 December 1991. The newly 
established Central Asian states thus faced a 
threefold challenge, which has come to be known 
as the "triple transition": the consolidation of a 
national and state identity, the democratization of 
the political system and the reorganization of the 
economic system.98 
                                                     
98 Offe (1994), pp. 64 ff. See also Linn (2002). 
Box 3: The Central Asian Countries and Intra- and Supraregional Cooperation 
While there was hardly any contact among the Central Asian republics in Soviet times, their common problems 
today are such that regional cooperation is inevitable. These problems include, in particular, water and energy sup-
ply and the rearrangement of transport routes and trade flows, which were changed or interrupted by the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and the new national frontiers. Since 1993 work has therefore proceeded on the formation of a 
Central Asian Union, and a start has been made on the creation of a customs union embracing Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan and Uzbekistan. In 1996 the Central Asian Bank for Cooperation and Development was established. On 
Tajikistan's accession, the Central Asian Union was renamed the "Central Asian Economic Community" in 1998. 
Turkmenistan, which declared its perpetual neutrality in December 1995, has not yet joined this project. In prac-
tice, however, intraregional cooperation is still limited, despite the declarations and the institutions that have been 
set up, and this is increasingly seen as a security problem. Like Kazakhstan, which dominates economically and in 
size, the strategically situated and heavily populated Uzbekistan is accused of having hegemonic aspirations. 
All the Central Asian countries have acceded to the CIS – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan having also 
joined the CIS customs union with Russia and Belarus – and, together with Turkey, Pakistan and Iran, they are 
members of the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO). The Central Asian countries, excluding Turkmeni-
stan, form, with Russia and China, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which has espoused the cause of 
security cooperation. TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia), an EU programme for the develop-
ment of East-West transport routes, unites the Central Asian and Caucasian countries, Ukraine, Moldavia, Roma-
nia, Bulgaria and Turkey. The Central Asian countries are also members of the United Nations, the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Re-
construction and Development (EBRD), the IMF and the World Bank. Currently, the only member of the World 
Trade Organization is Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan having observer status. 
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3.2.1 Political and Socio-cultural 
Developments 
With the exception of Kazakhstan, where anti-
Russian demonstrations had occurred as early as 
1986, there had been very few separatist efforts in 
the Central Asian Soviet republics.99 Furthermore, 
as none of the Central Asian Soviet republics had 
existed as an independent state at any time in his-
tory, autonomy as nation states was as much an 
unexpected as a new challenge for the countries of 
the region.100 All the Central Asian countries have 
multiethnic populations, although this is hardly 
ever taken into account in the construction of a 
national identity that has been the aim of each 
country's titular ethnic group since independence. 
Thus the gradual ousting of the previous lingua 
franca (Russian) from the administration and the 
workplace has caused major problems for the 
various ethnic minorities. In Kazakhstan, which is 
home to 150 different ethnic groups, only 40 % of 
the population belonged to the titular ethnic group 
in 1990, the figure in Kyrgyzstan being 52 % and 
in Tajikistan 63 %.101 Ethnic diversity was at its 
lowest in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where, 
respectively, 71 % and 73 % of the population 
belonged to the titular ethnic group. 
Political reorganization was launched in the Cen-
tral Asian countries with the adoption of new con-
                                                     
99 During the period of perestroika all that was demanded 
was greater autonomy within the Soviet Union. How-
ever, some violent, ethnically motivated confrontations 
did occur. See Rashid (1994) and von Gumppenberg 
(2002b). 
100 Until the Soviet era Central Asia, previously known as 
Turkestan, had been inhabited by nomadic tribes, which 
were organized into fairly large confederations in the 
Kazakh region. Since the 16th century there had also 
been three khanates, which developed into important 
economic, cultural and religious centres (Bukhara, 
Khiva and Kokand). See Capisani (2000) and Rasizade 
(2002). 
101 In Kazakhstan the other population groups were 
primarily ethnic Russians (38 %), Germans (6 %) and 
Ukrainians (5 %), the main groups in Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan being ethnic Uzbeks (24 % and 13 % re-
spectively) and Russian (8 % and 22 %). See Izvorski 
(1999), p. 7. 
stitutions and the abolition of the Supreme Sovi-
ets. First in this respect was Turkmenistan in 
1992. Bicameral systems have since been intro-
duced in Kazakhstan (1994), Kyrgyzstan (1995) 
and Tajikistan (1999), and Uzbekistan is prepar-
ing to take this step. In all the countries of the 
region a central role is played by the presidents, 
who have been in office since Soviet times, the 
exception being Tajikistan, where the old nomenk-
latura was removed in 1992.102 Their strong posi-
tion forms, as it were, the pinnacle of a network of 
clientele and patronage relations that survived the 
Soviet era.103 The appointment of strong presi-
dents with an autocratic style of leadership has 
been interpreted as an attempt to encourage cohe-
sion in society in view of the absence of a national 
identity.104 Another declared motive was the pre-
vention of civil war as in Tajikistan.105 Presiden-
tial and parliamentary elections in the region have 
not, as a rule, met the OSCE's standards. Opposi-
tion parties, where they exist, encounter massive 
obstruction and have been unable to develop into 
separate power centres. The curtailment of de-
mocratic rights and freedoms and widespread 
violations of human rights have led to interna-
tional criticism of the Central Asian govern-
ments.106 Even in Kyrgyzstan, where initially a 
                                                     
102 See Allnutt / Druker / Tracy (2001), who refer to "su-
per-presidentialism". Furthermore, the Turkmen Presi-
dent in particular is pursuing a very marked personality 
cult. 
103 See von Gumppenberg (2002a). Akiner (2002), p. 17, 
reports on a reconfiguration of the networks surround-
ing the Soviet-era khans. The interpersonal networks 
known as "clans" are not based solely on kinship. 
104 See, for example, Dshalalow (1999) and Kangas (1999). 
105 The civil war sparked by ethnic and ideological differ-
ences and by tribal and regional conflicts began in 1992 
and was formally brought to an end in 1997 with the 
signing of the General Agreement on Peace and Na-
tional Reconciliation in Tajikistan. It cost some 50,000 
lives, and half a million people were displaced. In most 
parts of Tajikistan today the situation is relaxed; the 
level of politically motivated violence is still high, 
however. Background information can be found on 
Amnesty International's website: http://www.amnesty. 
de/, 21 August 2002. 
106 See, for example, Amnesty International (2001), Free-
dom House (2001) and Moder (2002). 
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rather liberal climate prevailed and an active civil 
society emerged, human rights violations are now 
a frequent occurrence. The situation is, however, 
most serious in Turkmenistan, which, according to 
the US civil rights organization Freedom House, 
is one of the world's twelve most repressive re-
gimes.107 
In the context of autocratic rule the re-Islam-
ization of Central Asia has been interpreted as a 
means of constructing political legitimacy and 
forging links to a cultural and religious heritage. 
"Indeed, Islam has to some extent taken the place 
of Marxist ideology as state dogma."108 In the 
revival of Islamic traditions, however, significant 
regional differences are to be seen: while there are 
deep religious foundations to build on in the 
Ferghana Valley, for example, the relationship 
with Islam in northern Central Asia is cultural 
rather than religious.109 The separation of religion 
and state is enshrined in the constitutions of the 
Central Asian countries, but in Uzbekistan in par-
ticular re-Islamization is promoted by the gov-
ernment.110 At the same time, repeated terrorist 
attacks occur especially in the Ferghana Valley, 
which includes Uzbek, Kyrgyz and Tajik territory, 
the suspected perpetrators being Islamist 
groups.111 Local and human rights groups report, 
however, that accusations of Islamism and terror-
ism are deliberately used against religious and lay 
                                                     
107 See Freedom House (2002). 
108 Akiner (2002), p. 24. 
109 With Sunnis, Shiites, Ismailis, Wahabis and Sufis, 
different Islamic traditions are, moreover, represented 
in the region. The religions practised also include 
Shamanism, Zoroastrianism and Christianity. See Ca-
pisani (2000). 
110 Muslims who practise their faith outside the mosques 
authorized by the state can expect to be persecuted 
harshly. See Malashenko (2002) and Veser (2002). 
111 Both the transnational Hizb-ut-Tahrir-al-Islami (Is-
lamic Liberation Party), which recruits its members 
from the educated sections of the population, and the 
Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which oper-
ates primarily in the rural areas surrounding the 
Ferghana Valley, are calling for the establishment of a 
caliphate state in Central Asia – the former without, the 
latter with the use of violence. See Akbarzadeh (2001), 
Halbach (2002) and Schatz (2002). 
opposition groups.112 Besides its political func-
tion, re-Islamization is also having an initial im-
pact on the gender situation in the region, which 
in Soviet times was characterized by the postulate 
of nominally legal equality. Thus education was 
compulsory for girls, and women were encour-
aged to pursue gainful activities. Equal participa-
tion in working life was, however, impeded by a 
very high birth rate in the Soviet era, especially as 
the domestic division of labour had remained un-
changed.113 A stronger commitment to the tradi-
tional role  of women has been encouraged by the 
economic upheaval of the past decade, which has 
led to massive job losses and the closure of many 
nursery schools (see also Chapter 4.1).114 
3.2.2 Economic Transformation 
The challenges associated with the change from a 
planned to a market economy were greater in Cen-
tral Asia than in many other transition coun-
tries.115 The existing economic structures were in 
no way geared to national sovereignty, and the 
previous trade and transport routes, which had all 
passed through the Russian Federation, were in-
terrupted. National independence was accompa-
nied by an abrupt end to the budget transfers from 
Moscow and the withdrawal of the military indus-
trial complex from the region. This was joined by 
a brain drain, as several hundred thousand Rus-
sians – including many highly qualified specialists 
– left Central Asia after independence. However, 
the region has a relatively well educated popula-
tion, and Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in 
particular, but Uzbekistan too, are rich in natural 
                                                     
112 See Cheterian (2001). The number of political detain-
ees in Uzbekistan is estimated at 7,600; see Halbach 
(2002). 
113 See UNDP (2002), pp. 191 f. The number of births per 
woman in the 1970s still averaged 3.5 in Kazakhstan, 
4.7 in Kyrgyzstan, 6.2 in Turkmenistan, 6.3 in Uzbeki-
stan und 6.8 in Tajikistan. However, there were major 
differences between urban and rural areas. Recently, 
total fertility rates have fallen sharply (see Table 11). 
114 See von Gumppenberg (1999), Handrahan (2001), 
Herrfahrdt (2001), Mee (2001) and Kudabaewa (2002). 
115 See Linn (2002) and Akiner (2002). 
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ticular, but Uzbekistan too, are rich in natural 
resources, although only limited processing of the 
raw materials is done in Central Asia itself.116 
Furthermore, the wealth of natural resources, es-
pecially oil, has long been regarded as a mixed 
blessing in the development context.117 
A summary overview of the progress made by 
Central Asia until 2001 in changing from planned 
to market economy can be seen in Table 3. Meas-
ured with the EBRD's yardstick, Kyrgyzstan and 
                                                     
116 Kazakhstan is the second largest oil producer in the 
CIS, it has natural gas, mineral, gold, copper, coal, zinc 
and iron ore reserves, and it is a major wheat exporter. 
Turkmenistan is the world's fourth largest natural gas 
producer, has significant oil reserves and grows cotton 
and wheat. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are likely to 
derive considerable benefit from new discoveries of oil 
in the Caspian Sea. Uzbekistan is the world's second 
largest cotton exporter and produces gold, uranium, 
copper, oil and natural gas. Kyrgyzstan has the world's 
seventh largest gold mine, exports hydroelectric power 
and produces cereals, vegetables, cotton, tobacco and 
silk. Tajikistan grows cotton, wheat, fruit and vegeta-
bles, produces aluminium, mines gold, silver, zinc and 
coal and generates hydroelectric power. See EBRD 
(2001a), EBRD (2001b), EBRD (2001c), EBRD 
(2001d) and EBRD (2001e). 
117  See Sachs / Warner (1997). For a discussion of possible 
problems stemming from the Central Asian transition 
countries' wealth of natural resources see Auty (1999). 
Kazakhstan have already undertaken important 
reforms in some key areas, while Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan occupy a medium position.118 The 
Turkmen government, on the other hand, has 
sought to keep its explicit promise to initiate 
transformation with "ten years of well-being" 
[sic!] essentially by resorting to structural conser-
vatism.119 Particularly in the areas of competition 
policy and price liberalization and in the reform of 
the financial sector the Central Asian countries are 
still lagging well behind the other transition coun-
tries. Only in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do 
state-owned enterprises subject to soft budget 
constraints contribute significantly less than 50 % 
to GDP.120 
                                                     
118 For a comparative discussion of the different reform 
paths taken by Kazakhstan, which is committed to the 
"Washington Consensus", and by Uzbekistan with its 
gradualist strategy see Alam / Banerji (2000). 
119 Quoted from Capisani (2000), p. 149. See also World 
Bank (2001d), p. 18: "The 10 Year Plan envisages the 
transformation of thecountry’s centrally planned econ-
omy to a socially oriented market economy, without so-
cial or economic turmoil and conflict." 
120  The term "soft budget constraint" was coined by Kornai 
(1986). 
Table 3: Transition Indicators for Central Asia, 2002 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Price liberalizationa 3 3  3 2  2 
Trade and foreign exchange 
systema 
3+ 4    3+ 1  2– 
Privatizationa 
- small-scale 
- large-scale 
 
4 
3 
 
4 
3 
 
   4– 
   2+ 
 
2 
1 
 
 3 
 3– 
Competition policya 2 2    2– 1  2 
Financial institutionsa 
- Banking reform and interest 
rate liberalisation 
- Securities markets and non-
bank financial institutions 
 
3– 
 
2+ 
 
 2+ 
 
2 
 
   2– 
 
 1 
 
1 
 
1 
 
 2– 
 
 2 
Private sector share of GDP (%)          65          60 50          25          45 
a Ranking from 1 (little progress) to 4+ (standards and performance typical of advanced industrial economies) 
Source:  EBRD (2002) 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 19 
The development of a market economy will thus 
require numerous other reforms, including some 
not covered by the EBRD’s yardstick. Kazakh-
stan, one of the first countries in the region to 
undertake reforms, is, for example, associated 
with "unrestrained crony-capitalism".121 In other 
words, interest groups have hitherto monopolized 
the transformation process for their own ends 
through corruption and state capture. Corruption, 
in this context, affects the enforcement of existing 
laws, while state capture influences the process of 
establishing the legislative and regulatory frame-
work to the benefit of certain groups and indi-
viduals.122 While both corruption and state capture 
are found at a high level in Kyrgyzstan, the two 
phenomena do not always occur simultaneously. 
Thus while corruption is widespread in Uzbeki-
stan and Kazakhstan, the capture economy index 
indicates limited state capture by the business 
sector in both countries.123 
                                                     
121  Pomfret (1998), p. 17. 
122  See Hellman / Jones / Kaufmann (2000) and Hellman / 
Kaufmann (2001). 
123 See Hellman / Jones / Kaufmann (2000) and Allnutt / 
Druker / Tracy (2001). No data on Tajikistan and Turk-
menistan are given. Transparency International's Cor-
ruption Perceptions Index includes data only on Ka-
zakhstan und Uzbekistan. See http://www.trans-
A detailed analysis of post-Soviet economic pol-
icy in Central Asia cannot be undertaken here.124 
However, an overview of the trend in a number of 
important economic indicators since the early 
1990s will be given.125 In all the Central Asian 
countries the first half of the last decade was 
characterized by negative rates of growth in real 
GDP of up to 29 % in a single calendar year (see 
Table 4). 
From 1996 the growth rates in Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyzstan and Uzbekistan were mostly positive; in 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan this trend began 
somewhat later. Although the region has featured 
high growth rates in recent years, none of the Cen-
tral Asian countries except Uzbekistan had been 
able to achieve its 1989 GDP level by 2001. The 
cumulative decline in GDP was least pronounced 
in the case of the two slow reformers Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan, which achieved 105 % and 
96 %, respectively, of their 1989 GDP level in 
2001. In Tajikistan, on the other hand, GDP in 
2001 was only 56 % of its 1989 level, mainly 
                                                                                  
parency.org/cpi/, 21 August 2002. See also Jones Lu-
ong (2003). 
124  See Gürgen et al. (1999). 
125  For the reliability of Central Asian economic data and 
their limited informative value in the face of a growing 
informal sector see Alam / Banerji (2000) and Pomfret 
(2002). 
Table 4: Economic Growth during Transformation 
 Rates of growth in real gross domestic product (GDP) Indexa 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 '89=100
Kazakhstan -0.4 -11.0 -5.3 -9.3 -12.6 -8.2 0.5 1.7 -1.9 2.7 9.8 13.2 7.6  84 
Kyrgyzstan 3.0 -5.0 -19.0 -16.0 -20.1 -5.4 7.1 9.9 2.1 3.7 5.1 5.3 2.0  71 
Tajikistan -1.6 -7.1 -29.0 -11.0 -18.9 -12.5 -4.4 1.7 5.3 3.7 8.3 10.3 7.0  56 
Turkmenistan 2.0 -4.7 -5.3 -10.0 -17.3 -7.2 -6.7 -11.3 5.0 16.0 17.6 12.0 13.5  96 
Uzbekistan 1.6 -0.5 -11.1 -2.3 -4.2 -0.9 1.6 2.5 4.4 4.1 4.0 4.5 2.5  105 
CIS -0.4 -6.0 -17.4 -12.7 -14.1 -4.9 -3.4 1.0 -3.7 4.5 7.9 5.9 4.4  64 
Central Europe/ 
Baltic states 
-6.6 -10.3 -2.2 0.3 3.9 5.4 4.7 5.0 3.6 2.8 4.0 2.5 2.3  113 
Transition 
countries  
-3.3 -8.1 -11.0 -6.9 -6.1 -0.2 0.1 2.3 -1.0 3.0 5.5 4.2 3.4  76 
a Real GDP level in 2001 
Source: EBRD (2002) 
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because of the civil war. It was the only Central 
Asian country to lag behind the CIS average. Like 
Kyrgyzstan, it also fell below the average for all 
transition countries. The whole region fared far 
less well than the Central European and Baltic 
transition countries. 
The economic crisis triggered by transformation 
in Central Asia in the first half of the 1990s was 
also reflected in very high rates of inflation (see 
Table 5). All the Central Asian countries except 
Kyrgyzstan experienced four-digit rates of price 
increases between 1992 and 1995, i.e. immedi-
ately after secession from the Soviet Union. Only 
towards the end of the decade did it become pos-
sible to reduce inflation rates significantly. They 
remained high, however, in Turkmenistan and 
Tajikistan, at 22.8 % and 12.8 %, respectively. 
Table 5 shows that the rates of price increases in 
the Central Asian countries were far higher than in 
the other transition countries. This is particularly 
apparent from a comparison with Central Europe 
and the Baltic states, but also when the whole 
post-Communist region is considered. 
The trend in employment in the first decade of 
transformation is shown in Table 6. In 1989 the 
five Central Asian countries still had very high 
employment ratios compared to Western Europe. 
They reflected both the scale of employment 
among women and the "right to work" that was 
guaranteed during the Soviet era, but often re-
sulted in "unemployment on the job" and so to 
concealed unemployment.126 From 1989 to 1999 
the employment ratio fell by 19.4 % in Tajikistan, 
by 14.2 % in Kazakhstan and by 9.7 % in Kyr-
gyzstan. The fall was far less pronounced in 
Turkmenistan, at 6.0 %, and Uzbekistan, at 5.5 %.  
These differences in the decline in employment 
were due, on the one hand, to the scale of the 
market economy reforms hitherto undertaken, and 
especially the reforms in the enterprise sector (see 
Table 3). On the other hand, they reflect such 
contextual factors as the civil war in Tajikistan, 
which caused serious labour market problems. 
Table 6 shows that, as a rule, the decline in em-
ployment began before independence, when the 
Soviet Union was in economic crisis and the crea-
tion of new jobs could not keep pace with the high 
birth rates in Central Asia (see also Table 11).127 
Youth unemployment is a major problem today, 
particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, where 
young people between the ages of 15 and 24 ac-
counted for, respectively, 59.0 % and 40.6 % of 
                                                     
126  Götting (1998), p. 64. See also Kausch et al. (1994). 
127  See Ahlberg (1990) and Gumpel (1990). 
Table 5: Inflation during Transformationa  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Kazakhstan n.a. 78.8 1381.0 1662.3 1892.0 176.3 39.1 17.4 7.3 8.3 13.2 8.4 6.0 
Kyrgyzstan n.a. 85.0 855.0 772.4 228.7 40.7 31.3 25.5 12.0 35.8 18.7 7.0 2.5 
Tajikistan 4.0 112.0 1157.0 2195.0 350.0 609.0 418.0 88.0 43.2 27.6 32.9 38.6 12.8 
Turkmenistan 4.6 103.0 493.0 3102.0 1748.0 1005.3 992.4 83.7 16.8 24.2 8.3 11.6 9.6 
Uzbekistan 3.1 82.2 645.0 534.0 1568.0 304.6 54.0 58.9 17.8 29.1 24.2 26.2 22.8 
CISb n.a. 93.4 1064.0 1426.0 1616.0 251.0 44.0 17.0 11.0 26.0 20.0 11.0 7.0 
Central Europe/ 
Baltic statesb 
23.1 117.7 207.3 35.3 32.2 25.0 17.6 8.5 7.9 4.2 6.2 5.5 2.3 
Transition 
countriesb 
24.7 100.5 899.7 534.0 131.6 40.2 24.1 14.8 10.6 9.2 9.9 7.3 5.1 
a Change in annual average retail/consumer price level, in per cent  
b  Median 
Source: EBRD (2002) 
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total unemployment.128 It is generally noticeable 
that the decline in employment in all the Central  
Asian countries as shown in the statistics was far 
higher than that revealed by the official unem-
ployment figures.129 
Table 7 sheds some light on the foreign trade 
situation of the Central Asian countries in the first 
decade of transformation. Given the wealth of raw 
materials, there was considerable initial optimism, 
                                                     
128  Youth unemployment was 28.9 % in Kazakhstan and 
15.8 % in Kyrgyzstan. No data were available for 
Turkmenistan. See UNICEF (2001). 
129  The EBRD (2001f) gives the following official unem-
ployment rates for 1999: 6.0 % in Kazakhstan, 5.4 % in 
Kyrgyzstan, 4.3 % in Uzbekistan and 2.8 % in Tajiki-
stan. Actual unemployment is likely to have been far 
higher, however. 
particularly in Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, 
especially as the transition to world market prices 
improved both countries' terms of trade, by 50 % 
and 19 %, respectively.130 However, the practical 
difficulties of selling in the world market the oil 
and natural gas that was produced soon became 
apparent. The export of oil and natural gas is ham-
pered primarily by the Central Asian countries' 
lack of access to the sea, which makes it difficult 
for them to penetrate new markets. The existing 
pipelines were badly maintained and led to less-
than-solvent CIS countries, where the oil and gas 
were bartered rather than exchanged for foreign 
                                                     
130  See Pomfret (2002), p. 32. 
Table 6: Employment Ratios in Central Asiaa 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Kazakhstan 82.6 81.4 79.9 78.0 71.2 68.2 69.1 69.5 69.8 67.0 68.4 
Kyrgyzstan 74.3 73.2 72.3 74.8 67.3 64.8 64.1 63.5 64.0 63.6 64.6 
Tajikistan 72.6 72.4 71.7 68.3 65.8 64.7 63.4 58.1 58.8 57.2 53.2 
Turkmenistan 77.9 74.1 73.7 73.2 72.6 72.4 72.5 72.0 72.6 73.1 71.9 
Uzbekistan 72.0 73.9 75.3 73.7 71.9 71.3 70.2 69.4 68.6 67.7 66.5 
a  Number of employed as % of 15-59 population 
Source: UNICEF (2001) 
Table 7: Current Account Balance during Transformationa 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Kazakhstan 0.0 -7.9 -7.8 -1.3  -3.6 -3.6  -5.6 -1.0 2.2 -7.8 -5.5 
Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. -6.9 -13.9  -21.4 -7.8  -25.0 -19.5 -11.6 -3.4 -2.9 
Tajikistan n.a. -28.8 -17.8 -16.0  -7.1 -5.4  -9.1 -3.4 -6.4 -6.9 -4.1 
Turkmenistan 68.5 14.1 4.0 0.9  0.1 -25.3  -37.4 -24.8 15.2 -2.5 0.8 
Uzbekistan -12.0 -8.4 2.1 -0.2  -7.8 -5.4  -0.4 -2.0 2.8 -0.5 0.6 
CISb 1.3 -13.5 -7.7 -6.7  -8.8 -10.0  -13.7 -6.5 -0.8 -2.6 -3.9 
Central 
Europe/ Baltic 
statesb 
3.2 1.3 0.0 -2.8  -5.7 -6.8  -6.8 -6.3 -4.7 -4.9 -4.7 
Transition  
countriesb  
0.8 -7.0 -4.9 -5.1  -8.1 -9.0  -10.1 -6.7 -3.7 -5.1 -5.5 
a  Deficit / surplus in % of GDP  
b  Unweighted average 
Source: EBRD (2002) 
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currencies.131 The falling world market prices of 
cotton and gold and the major price fluctuations in 
the oil market also contributed to the Central 
Asian countries' external imbalances.132 Table 7 
shows that the current-account situation was far 
less stable in Central Asia than in the other transi-
tion countries, which, although similarly affected 
by the collapse of the old foreign trade structures, 
were less dependent on imports than the Central 
Asian countries. Turkmenistan's balance on cur-
rent account was affected by the most extreme 
fluctuations, which ranged from a surplus of 
68.5 % of GDP in 1992 to a deficit of 37.4 % of 
GDP in 1998. 
The financing of the post-Soviet economic model 
in Central Asia is shown in Table 8. None of the 
Central Asian countries except Kazakhstan has so 
far benefited from much foreign direct invest-
ment, which is not surprising given that property 
                                                     
131  The construction of new pipelines, however, requires 
supranational cooperation, which is not always easy to 
achieve in an unstable region. For an overview of the 
oil and natural gas pipelines already in existence, under 
construction or planned see EBRD (2001a), p. 17. See 
also Jaffe (1999) and Pomfret (2002).  
132  See EBRD (2001f), p. 65. 
rights are not well protected and economic re-
forms have been slow.133 
Cumulative direct investment has been lower in 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – US $ 23 and US $ 28 
per capita, respectively – than in any other transi-
tion country. Only in Kazakhstan and Turkmeni-
stan, which have extensive oil and natural gas 
reserves, has foreign direct investment exceeded 
the CIS average of US $ 167 per capita.134 Foreign 
direct investment in Central Europe and the Baltic 
states was, at US $ 1,154 per capita, many times 
higher, however. Official development assistance 
in 2000 exceeded the per capita average for the 
transition countries (US $ 18.7) only in Kyr-
gyzstan and Tajikistan.135 ODA payments to these 
                                                     
133  Land, for example, may not be owned at all or may not 
be owned by foreigners, the ban also extending to leas-
ing in some cases. Other factors are considerable legal 
uncertainty, the absence of an independent judiciary 
and, in Uzbekistan's case, a currency that is not freely 
convertible. See EBRD (2001a), EBRD (2001b), 
EBRD (2001c), EBRD (2001d) and EBRD (2001e). 
134 Alam / Banerji (2000) point out, however, that foreign 
direct investment in extractive oil and gas enclaves has 
very limited multiplier effects. 
135  Kyrgyzstan, which still receives the highest develop-
ment assistance payments of all the Central Asian coun-
Table 8: Development Financing in Central Asia 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Foreign direct investment 
(1989-2000) 
- in US $ m 
- per capita, in US $ 
 
 
 
 8,593 
 577 
 
 
 
 440 
 93 
 
 
 
 144 
 23 
 
 
 
 913 
 171 
 
 
 
 697 
 28 
Offical development assis-
tance (ODA), 2000 
- in US $ m 
- per capita, in US $ 
- in % of GDP 
 
 
 
 189.1 
 11.7 
 1.0 
 
 
 
 215.0 
 43.7 
 16.5 
 
 
 
 142.3 
 23.4 
 14.4 
 
 
 
 31.5 
 6.7 
 0.7 
 
 
 
 185.9 
 7.5 
 2.4 
Foreign debt, 1998-2000 
- total, in US $ m 
- PV ÷ XGSa 
- PV ÷ GNIb 
 
 
 6,664 
 81 
 36 
 
 
 1,829 
 242 
 106 
 
 
 1,170 
 136 
 88 
 
 
 n.a. 
 n.a. 
 n.a. 
 
 
 4,340 
 129 
 n.a. 
a  Present value of debt service ÷ exports of goods and services 
b Present value of debt service ÷ gross national income 
Source:  EBRD (2001f), UNDP (2002) and World Bank (2002a) 
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two countries amounted to 16.5 % and 14.4 % of 
GDP, respectively. In Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, on the other hand, development 
assistance payments were comparatively low. 
Given the logistical support the Central Asian 
countries provided for the military intervention in 
Afghanistan, foreign aid is expected to increase.136 
In view of the loss of transfer payments from 
Moscow and the serious foreign trade imbalances, 
which have been further exacerbated by the Rus-
sian crisis, the Central Asian countries took to 
borrowing more abroad.137 Although Central Asia 
was free from debt when the economic change 
began, the current value of debt service at the end 
of the 1990s was well above export earnings, es-
pecially in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are now classified as 
                                                                                  
tries, was initially regarded as the "wunderkind of the 
international donor community". See Gleason (2001), 
p. 5. 
136  See Rasizade (2002), von Gumppenberg (2002a) and 
World Bank (2002a). Troops of the anti-terrorism coali-
tion are based in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajiki-
stan. Tajik and Kazakh airfields are also being used for 
military operations, and even neutral Turkmenistan has 
granted overflight rights. 
137 For the effects of the Russian crisis on the Central 
Asian region see Pastor / Damjanovic (2001).  
severely indebted, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
as moderately indebted.138 
4 Poverty in Central Asia 
4.1 Human Development and Social 
Situation 
Despite the controversy over the Soviet legacy in 
Central Asia (see Chapter 3.1), it is agreed that 
major efforts were made to improve the social 
situation during the seven decades of Commu-
nism. How UNDP assesses the present state of 
human development in Central Asia is shown in 
Table 9.139 Although the Central Asian countries 
have lagged well behind the average HDI for the 
transition countries, they have still done much 
better than the average for the developing coun-
                                                     
138  World Bank (2002a), p. 121. See also IMF / World 
Bank (2001). 
139  UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI) depicts the 
three basic dimensions of human development – a 
long, healthy life, knowledge and a decent standard of 
living. These three dimensions are operationalized by 
life expectancy, adult literacy and gross enrolment ra-
tios and by GDP per capita (PPP US $). For the meth-
odology see UNDP (2002). 
Table 9: Basic Indicators of Human Development in Central Asia, 2000 
 Human Devel-
opment Index 
(HDI) 
Life expec-
tancy at birth 
(years) 
Adult literacy 
rate (%) 
School and 
university atten-
dance (%)a 
GDP per capita 
(PPP US$) 
Kazakhstan 0.750 64.6 98.0 77  5,871 
Kyrgyzstan 0.712 67.8 97.0 68  2,711 
Tajikistan 0.667 67.6 99.2 67  1,152 
Turkmenistan 0.741 66.2 98.0 81  3,956 
Uzbekistan 0.727 69.0 99.2 76  2,441 
Transition countries 0.783 68.6 99.3 77  6,930 
Developing countries 0.654 64.7 73.7 61  3,783 
OECD 0.905 76.8 n.a. 87  23,569 
a Combined indicator of primary, secondary and tertiary gross enrolment in the relevant age group (1999) 
Source: UNDP (2002) 
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tries. However, the considerable disparities within 
the Central Asian region are also becoming appar-
ent. Thus, in the global HDI ranking, which 
ranges from 1 (Norway) to 173 (Sierra Leone), the 
Central Asian countries lie between 79th and 
112th place, with Kazakhstan and Tajikistan form-
ing the two regional extremes (see also Table 10). 
With almost completely literate populations, a 
comparatively high life expectancy and a high 
level of education, all the Central Asian countries 
today fall into the "medium human development" 
category.140 With the exception of Kazakhstan, 
however, all the Central Asian countries were 
low-income countries in 2000.141 Tajikistan even 
fell as low as a mere 30 % of average per capita 
GDP for the developing countries. Once the So-
viet Union's poorhouse (see Table 14), it is now 
one of the world's poorest countries.142 The only 
Central Asian country not to reach the average life 
expectancy for the developing countries, on the 
other hand, was Kazakhstan. The main reason for 
this was the mortality rate among middle-aged 
men, which is almost as high in Kazakhstan as it 
                                                     
140  In the light of the analysis undertaken in Chapter 3.2 
the high ranking of Turkmenistan in particular does, 
however, reveal the limits to the HDI approach. 
141  See World Bank (2001e), p. 334. However, Turkmeni-
stan has meanwhile moved up into the group of lower 
middle income countries, in which Kazakhstan is also 
to be found; see World Bank (2002f). 
142 See World Bank (2000d) und Schmid (2001). In terms 
of per capita GNI Tajikistan was the world's seventh 
poorest country in 2000. See the World Bank's statis-
tics: http://www.worldbank.org/data/databytopic/ 
GNPPC.pdf, 22 January 2003. 
is in Russia.143 Only 47.6 % of boys born in Ka-
zakhstan can expect to survive until the age of 65, 
as compared to 72.7 % of new-born girls.144 
From the data presented in Table 9 it can be con-
cluded that the Central Asian countries have 
reached a far higher level of human development 
than their per capita income indicates, but this is 
not the only relevant angle from which to view the 
situation. An intertemporal comparison of HDI 
rankings in fact reveals that the Central Asian 
countries are steadily falling to the lower places 
(see Table 10). The region has been unable to 
equal the progress in human development made in 
other regions of the world. In the case of Turk-
menistan and Kazakhstan, the latter having been 
placed in the high human development category 
as recently as 1990, there is evidence of a decline 
in the HDI. Various indicators of human devel-
opment are used in the following to show the ef-
fects that transformation had on the social situa-
tion in Central Asia. Wherever possible, data on 
the final Soviet decade are included so that the 
latest development trends may be seen in context. 
                                                     
143  See UNICEF (2001), p. 138. 
144  A contributory factor here is likely to be the high per-
centage of Russians living in Kazakhstan, since the 
gender gaps in the other Central Asian countries are far 
narrower. The probability of surviving until 65 was 
57.8 % (men) and 75.3 % (women) in Kyrgyzstan, 
62.7 % (men) and 73.6 % (women) in Tajikistan, 
56.9 % (men) and 71.7 % (women) in Turkmenistan 
and 62.9 % (men) and 75.0 % (women) in Uzbekistan. 
See UNDP (2002), pp. 203 f. 
Table 10: Comparison of Human Development in Central Asia, 1990-2000  
Human Development Index (HDI) HDI ranking  
1990 2000 1990 2000 
Kazakhstan 0.802 0.750 54  79 
Kyrgyzstan 0.689 0.712 83  102 
Tajikistan 0.657 0.667 88  112 
Turkmenistan 0.746 0.741 66  87 
Uzbekistan 0.695 0.727 80  95 
Sources: UNDP (1993) and UNDP (2002) 
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Table 11 shows that life expectancy in Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan worsened in the 
first decade of independence. By 1999 the life 
expectancy of both sexes in Kazakhstan had even 
fallen below its 1980 level. Only the data for 
Turkmenistan reveal a trend in the opposite direc-
tion. Some studies ascribe the significant increase 
in mortality, which is also to be seen in other tran-
sition countries, to transformation-induced psy-
chosocial stress.145 The gender-specific differ-
ences in life expectancy are, however, so pro-
nounced that reference is made to the phenome-
non of the "missing men".146 The life expectancy 
of Russian men was far lower than that of women 
even in Soviet times, this being attributed to the 
gender-specific differences in alcohol and ciga-
rette consumption. 
Despite the decline in life expectancy, the Central 
Asian countries again experienced a substantial 
increase in population during the transformation 
decade. An exception was Kazakhstan, whose 
population decreased by 9 % in the last decade, 
largely because of the emigration of a large propor-  
                                                     
145  See UNICEF (1995) and UNDP (1998). 
146  See Ellman (2000), p. 136, and Powell (2002). 
tion of the Slav population.147 Population growth 
has been particularly high in Turkmenistan 
(71 %), Tajikistan (59 %) and Uzbekistan (56 %) 
in the last twenty years. This has been due to 
very high total fertility rates, with four to six 
births per woman in 1980 in all the Central Asian 
countries except Kazakhstan. Although the trans-
formation years have seen a sharp drop in birth 
rates, by almost 50 % in Turkmenistan and Taji-
kistan, peak figures are still being achieved in the 
region compared to the other transition coun-
tries.148 The coincidence of a rapidly growing 
population and a shrinking economy due to trans-
formation has increased the pressure on the exist-
ing social policy institutions in the Central Asian 
countries, as will be evident from the following 
indicators. 
Table 12 sheds light on a number of health and 
nutrition indicators. From 1990 to 1998 Kazakh-
stan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular ex-
perienced a serious reduction in available medical 
staff, the only increase occurring in Uzbekistan. 
The trend in maternal mortality, which is very 
high in the Caucasus, Russia, Romania and Lat-
                                                     
147  In 1994 alone net external migration amounted to more 
than 400,000 people. See UNICEF (2001), p. 123. 
148  See UNICEF (2001), p. 128. 
Table 11: Trends in some Demographic Indicators in Central Asia 
 Year Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Life expectancy at birth, 
men 
1980 
1990 
1999 
61.6 
63.2 
60.3 
61.1 
64.2 
63.1 
 63.7 
 66.8 
 65.6a 
61.1 
62.4 
63.4 
64.0 
66.1 
n.a. 
Life expectancy at birth, 
women 
1980 
1990  
1999 
71.9 
72.7 
71.0 
70.1 
72.6 
71.1 
 68.6 
 71.9 
 71.3a 
67.8 
69.0 
70.4 
70.7 
72.4 
n.a. 
Population (m) 1980  
1990 
2000 
14.8 
16.3 
14.9 
3.6 
4.4 
4.9 
 3.9 
 5.2 
 6.2 
2.8 
3.7 
4.8 
15.7 
20.2 
24.5 
Total fertility rate  
(births per woman) 
1980 
1990 
1999 
 2.90 
 2.72 
 1.93 
 4.07 
 3.63 
 2.63 
5.64 
5.09 
2.60 
4.93 
4.20 
2.20 
4.81 
4.07 
2.72 
a  1997 
Source: UNICEF (2001) 
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via, is not uniform. In Kyrgyzstan and Turkmeni-
stan it deteriorated in the final Soviet decade, but 
has since improved significantly. In Tajikistan, on 
the other hand, maternal mortality again rose by 
39 % during the first half of the 1990s. However, 
it is now well below the 1980 level in all the Cen-
tral Asian countries. The data in Table 12 reveal a 
sharp decline in infant mortality in the past two 
decades, especially in Tajikistan (-67 %), Uzbeki-
stan (-57 %) and Turkmenistan (-53 %). It must be 
assumed, however, that actual infant mortality 
rates are far higher than those officially registered, 
since the deaths of new-born children have not 
always been reported in the Central Asian coun-
tries since independence.149 Even the Central 
Asian countries' official figures on infant mortal-
ity are, however, well above the level in all other 
transition countries. 
A health indicator of relevance to poverty is the 
incidence of tuberculosis, which, while falling 
                                                     
149  See Falkingham (1999b) and UNICEF (2001). Accord-
ing to Bonilla-Chacin / Murrugarra / Temourov (2003), 
the charging of registration fees is likely to be one of 
the causes of the incomplete records of mortality in 
Central Asia and the Caucasus. 
slightly in Tajikistan in the first transformation 
decade, rose significantly in the other Central 
Asian countries. The increase was particularly 
pronounced in Kyrgyzstan (+166 %) and Kazakh-
stan (+66 %). The incidence of cholera, typhoid, 
diphtheria, hepatitis, syphilis, HIV/AIDS and 
malaria also rose.150 Drug addiction is also a 
growing problem, since Central Asia is increas-
ingly developing into a growing area and a trans-
port route for narcotics, and especially Afghan 
heroin ("Silk Road").151 In addition, undernour-
ishment has been more common than the CIS 
average (8 %) in all the Central Asian countries 
except Uzbekistan. This problem was particularly 
serious in Tajikistan after the years of civil war – 
almost half its population suffered from under-
                                                     
150  See UNDP (1998), Falkingham (1999c) and McKee / 
Chenet (2002). Profiles of the Central Asian countries 
can be found on a website maintained by the Central 
Eurasia Project of the Open Society Institute: http://www. 
eurasianet.org/resource/regional/health.shtml, 21 August 
2002. 
151  See BKA (2002), p. 94. 
Table 12:  Selected Health and Nutrition Indicators for Central Asia 
 Year Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Doctors (change in %)  -20.0  -4.6  -8.4   +6.0 c  +6.0 
Nurses  (change in %) 1990-98  -34.0 -11.0  -30.0  -12.0 c  +13.0 
Maternal mortality rate 
(per 100,000 live births) 
1980  
1990 
1999 
 55.6 
 55.0 
 49.6 
49.4 
62.9 
42.3 
 94.2 
 41.8 
 58.2 b 
 40.8 
 42.3 
 18.2 
 46.3 
 34.1 
 14.7 
Infant mortality rate (per 
1,000 live births) 
1980  
1990 
1999 
 32.7 
 26.3 
 20.7 
43.3 
30.0 
22.7 
 58.1 
 40.7 
 19.4 
 53.6 
 45.2 
 25.4 
 47.0 
 34.3 
 20.3 
Tuberculosis incidence 
(new cases per 100,000 
people)  
1989  
1999 
 74.1 
 122.8 d 
49.5 
131.8 
 47.0 
 41.5 
 58.4 
 84.2 
 46.1a 
 64.6 
Undernourished as propor-
tion of population (in %) 
1997-99  11.0 10.0  47.0  9.0  4.0 
a 1990 
b 1995 
c  1997 
d 1998 
Source: FAO (2001), UNICEF (2001) and Healy (2002) 
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nourishment. Tajikistan thus took a sad lead in an 
international comparison.152 
Table 13 lists a number of education indicators. 
Attendance of pre-school facilities had already 
been comparatively low in Central Asia in 1989; 
only in Kazakhstan did one child in two attend a 
nursery school, which probably reflects the higher 
degree of urbanization in this Soviet republic.153 
Ten years later nursery school attendance had 
fallen sharply, primarily in Kazakhstan (-80 %), 
Kyrgyzstan (-77 %) and Tajikistan (-64 %).154 In 
Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan two thirds of all nurs-
ery schools had been closed by the mid-1990s.155 
Elementary schools too were attended by a far 
smaller percentage of 7- to 15-year-olds in 1999 
than ten years earlier. Although the reductions at 
                                                     
152  The only countries with a higher proportion of under-
nourished people were Afghanistan, Haiti, Somalia, 
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, 
Mozambique, Angola and Ethiopia. See FAO (2001). 
153  Klugman et al. (1997) argue that, as there was already a 
labour surplus in Soviet times, especially in the rural 
areas of Central Asia, there was little incentive to in-
crease the female employment rate by providing com-
prehensive child care facilities. 
154  In almost all other transition countries, on the other 
hand, pre-school care facilities continue to be widely 
used. See UNICEF (2001), p. 147. 
155  See Bauer et al. (1998), p. 64. 
this level have been the smallest numerically, the 
transition in just a few years from almost univer-
sal elementary education to the exclusion from 
elementary schools of 21.1 % of all children in 
Turkmenistan and 15.7 % in Tajikistan is alarm-
ing. The Central Asian population is almost com-
pletely literate today, as Table 13 shows.156 The 
steady decline in school attendance indicates the 
likelihood of this legacy of Soviet times soon 
being abandoned, however.157 At the level of sec-
ondary school education there is evidence of a 
split regional trend: while a larger percentage of 
young people in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan at-
tended a secondary school or university in the late 
1990s than in 1989, the trend in the other Central 
Asian countries has been sharply downward. In 
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan in par-
ticular universities are attended by only a small 
                                                     
156  It should be pointed out that the data on the current 
scale of illiteracy in Uzbekistan are highly inconsistent. 
The illiteracy rate for Uzbekistan is given as 11.5 % in 
UNDP (2001), but as 0.8 % in UNDP (2002). Similar 
discrepancies are to be found between World Bank 
(2001e), which refers to 7 % of men and 17 % of 
women, and World Bank (2002f), where the figures are 
0 % for men and 1 % for women. According to the of-
ficial Uzbek data, less than 1 % of the population was 
illiterate between 1996 and 1999; see UNDP (2000a). 
See also the divergent data in Tables 9 and 13. 
157  See Falkingham (2002). 
Table 13: Selected Education Indicators for Central Asia 
 Year Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Pre-primary enrolment (in % of 
3- to 6-year-olds)  
1989  
1999 
53.1 
10.5 
30.0 
6.9 
 15.2 a 
 5.5 
33.5 
18.7 
36.8 
16.2 
Basic education enrolment (in % 
of 7- to 15-year-olds) 
1989  
1999 
94.8 
94.2 
92.2 
89.5 
 94.3 
 84.3 
91.2 
78.9 
92.0 
88.9 
General secondary enrolments  
(in % of 15 to 18-year-olds) 
1989  
1999 
32.5 
38.9 
36.7 
37.5 
 40.4 
 17.2 
41.7 
28.7 
36.3 
30.9 
Higher education enrolments 
(in % of 19- to 24-year-olds)  
1989  
1999 
18.1 
23.3 
13.2 
29.8 
 11.5 
 11.5 
10.2 
3.9 
15.0 
6.2 
Adult literacy rate (in %) 1991  
1998 
97.5 
99.0 
97.0 
97.0 
 96.7 
 99.0 
97.7 
98.0 
97.2 
88.0 
a 1990 
Source: UNICEF (2001) and Falkingham (2002) 
28 Katharina Müller 
minority today, the percentage being lower than in 
any other transition country.158 
4.2 Regional Comparison of Income 
Poverty 
Income poverty in the Central Asian region can-
not be ascribed only to transformation, since it 
reaches back into the Soviet era. Table 14 assem-
bles the available indicators of income poverty in 
Central Asia, enabling a comparison to be made. 
It becomes clear that the income of a significant 
proportion of the Central Asian population fell 
below the "absolute minimum subsistence level" 
of 75 roubles as early as 1988 – well before the 
Central Asian countries gained their independence 
– this being especially true of Tajikistan (58.6 %) 
and Uzbekistan (44.7) %.159 Data on earlier years  
are not available, since measuring poverty was 
taboo in the Soviet Union before the glasnost 
period. As poverty was regarded as inherent in the 
capitalist system, it was deemed by definition not 
                                                     
158  See UNICEF (2001), p. 149. According to Paci (2002), 
p. 137, the trend in Tajikistan primarily affected 
women, only half as many of whom were enrolled at 
universities in 1996 as men.  
159  By comparison, only 6.3 % of the population of the 
Russian Federation fell short of this officially defined 
minimum subsistence level in 1988; in the Baltic states 
the percentage of those affected by income poverty was 
even smaller. See Gumpel (1990), p. 1180. 
to exist under Communism and did not therefore 
need to be measured or combated.160 From the 
incomplete nature of the data on poverty in the 
period after independence had been gained it can 
be concluded that it is still a politically sensitive 
subject in most Central Asian countries, and espe-
cially Uzbekistan.161 
Because of the different sources of data and pov-
erty lines taken as a basis, Table 14 permits no 
more than cautious conclusions to be drawn, espe-
cially where an intertemporal comparison is con-
cerned. The indicators which have been assem-
bled suggest, however, that the change of system 
was followed by a considerable worsening of the 
problem of income poverty. Even the international 
standard indicator of absolute poverty, US $ 1 a 
day (see Chapter 2), which otherwise sheds little 
light on the post-Communist countries of eastern 
Europe and the CIS, was relevant in Tajikistan 
and Turkmenistan for a time (see also Table 24). 
Recent data suggest that hardest hit by the prob-
lem of income poverty in the late 1990s was Taji-
kistan, followed by Kyrgyzstan. In these two 
countries only 4.2 % and 15.9 % of the popula-
tion, respectively, had an income of more than 
                                                     
160  See Ahlberg (1990), Atkinson / Micklewright (1992) 
and Falkingham (2002). Assistance for "undersupplied 
households" did not begin until 1974. See Pomfret 
(1999). 
161  See UNDP (2000c) and Kasymov (2001). 
Table 14: Income Poverty in Central Asia (% of the population) 
Poverty line Year Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
75 roubles/month 1988  15.9 37.1 58.6 36.6 44.7 
1987-88  5.0 12.0 n.a. 12.0 24.0 
US $ 120/montha 1993-95  65.0 88.0 n.a. 61.0 63.0 
US $ 1/dayb 1993-96  1.5 n.a. n.a. 20.9 3.3 
US $ 2.15/dayb  5.7c 49.1 68.3 7.0 n.a. 
US $ 4.30/dayb 1998-99  30.9c 84.1 95.8 34.4 n.a. 
a in international dollars 
b  at 1993 international prices  
c  1996 
Source:  Gumpel (1990), Milanovic (1998), World Bank (2000c), World Bank (2001e) 
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US $ 4.30 a day, as against two thirds of the popu-
lation in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan – the re-
gion's wealthiest countries. Uzbekistan could not 
be included in this study. The data presented 
should therefore be interpreted with caution, since 
they were all collected several years ago and con-
siderable volatility is an inherent feature of poli-
tical and economic transformation. 
Table 15 shows how the relative risk of poverty 
faced by Central Asian households correlates with 
selected household characteristics. The data reveal 
a particularly close link between poverty and the 
number of children, the risk of poverty being 
greater than average only when three or more 
children are present. Except in Tajikistan, the risk 
of poverty also correlates with the status of the 
head of household in the labour market. If he or 
she is unemployed or retired, there is a higher than 
average risk of poverty. Access to a private plot of 
land for fruit and vegetable growing may prevent 
poverty in Kazakhstan and Tajikistan.162 
The trend in real wages during Central Asia's first 
decade of independence is shown in Table 16. 
Although data relating to the same base year can-
not be obtained, making an intraregional compari-
son difficult, the scale of income losses is none-
theless clear. In Tajikistan and Uzbekistan real 
wages in the mid-1990s were almost completely 
                                                     
162  For a detailed analysis based on different poverty lines 
and equivalence scales and with account taken of other 
household features see World Bank (2000c). Here 
again, however, Uzbekistan is omitted, and the survey 
years differ. 
eroded by high rates of inflation, falling to, re-
spectively, 6.5 % and 9.2 % of the 1989 level. 
Although Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan in particu-
lar managed to avoid such extreme income losses, 
their real wage levels had also fallen by the mid-
1990s, by 58 % and 67 %, respectively. All the 
Central Asian countries have since seen a gradual 
recovery of real wages, though so far on a very 
modest scale in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: with 
prices continuing to rise steeply, they reached 
only 17.2 % and 20.8 %, respectively, of their 
1989 level (see also Table 5). In any interpretation 
of these figures, it should be borne in mind that 
wages in Central Asia are often paid after some 
considerable delay or not at all, which further 
increases the erosion of their real value.163 
Economic transformation in Central Asia, how-
ever, has been associated not only with extreme 
erosion of real wages but also with the spread of 
the phenomenon of open unemployment, largely 
unknown in the past. Occurring simultaneously, 
the two processes have resulted in guaranteed 
employment and the role of wages and salaries 
rapidly waning in importance. At the same time, 
an urgent need to develop coping strategies has 
emerged. Thus in the rural areas of Central Asia in 
particular there have been many cases of the 
economy being largely demonetized and the tran-
sition being made to a barter economy.164 The 
people of Central Asia have also been forced to 
resort to the combination of different sources of 
                                                     
163  See Pomfret (1999). 
164  See, for example, World Bank (2000d). 
Table 15: Real Wages in Central Asiaa 
 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Kazakhstan n.a. n.a. 100.0 64.8 49.1 32.9 33.4 34.4 36.6 38.7 41.5 
Kyrgyzstan n.a. 100.0 70.7 59.4 49.6 42.0 43.5 44.5 49.1 54.1 49.4 
Tajikistan 100.0 106.4 89.9 39.3 13.6 6.5 24.3 15.0 13.5 17.3 17.2 
Turkmenistan n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 100.0 52.9 24.8 20.2 30.9 32.4 34.7 
Uzbekistan 100.0 108.7 95.9 94.7 17.8 9.9 9.2 12.1 12.8 16.2 20.8 
a  Index, base year = 100 
Source: UNICEF (2001) 
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income commonly encountered in countries of the 
"classical" periphery. The available information on 
this process of diversification indicates that survival 
today is ensured by income from dependent em-
ployment, from self-employed activity and from 
agricultural production along with home-produced 
foodstuffs and publicly provided social benefits 
(especially pensions). The patterns of diversifica-
tion to be seen in this context differ according to 
social stratum and region, urban and rural area.165 
There are also indications that private transfers 
effected in the context of extended families and 
existing social networks play an important role. 
Alms and other forms of social welfare similarly 
have a fixed place in Islamic tradition, which is 
predominant in some parts of the region (see 
Chapter 3.2.1).166 However, there has been little 
research into the scale and context of private 
transfers and support from social networks in Cen-
tral Asia.167 The following institutions are mentioned 
                                                     
165  For some indicators of country-specific patterns of 
diversification see Table 19 (Kazakhstan), Table 23 
(Kyrgyzstan), Table 25 (Tajikistan) and Table 29 (Uz-
bekistan). An analysis of this kind was not available for 
Turkmenistan. 
166  Reciprocal social responsibility plays an important part 
in this context, and poor people have a legal claim to 
the possessions of the rich. See Weidnitzer (1998). 
167  See, however, Coudouel / McAuley / Micklewright 
(1997). 
in the literature: gaps and gashtaks (Uzbekistan) are 
social gatherings that also act as rotating savings and 
credit associations (ROSCAs), and kashar (Uz-
bekistan), ashar (Kyrgyzstan) and hashar (Taji-
kistan) are traditional forms of neighbourhood assis-
tance.168 It should be pointed out that, as a rule, eth-
nic Russians in particular are less involved in fam-
ily networks than other ethnic groups living in Cen-
tral Asia, not least because their relatives often live 
in other parts of the former Soviet Union. 
The occurrence of persistent income poverty in 
Central Asia may be seen as the largely unin-
tended consequence of the political and economic 
changes. However, this certainly cannot be said of 
the increase in inequality which accompanied 
these changes, the farewell to "egalitarian" society 
being, after all, an explicit item on the transforma-
tion agenda.169 The pace and scale of the social 
differentiation did, however, come as something 
of a surprise.170 Table 17 shows the current degree 
of income inequality in the Central Asian countries 
with the help of the Gini coefficient for per capita 
                                                     
168  See Kandiyoti (1999), Berg (2000), UNDP (2000c) and 
Freizer (2002). 
169  See Aghion / Commander (1999), Kolodko (1999) and 
Mason / Kluegel (2000). 
170  See World Bank (2000c) and Milanovic (2001). 
Table 16: Relative Poverty Risks, by Type of Household 
Type of household Kazakhstana Kyrgyzstan b Tajikistan d Turkmenistan c 
No children 0.65 0.36 0.32 0.38 
Two children 0.93 0.82 0.81 0.66 
Three or more children 2.20 1.34 1.11 1.36 
Retired head of household 1.10 1.30 0.93 1.10 
Unemployed head of household 1.29 1.12 0.71 1.76 
Rural 1.21 1.23 1.02 1.39 
Access to private plot 0.80 1.02 0.99 1.18 
a 1996 
b 1997 
c 1998 
d  1999 
NB: Poverty is defined as below 50 % median per person consumption. At a relative poverty rate greater than 1, 
the risk of poverty is higher than that of an average household. 
Source: Falkingham (2002) 
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income.171 In the late 1980s income inequality in 
Central Asia had already been slightly above the 
Scandinavian level (0.25). In Kazakhstan the Gini 
coefficient has not risen appreciably since then, 
being slightly higher than the figure for Germany 
(0.30) from 1996 to 1998.172 Kyrgyzstan, Tajiki-
stan and Turkmenistan, on the other hand, ex-
ceeded the figure for the USA (0.41) in the late 
1990s and so reached levels prevalent in Latin 
America (0.45 to 0.60), the region with the 
world's highest income inequality.173 
4.3 Country-specific Poverty Profiles 
The intraregional comparative analysis of poverty 
is complemented in the following by an attempt to 
identify features specific to each country. From 
Soviet times the Central Asian republics inherited 
the Family Budget Survey (FBS), the methodol-
ogy of which has, however, been fundamentally 
criticized.174 Regarded as the most important 
source of data, therefore, are the Living Standards 
Measurement Surveys (LSMSs), which were con-
ducted on the World Bank's initiative in all the 
Central Asian countries except Uzbekistan from 
1996 to 1999. In Kyrgyzstan a Multipurpose Pov-
erty Survey (MPS) and a Poverty Monitoring Sur-
                                                     
171  Equal distribution occurs at a Gini coefficient of 0, 
perfect inequality of distribution at a Gini coefficient of 
1. See also Mikhalev / Heinrich (1999) and Falking-
ham (2002). 
172  According to government figures, the Gini coefficient 
in Uzbekistan rose from 0.26 in 1991 to 0.37 in 1999; 
see OECD (2000). For the Gini coefficients of Scandi-
navia, Germany, the USA and Latin America see 
World Bank (2001e), pp. 282 f. 
173  See Morley (2000) and Wodon (2000). 
174  See Atkinson / Micklewright (1992) and Falkingham / 
Micklewright (1997). 
vey (PMS) were carried out, financed by a loan 
from the International Development Association 
(IDA).175 Any attempt to paint a detailed picture 
of the social situation in the Central Asian coun-
tries in this way has its limits, however.176 There 
are, for example, hardly any qualitative back-
ground studies on the fundamental social changes 
and reconfigurations that have occurred in Central 
Asia in the past decade and affect the household 
level in particular. Household surveys in which a 
basic understanding of the social context exam-
ined cannot be presupposed are not very meaning-
ful, however. There are, moreover, indications 
that the interpretation of the terms "income" and 
"expenditure" differs markedly from market econ-
omy convention, which can be ascribed to funda-
mental semantic and cultural differences and may 
distort the survey findings.177 
4.3.1 Kazakhstan 
The poverty line used in Kazakhstan is well below 
the subsistence level defined by the government. 
The concept of poverty on which it is based is 
related to consumption rather than income. For 
2002 the poverty line was set at 40 % of the 
                                                     
175  The methodology of this survey has also been criti-
cized. See Lanjouw (1997) and Pomfret / Anderson 
(1999). 
176  See Falkingham (1999a). 
177  Pensions, for example, are not perceived as "income" 
but as a legal entitlement. Convincing evidence of these 
methodological problems has been produced in Uzbeki-
stan's case; see Kandiyoti (1999). A project arising 
from this criticism, the Social Development Research 
Capacity Project, in which the DfID and UNDP are par-
ticipating and which combines quantitative and qualita-
tive studies, is currently being implemented. Other in-
formation can be found on the project website: 
http://www.sdrc.uz/, 21 August 2002. 
Table 17:  Income Distribution in Central Asia 
 Year Kakakhstan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
1987-90  0.30 0.31 0.28 0.28 n.a. Gini coefficient  
(per capita income) 1996-98 0.35 0.47 0.47 0.45 n.a. 
Source:  World Bank (2002b) 
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minimum subsistence level, which is based on a 
minimum basket consisting of 70 % foodstuffs 
and 30 % other goods and services.178 In 2001 the 
poverty line was set at only 38 % of the minimum 
subsistence level. While just under 40 % of the 
Kazakh population were living below subsistence 
level in 1998, the proportion had fallen to 28.4 % 
by 2001. Table 18 also reveals the proportion of 
the population consuming less than the minimum 
basket of food. This indicator too fell from 1998, 
but rose again slightly in 2001 and is now 12.5 %. 
The Kazakh government's latest poverty analysis 
identifies the following principal risk groups: 
young people who are neither employed nor 
studying, children and large families, the long-
term unemployed, elderly people living alone, the 
disabled and the "marginalized" (the homeless, 
former detainees, migrants and refugees), about 
whom little information is, however, available.179 
The unemployed, single parents and pensioners 
are referred to as potential risk groups.180 The 
problem of the working poor is also growing in 
Kazakhstan. At the beginning of the year 11.8 % 
of all welfare recipients were employed. The 
problem of inadequate earned income affects 
women in particular; even in Soviet times they 
earned on average less than men.181 The gender-
related wage differentials in 1998 were 24.2 %, 
                                                     
178  See Republic of Kazakhstan (2002), p. 6, and World 
Bank (1998), p. 13. 
179  See Republic of Kazakhstan (2002), pp. 7 f. For a 
qualitative, participatory study of poverty see Sange 
Agency (2001). 
180  See Republic of Kazakhstan (2002), p. 11. 
181  The wage differentials at that time were about 30 %. 
See Falkingham (1999b). 
but had risen to 41.6 % by 2001.182 A study car-
ried out in 1999 came to the conclusion that, 
throughout the country, almost one woman in two, 
but only one man in three, had a total income be-
low the minimum subsistence level.183 
Table 19 shows the sources of income open to 
Kazakh households in 1996. While by far the 
most important source consisted of wages and 
salaries, it accounted for only about half of total 
money income and a quarter of total income.184 In 
all social strata except the highest the sum of state 
social transfers took second place, pensions play-
ing a particularly important role. Private monetary 
transfers were also very significant. Particular 
reference should be made in this context to pay-
ments made by parents to children.185 However, 
Kazakh households also received financial trans-
fers from other relatives, cultural and religious 
organizations and non-governmental organiza-
tions. Other sources of income were business ac-
tivities, second jobs and the sale of home-
produced foodstuffs. An analysis by consumption 
quintiles reveals substantial differences, especially 
with regard to the contribution made to household 
income by social benefits. While the two lowest 
quintiles derived 22 % and 25 % of their monetary 
income from this source, the figure for the highest 
quintile was only 12 %, which indicates relatively 
good targeting. Government transfers related to 
                                                     
182  Republic of Kazakhstan (2002), p. 11. 
183  UNDP (2001a), p. 19. 
184  In 1996 monetary per capita income averaged 2,370 
tenge, while total income, including added income from 
subsistence production, was about 4,742 tenge; see 
World Bank (1998), p. 26. 
185  See World Bank (1998). 
Table 18:  Poverty in Kazakhstan (in % of the Population) 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Below the subsistence minimum 34.6 38.3 39.0 34.5 31.8 28.4 
Below the food basket n.a. 12.7 16.2 14.5 11.7 12.5 
Source:  Republic of Kazakhstan (2002)  
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total income are even more crucial in the lower 
quintiles.186 
The poverty encountered in Kazakhstan, however, 
also has a geographical component. When evalu-
ating the Kazakh LSMS carried out in July 1996, 
the World Bank identified a considerable North-
South divide in what is by far the largest Central 
Asian country. Only the north of Kazakhstan ex-
hibited a single-digit poverty incidence calculated 
by the headcount method, whereas more than two 
thirds of the population in the southern parts of 
the country bordering Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan 
were consuming less than the minimum subsis-
tence level, which at that time was equivalent to 
about US $ 40 per month (see Table 20).187 The 
poverty gap and the severity of poverty too were far 
more pronounced in the south than in the other parts 
of the country (see Box 1). In the oblasts of Atyrau 
and Zhambyl a particularly large proportion of the 
population is living below the minimum subsis-
                                                     
186  While monetary income accounted for only 43.4 % of 
total income in the highest social strata, the proportion 
in the two lowest consumption quintiles was 69.8 % 
and 63.6 %. See World Bank (1998), p. 26. 
187  This was equivalent to about US $ 70 PPP. See Murthi / 
Pradhan / Scott (2002), p. 5. 
tence level today.188 Many labour migrants and 
civil war refugees from Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, the northern Caucasus and 
Russia live in the oblasts of Mangistau, Almaty, 
South Kazakhstan, Zhambyl and Kostanai, which 
are situated in the border regions. An added factor 
is internal migration, largely comprising movement 
away from the regions around the Aral Sea (Kyzy-
lorda oblast) and Semipalatinsk (East Kazakhstan, 
Pavlodar and Karaganda oblasts), which have been 
affected by pollution, desertification and a shortage 
of drinking water. 
The Kazakh government estimates that income 
poverty is having an above-average effect on re-
mote rural areas and small towns today, while 
peak incomes are being achieved in the oil en-
claves.189 In small Kazakh towns in 2001 an aver-
age of one person in two was unemployed owing 
to transformation-induced recession and the 
change in economic structures. In many cases, the 
only local enterprise was closed – by 1998 there 
were already 57 former "one-company towns" in 
                                                     
188  See Republic of Kazakhstan (2002), p. 7. 
189  See Republic of Kazakhstan (2002), p. 17. In the Mang-
istau oblast salaries in the oil industry are 18 times 
higher than monetary incomes in the agricultural sector. 
Table 19: Structure of Cash Income by Consumption Quintiles, Kazakhstan 1996 (in %)a 
 1st quintileb 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintilec Total 
Primary wage  45  49  55  51  50  51 
Pensions  16  21  14  13  9  13 
Other public transfers  6  4  4  3  3  3 
Secondary/other occupation  6  4  6  4  4  5 
Own business  8  3  7  8  8  7 
Sale of food  2  1  1  1  3  2 
Private cash transfers  14  13  9  14  19  15 
Other  4  4  4  4  4  4 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
a  Only cash income was taken into account here. In 1996, however, non-monetary sources contributed just as much to total in-
come as monetary sources. 
b Quintile with the lowest household consumption 
c  Quintile with the highest household consumption 
Source:  World Bank (1998) 
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Kazakhstan.190 In late 2001 36.7 % of the rural 
population were affected by poverty, while urban 
poverty, at 19.0 % of the population, was only 
about half that level.191 The LSMS carried out in 
1996 had revealed a much narrower gap between 
urban areas (39 %) and rural areas (30 %) as re-
gards the incidence of poverty.192 However, other 
social indicators in the rural areas were already far 
worse at that time. Children, for example, were 
more frequently affected by anaemia, under-
weight, stunting and increased mortality rates. In 
addition, housing was of a poorer quality, and 
access to drinking water, central heating and sani-
tation, by no means universal in urban areas ei-
ther, was available to only a very small proportion 
of the rural population.193 All in all, the National 
Human Development Report on Kazakhstan notes 
                                                     
190  See World Bank (1998), p. 15. 
191  See Republic of Kazakhstan (2002), p. 17. 
192  As the 1996 study was carried out at the principal 
harvest time, rural poverty is likely to have been sys-
tematically underestimated. See World Bank (1998) 
and Murthi / Pradhan / Scott (2002). 
193  Only 78 % of the urban population and 17 % of the 
rural population had clean tap water, and only 70 % of 
the urban population and 10 % of the rural population 
had Central heating. Only 59 % of urban dwellers and 
5.6 % of rural dwellers had an indoor toilet. See Murthi 
/ Pradhan / Scott (2002). 
that poverty has become a widespread and acute 
problem in the past decade.194 
4.3.2 Kyrgyzstan 
The Kyrgyz Poverty Monitoring Survey (KPMS) 
carried out in Kyrgyzstan on a number of occa-
sions in the latter half of the 1990s defines a level 
of consumption below the minimum calorie re-
quirement as extreme poverty, while consumption 
below the minimum amount of food and other 
necessary non-food consumption is deemed to be 
poverty.195 Table 21 shows that inadequate con-
sumption had become a mass phenomenon in 
Kyrgyzstan in the late 1990s. In 1996 half the 
Kyrgyz population were living in poverty; by 
1999 almost two thirds of the population were 
affected. In the same period extreme poverty rose 
from 19.1 % (1996) to 23.3 % (1999). The calcu-
lated poverty gaps similarly grew from 1996 to 
1999. Their level indicates, however, that rela-
tively slight increases in consumption enabled 
extreme poverty to be overcome ("shallow pov-
                                                     
194  UNDP (2001a), p. 6. 
195 In 1999 the poverty line was 7,340 som (US $ 176) per 
person p.a.; in the case of extreme poverty it was 3,849 
som (US $ 92) per person p.a. See World Bank (1999a) 
and World Bank (2001b). 
Table 20: Regional Distribution of the Population and of Poverty in Kazakhstan, 1996 
 % of populationa Headcount Poverty gap Severity of poverty 
Northb 20.0  9.2 1.9 0.7 
Centrec 19.0 26.4 9.0 4.4 
Eastd 13.8 31.3 9.0 3.6 
Weste 26.8 37.8 10.8 4.2 
Southf 20.4 69.2 26.4 13.0 
a  Total population of the region in % of the total population of Kazakhstan 
b  Kostanai, Kokshetau, Pavlodar and North Kazakhstan oblasts 
c  Mangistau, Atyrau, Aktyubinsk and West Kazakhstan oblasts 
d  Zhezkazgan, Karaganda, Akmola and Torgai oblasts 
e  Semipalatinsk, East Kazakhstan, Taldykorgan and Almaty oblasts 
f  Kyzylorda, South Kazakhstan and Zhambyl oblasts 
NB: The number of oblasts has been reduced since the study was carried out. 
Source: World Bank (1998) 
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erty"), although the same is not true of the general 
incidence of poverty. 
As Table 21 shows, the Kyrgyz rural population 
was hit far harder by poverty and extreme pov-
erty from 1996 to 1999 than the urban popula-
tion, the percentage gap between the indicators 
for the urban and rural populations narrowing in 
that period.196 In 1997, when economic growth 
was high and inflation fell sharply in Kyrgyzstan 
(see Tables 4 and 5), the disparities were at their 
greatest at 36.0 and 15.8 percentage points. 
While the urban population benefited from eco-
nomic recovery and extreme poverty was re-
duced, rural poverty worsened. With the onset of 
the Russian crisis in 1998, the incidence of pov-
erty rose again, or continued to rise, in urban and 
rural areas. According to World Bank figures, 
                                                     
196  Urban/rural poverty disparities fell from 21.8 to 20.7 
percentage points between 1996 and 1999, while abso-
lute poverty declined from 13.0 to 8.5 percentage 
points. 
since that external shock was overcome, poverty 
rates have been falling in Kyrgyzstan.197 
Table 22 enables the regional distribution of pov-
erty in Kyrgyzstan to be analysed. In social terms 
the eight oblasts differed widely in 2000, and as in 
Kazakhstan, there is a North-South divide. Only 
in the capital, Bishkek, and the neighbouring Chui 
oblast did poverty affect less than 30 % of the 
population. In Osh and Issyk-Kul, on the other 
hand, half the population was affected, and the 
proportion rose as high as two thirds in Batken 
and Jalal-Abad. The highest poverty rates were 
recorded in the Naryn (81 %) and Talas (73 %) 
oblasts. A similar picture emerges in the case of 
                                                     
197  In terms of per capita consumption poverty was still 
affecting 62.5 % of the population in 2000 and 56.4 % 
in 2001. The proportion of the population affected by 
extreme poverty fell from 31.9 % (2000) to 24.7 % 
(2001). Poverty declined in both urban and rural areas. 
Methodological differences, however, prevent these 
figures from being comparable to the data in Table 21. 
See World Bank (2002b). 
Table 21: Regional Distribution of Poverty in Kyrgyzstan, 2000 
Oblast Bishkek Batken Chui Issyk-Kul Jalal-Abad Naryn Osh Talas 
Povertya 29.9 69.0 28.1 53.7 67.9 81.4 51.6 72.7 
Extreme povertya 5.8 34.3 4.5 27.6 15.1 37.6 19.8 36.6 
No access to drinking 
watera 
n.a. 28.2 n.a. 0.0 13.1  6.7 36.6  0.1 
No medical carea 15.1  7.7 26.6 13.2 12.7 21.2 3.8 5.0 
Underweight among 
1- to 6-year-old childrenb 
12.7  4.2 9.6 4.4  6.9  3.1 5.2 4.0 
a % of the population 
b % of all 1- to 6-year-old children 
Source: UNDP (2001c) 
Table 22: Poverty and ExtremePoverty in Kyrgyzstan 
Poverty Extreme poverty 
Urban Rural Total Urban Rural Total 
 
in % of the population 
Poverty gap 
in % of the population 
Poverty gap 
1996 37.1 58.9 51.9 20.0 10.3 23.3 19.1 6.0 
1997 28.5 64.5 51.0 18.0 4.9 20.7 14.8 4.0 
1998 50.7 71.3 63.6 24.7 18.3 25.8 23.0 6.0 
1999 49.0 69.7 64.1 25.0 17.1 25.6 23.3 7.1 
Source: World Bank (2001b) 
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extreme poverty, the only single-digit rates occur-
ring in Bishkek and Chui. In the Naryn, Talas and 
Batken oblasts over a third of the population was 
consuming less food than required for the mini-
mum calorie intake. Table 22 also shows that 
37 % of the population in Osh and 28 % in Batken 
did not have clean drinking water.198 Medical care 
was unavailable to 27 % of the population in Chui 
and 21 % in Naryn, whereas only a small propor-
tion of the population was affected in this way in 
Osh and Talas. In Bishkek and Chui one child in 
ten was underweight. The data in Table 22 thus 
show not only that the material situation in Kyr-
gyzstan in 2000 was alarming, but that sometimes 
major deficiencies were also to be seen in the 
areas of nutrition, health care and infrastructure. 
The same is increasingly true of the capital, Bish-
kek.199 
A World Bank study of the determinants of pov-
erty in Kyrgyzstan, based on household data col-
lected in 1998, similarly found that geographical 
location had by far the greatest influence on a 
household's level of consumption. It was more 
                                                     
198  Unlike Kazakhstan, where only drinking water pipes 
were counted, Kyrgyzstan bases its figures on a far 
wider concept of drinking water, which includes access 
to clean water from rivers, springs and canals. See 
UNDP (2000b), p. 100. 
199  See UNDP (2001c). 
significant than its situation in a rural or urban 
area.200 In this respect too, households in Naryn 
and Talas fared particularly badly. In addition, the 
level of consumption in Kyrgyz households was 
below the average where the head of household 
did not speak Russian or, being single, divorced or 
widowed, was living alone. The size of the house-
hold and the number of children under the age of 
14 living in it were other influential factors: the 
larger the household or the number of children, 
the lower the level of consumption.201 Even when 
a pensioner was living in the household, the level 
of consumption was likely to be below the av-
erage. A growing proportion of the Kyrgyz 
population are resorting to farming, which 
does not as a rule rise above subsistence level, 
as an alternative to the employment opportu-
nities lost in the industrial sector.202 
                                                     
200  See World Bank (2001b), pp. 6 ff. For a similar analy-
sis based on household surveys conducted in 1993, 
1996 and 1997 see World Bank (1995), Ackland / 
Falkingham (1997), Pomfret / Anderson (1999) and 
Heinrich (2000). 
201  See Bauer et al. (1998) and Howell (1998) for the 
situation of children in Kyrgyzstan. 
202  The agricultural workforce as a proportion of the work-
ing population rose from 39 % in 1993 to 52 % in 1999, 
while the industrial workforce shrank from 21 % to 
12 %. See UNDP (2000b), p. 90. 
Table 23: Structure of Household Income, Kyrgyzstan 2001 (in % of total income)  
 Total Urban areas Rural areas 
Subsistence agriculturea  24.6  12.7  31.0 
Wages and salaries  22.8  42.5  12.2 
Net earnings from entrepreneurial activity  16.6  22.4  11.9 
Sale of agricultural products  14.9  2.0  21.8 
Sales of private possessions  7.0  1.5  10.0 
Pensions  6.6  8.1  5.9 
Private transfers  5.0  7.1  3.9 
Other social transfers  1.0  0.9  0.9 
Other income  2.5  2.8  2.4 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
a Imputed income from consumption of home-produced products 
Source:  World Bank (2002b) 
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Table 23 shows the structure of household income 
in Kyrgyzstan in 2001. Taking a country-wide 
average, the most significant item was attributed 
income from subsistence agriculture, followed by 
wages and salaries. The income patterns of the 
urban and rural populations of Kyrgyzstan are 
very different.203 While the urban population de-
rived almost two thirds from wages and salaries 
and self-employed activity, the rural population 
had far more diversified sources of income. 
Households in rural areas derived only half of 
their income from agricultural activities, while 
wages and salaries, income from self-employed 
activity and the sale of private possessions each 
contributed about 10 to 12 %. Government trans-
fers, especially pensions, play a more important 
role in Kyrgyzstan than private transfers, which 
are of some consequence only in urban areas. 
Despite all the coping strategies that have been 
undertaken, a participatory analysis of poverty 
recently initiated by the World Bank came to the 
following conclusion: "In the Kyrgyz Republic, 
poor people’s well-being seems to be spiralling 
downward, and many face increasingly desperate 
situations."204 
                                                     
203  See also Temesgen (2002). 
204  Rysakova et al. (2002), p. 296. 
4.3.3 Tajikistan 
An intertemporal analysis is not possible in Taji-
kistan's case, since the only available source of 
data is the Tajik Living Standards Survey (TLSS) 
carried out in 1999 (see also Table 14, however). 
Given the scale of the poverty problem, the choice 
of a suitable poverty line is critical. Three quarters 
of the Tajik population did not know at the time of 
the survey how they were going to satisfy their 
basic needs in the next twelve months, and under-
nourishment continues to be a problem today.205 A 
poverty line below which 96 % of the population 
fall, such as the minimum basket of goods in Ta-
ble 24, is not, however, very meaningful.206 
The results are highly sensitive as regards the 
poverty lines used (see Table 24).207 Depending 
on the indicator taken as the basis, between 
                                                     
205  World Bank (2000d), p. 2, and IMF / World Bank 
(2002b).  
206  The minimum basket of goods defined by the Tajik 
government consists of 75 % foodstuffs needed to meet 
a minimum calorie requirement and 25 % other goods 
and services. See World Bank (2000d), p. 18. 
207  The equivalence scale on which all the data in Table 24 
are based is 0.75. For a more detailed breakdown based 
on different equivalence scales see Falkingham (2000), 
p. 10. 
Table 24: Measurement of Poverty in Tajikistan, 1999 
Expenditure Income 
Poverty lines (month) 
Headcounta Poverty gap Headcounta Poverty gap 
Minimum consumption basket in 1999 (TR 
32,083) 
95.7 56.4 95.9 69.5 
"Poor" as defined by State Statistical Agency 
(TR 20,000) 
82.6 35.8 88.6 55.3 
"Very poor" as defined by State Statistical 
Agency (TR 10,000) 
32.8 9.2 63.5 31.4 
US $ 2.15 PPP a day (TR 15,111) 65.4 22.9 81.4 45.5 
US $ 1.075 PPP a day (TR 7,557) 16.3 4.4 49.4 23.0 
Relative poverty (below 50 % of median) 10.9 2.6 23.7 10.5 
a  The poor as a proportion of the total population (in %) 
TR = Tajik roubles; since November 2000: somoni 
Source:  Falkingham (2000) 
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10.9 % and 95.9 % of the population are affected 
by poverty, the use of income-related variables 
systematically producing higher poverty figures 
than expenditure-related variables; the same is 
true of absolute as against relative poverty indica-
tors. If the standard figure of US $ 2.15 PPP a day 
often used by the World Bank is taken as the ba-
sis, 65.4 % (consumption) or 81.4 % (income) of 
the Tajik population are poor. Even if the poverty  
line commonly used in low-income countries ("a 
dollar a day") is applied, 16.3 % (consumption) or 
49.4 % (income) of the population still had to be 
regarded as poor. The poverty gaps similarly var-
ied with the parameters chosen, but generally 
indicated a considerable depth of poverty. To 
enable all inhabitants of Tajikistan to consume 
the minimum basket of goods each month, the 
government would have had to make transfers 
equivalent to Tajikistan's entire GDP in 1999.208 
The TLSS shows that children were a population 
group particularly affected by poverty.209 Street 
                                                     
208  Closing the poverty gap of 56.4 (see Table 24) would 
have cost a total of 1.33 billion TR, while GDP in 1999 
was estimated at 1.33 billion TR. See Falkingham 
(2000), pp. 12 f. 
209  See World Bank (2000d). 
children and children living in homes experienced 
particularly serious material hardship, but the risk 
of poverty faced by households rose with the 
number of children. Thus only 7 % of the mem-
bers of childless households were in the lowest 
quintile, as compared to 31 % in the case of 
households with five or more children. House-
holds with at least three children accounted for 
83 % of all the poor. Elderly people usually lived 
with younger relatives and were exposed to only a 
slightly increased risk of poverty; the incidence of 
poverty was, however, higher among people over 
75 than among children. Households headed by a 
woman were also exposed to a greater risk of 
poverty and less frequently had access to land, 
water and livestock. Although more such house-
holds received humanitarian assistance, their total 
income remained below that of households headed 
by a man. 
Poverty correlated closely with level of education 
and was particularly frequent among the unedu-
cated, whereas vocational school and university 
graduates were exposed to no more than a slight 
risk of poverty. On the other hand, there was no 
close link between poverty and labour market 
status, which is not surprising in view of the ero-
sion of real wages in the past decade (see Table 
16). Table 25 shows the sources of income to 
Table 25: Structure of Total Household Income by Consumption Quintiles, Tajikistan 1999 (in %)  
 1st quintilea 2nd quintile 3rd quintile 4th quintile 5th quintileb 
Labour income  32  34  34  38  42 
Sale of food and crops  16  18  17  14  10 
Sale of private belongings  14  13  18  16  15 
Sale of commercial goods  1  3  2  2  3 
Rent  1  –    –     1  1 
Withdrawal of savings  2  2  2  3  3 
Remittances  14  12  9  10  12 
Aid  8  7  7  6  4 
Social transfers  6  6  5  5  5 
Other  7  5  5  6  6 
Total  100  100  100  100  100 
a Quintile with the highest household consumption 
b Quintile with the lowest household consumption 
Source:  World Bank (2000d) 
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which the various quintiles had access in Tajiki-
stan. Wages and salaries were the most important 
source of income, but only in the two highest 
quintiles did they contribute significantly more 
than a third of total income. Other important 
sources of income in all quintiles were the sale of 
foodstuffs, the sale of private possessions and 
remittances from abroad. In addition, the lowest 
quintiles in particular received aid and social 
transfers.  
Poverty and wealth were very unequally distrib-
uted in Tajikistan in 1999 (see Table 26). Inhabit-
ants of rural areas were represented with above-
average frequency in the poorest quintile of the 
population. An examination by viloyat (province) 
revealed that 91 % of the poorest people lived in  
the three parts of the country with the largest 
population, Khatlon, Leninabad and the RRS. 
However, only Khatlon province was affected by 
poverty to an above-average degree, while an 
average number of poor people and a below-
average number of wealthy people lived in Leni-
nabad. In contrast, 19.2 % of the inhabitants of the 
RRS, which are situated near the capital and ac-
counted for 25.3 % of the total population, fell 
into the lowest quintile, 36.4 % into the highest. 
Only 2.1 % of the poorest, but an easily above-
average proportion of the wealthiest inhabitants of 
Tajikistan lived in Dushanbe. The 200,000 inhabi-
tants of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 
Province were particularly hard hit by extreme 
poverty. This province is located in the Pamir 
Mountains and borders Afghanistan and China. 
Gorno-Badakhshan, where less than 4 % of the 
Tajik population lived in 1999, accounted for 
almost 7 % of all those falling into the lowest 
quintile of Tajik per capita household income. In 
this thinly populated mountainous region there is 
little involvement in supraregional trade today, 
"new farmers" (teachers, doctors, skilled workers 
and technicians) are trying their hand at subsis-
tence agriculture, and dependence on humanitar-
ian assistance for food security is very high.210 Of 
all Gorno-Badakhshan's inhabitants in 1999, 
39.1 % were members of households in the lowest 
quintile, as compared to 26.8 % in Khatlon and 
22.4 % in Leninabad.211 Other poverty indicators, 
such as undernourishment among small children, 
were also most pronounced in Gorno-
Badakhshan, Khatlon and Leninabad.212 
However, in the other parts of the country too 
living conditions were precarious in many re-
spects.213 Although 97 % of all Tajik households 
had mains electricity, only 46 % had access to 
                                                     
210  See Lambert (1998) and Kreutzmann (2002). 
211  Falkingham (2000), p. 18. 
212  In 1998 53 % of children aged 6 to 59 months in 
Gorno-Badakhshan were stunted, a sign of chronic un-
dernourishment. The figures for Khatlon and Leninabad 
were 39 % and 20 %, respectively. See World Bank 
(2000d), p. 23. 
213  See Falkingham (2000) and World Bank (2000d). 
Table 26:  Distribution of Population by Regions and Consumption Quintiles, Tajikistan 1999 
 Total population 1st quintilea 5th quintileb 
Total  100.0 %  100.0 %  100.0 % 
Urban population  21.9 %  18.5 %  29.7 % 
Rural population  78.1 %  81.5 %  70.3 % 
City of Dushanbe  6.4 %  2.1 %  14.5 % 
Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Province  3.9 %  6.9 %  1.3 % 
Regions of Republican Subordination (RRS)  25.3 %  19.2 %  36.4 % 
Leninabad (now Sogd) Province  26.1 %  26.1 %  22.8 % 
Khatlon Province  38.1 %  45.7 %  25.0 % 
a  Quintile with the lowest per capita household consumption 
b  Quintile with the highest per capita household consumption 
Source:  Falkingham (2000) and World Bank (2000) 
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mains water, which was, moreover, usually avail-
able for only an hour at a time. 85 % of all house-
holds used a latrine. The fuel mainly used for 
cooking and heating was wood (43 % and 45 % of 
all households, respectively), followed by dung 
and peat. Only 14 % of all households had a tele-
phone, 17 % were able to use their neighbours', 
but 54 % had no access at all. 37 % of all pregnant 
women received no medical care owing, in 69 % 
of cases, to the associated costs or the distance to 
be covered. In the school year preceding the sur-
vey 37 % of all Tajik children between the ages of 
7 and 15 had missed school for at least two weeks, 
the proportion in the lowest quintile being 44 %. 
Of these, almost one child in two stayed away 
owing to a lack of shoes or clothing, only 8 % 
because of illness.214 In view of the high incidence 
of material and subjective poverty a recent analy-
sis by the World Bank comes to the following 
conclusion: "Tajikistan is in danger of losing one 
of the most important assets it has on which to 
build its future; its human capital."215 
                                                     
214  As the missing articles were, as a rule, winter shoes and 
winter clothing, it can be assumed that the children 
concerned were absent from school for far longer than 
two weeks. 
215 World Bank (2003), p. 5. See also UNDP (2000d) and 
IMF / World Bank (2002b). 
4.3.4 Turkmenistan 
In Turkmenistan's case neither an analysis of cur-
rent poverty nor an intertemporal comparison of 
the trend in poverty is possible. The only available 
source of data is the Turkmenistan Living Stan-
dards Survey (TLSS) conducted four years ago.216 
What is particularly difficult in the Turkmen con-
text is, moreover, the absence of a subsistence-
related yardstick for the purposes of comparison, 
since the calculated minimum basket of goods has 
not been recognized by the government and is re-
garded as confidential.217 Various other poverty 
lines have therefore had to be used to determine the 
incidence of poverty (see Table 27). 
The differences in the resulting poverty figures 
are considerable, ranging from 1 % (Turkmen 
government) to 58 % (Turkmenstatprognoz) of the 
population. If the standard figure of US $ 2.15 
PPP per day often used by the World Bank is 
taken as the basis, 7 % of the Turkmen population 
                                                     
216  UNDP / UNFPA (2000), p. 3, complain of an "absence 
of reliable data on key social indicators – particularly 
concerning the vulnerability of different groups and the 
true extent of poverty in rural Turkmenistan." 
217  See World Bank (2001d). The official figures on per 
capita calorie consumption show a rise in the latter half 
of the 1990s. The figure given for 1999, however, is 
only 99.6 % of the estimated minimum requirement. 
See UNTUK (2000), p. 19. 
Table 27: Measurement of Poverty in Turkmenistan, 1998 
Poverty lines Estimated percentage of the population 
living below the poverty line 
Source 
Absolute poverty 
- Official minimum wagea 
- US $ 4.30 PPP/day 
- US $ 2.15 PPP/day 
 
58 
34 
  7 
 
Turkmenstatprognozb 
World Bank 
World Bank 
Relative poverty 
- 67 % of average consumption 
- 50 % of average consumption 
- 50 % of median income 
 
45 
29 
   1 
 
World Bank 
World Bank 
Turkmen government 
a  Unlike the other sources, this estimate of poverty takes account only of monetary income. 
b  National Institute of Statistics of Turkmenistan; now known as Turkmenmillihasabat. 
Source: World Bank (2001d) 
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were poor; at US $ 4.30, however, 34 % fell be-
low the poverty line. Another poverty line com-
monly used is 50 % of average consumption. If 
this measurable variable is taken as the basis for  
relative poverty in Turkmenistan, 29 % of the 
population are found to be affected by this prob-
lem. If, however, the line is raised to 67 % of av-
erage consumption, 45 % of the population fall 
below it. 
Although the available data indicate that the pov-
erty problem in the late 1990s in what is, at only 
4.8 million inhabitants, the least heavily populated 
country of the region was less serious in absolute 
and relative terms than in Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan, the results of the TLSS point to major dis-
parities within Turkmenistan. In 1998, for exam-
ple, a mere 10 % of the population accounted for 
not less than 44 % of Turkmenistan's total con-
sumption, leaving only 6 % of the total to the 
lowest quintile of the population.218 A compara-
tive study of household features by expenditure 
quintiles revealed hardly any differences in levels 
of education. However, the various social strata 
differed significantly in the number of children 
per household. While the dependency rate for 
children up to the age of 17 was 51 % in the poor-
est quintile, the figure was only 28 % in the 
                                                     
218  See World Bank (2001d), p. 8. 
wealthiest quintile.219 Disparities were also to be 
seen in living conditions and infrastructure. Only 
24 % of all people in the lowest quintile had free 
mains water, compared to 74 % in the highest quin-
tile.220 But even in the latter population group only 
50 % had an indoor toilet, compared to not more 
than 7 % of the poorest. Of the lowest quintile, 
42 % had no access to a telephone, as against 15 % 
of the highest quintile.221 Major disparities in living 
conditions were observed particularly between the 
capital, Ashgabat, and the rest of the country (see 
also Table 28). 
An analysis of the distribution of poverty by we-
layat (province) reveals considerable regional 
differences. Table 28 shows that almost 60 % of 
all poor people were living in the provinces of 
Dashkovuz, which adjoins Uzbekistan, and Mary, 
which borders on Afghanistan and Iran. Com-
pared to their shares of the population, these two 
provinces account for a disproportionately large 
number of the poor. To a lesser extent, this is also 
                                                     
219  This dependency rate indicates the number of children 
under the age of 18, divided by the total number of  
family members. 
220  In Turkmenistan up to 250 litres of water per person per 
day is supplied free of charge. There are similar ar-
rangements for electricity and gas. However, the 
wealthiest have greater access to the subsidized infra-
structure than the poorest. See World Bank (2001d). 
221  See World Bank (2001d), pp. 34 ff. 
Table 28: Regional Distribution of Poverty, Turkmenistan 1998 
Population living below the poverty linea Province's share of total 
poverty 
Province's share of 
population 
Province (in % of the rural popula-
tion of the province) 
(in % of the urban 
population of  the 
province) 
(in % of all poor people 
in Turkmenistan) 
(in % of total popula-
tion) 
Dashkovuz 53 41 30.5 18.2 
Mary 39 27 27.1 21.7 
Balkan 37 13  7.5 12.0 
Akhal 35 22 18.1 17.0 
Lebap 31   9 16.7 21.1 
Ashgabat –   0 0 10.1 
a The poverty line taken as the basis here is 50 % of average consumption. 
Source:  World Bank (2001d) 
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true of the province of Akhal near the capital. In 
contrast, the incidence of poverty in Balkan and 
Lebap, the two provinces with the smallest rural 
populations, was below the average, although 
there were major disparities (24 and 22 percentage 
points, respectively) between the urban and the 
rural population.222 In the capital, Ashgabat, the 
TLSS was unable to identify any poverty at all. 
The average for the country, taking the definition 
of poverty on which Table 28 is based, i.e. 50 % 
of average consumption, is 29 % (see also Table 
27). It is evident that the poverty figures were 
significantly higher among the rural population of 
all provinces. In the rural areas of Dashkovuz one 
person in two was affected by poverty, compared 
to almost 40 % in Mary and Balkan and about a 
third of the populations of the provinces of Akhal 
and Lebap. On the other hand, a below-average 
proportion of the populations of all provinces 
except Dashkovuz was affected by poverty.223 
Even though a final evaluation is not possible 
because of the limited volume of data available, 
the World Bank concludes: "While the extent of 
absolute poverty is quite small in Turkmenistan, 
[...] the cushion between the poor and the non-
poor is quite thin, and any economic shock could 
send a significant proportion of the population 
into greater income poverty."224 
4.3.5 Uzbekistan 
Information is still at its most fragmentary in Uz-
bekistan, the country which, with 24.5 million 
inhabitants, has the largest population in the re-
gion. After considerable hesitation on the part of 
the government the first country-wide survey of 
living standards based on international standards 
was only recently carried out; the results are not 
                                                     
222  See UNTUK (2000), p. 32. 
223  The results may exaggerate the differences between 
urban and rural areas, since the level of prices was not 
regionally adjusted and barter transactions were not 
taken into account. See World Bank (2001d), p. 8. 
224  World Bank (2001d), p. 14. 
yet publicly available, however.225 According to 
earlier statements by the Uzbek government, the 
living standards and disposable income of the 
population have risen steadily in recent years.226 
This claim was not, however, backed by appropri-
ate data. There is no information on the incidence 
of poverty in Uzbekistan, since poverty was for 
many years considered by the Uzbek government 
to be a taboo subject.227 
According to estimates by the EBRD, which has 
set the poverty line at 1.5 times the official mini-
mum wage, 14 % of the population were poor in 
1999, with rural households, landless families and 
single parents particularly hard hit.228 The World 
Bank puts the proportion of the population living 
below the poverty line in 2000/2001 at 31 % and 
estimates that more than two thirds of the poor 
were living in rural areas.229 Other insights into 
the poverty problem in Uzbekistan are provided 
by household surveys limited to specific re-
gions.230 The findings of a study confined to the 
Ferghana region suggest that households affected 
by poverty usually feature a number of risk fac-
tors, such as an unfavourable demographic struc-
ture, unemployment of members of the household, 
absence of livestock and sick or disabled family 
members. Better-off households, on the other 
hand, are characterized by well-paid jobs in the 
formal sector, their own piece of land, entrepre-
neurial activities and ownership of livestock. 
Wealthy households have a variety of sources of 
income, such as earned income, pensions, a small 
subsistence farm and entrepreneurial activities. 
While income from dependent employment plays 
                                                     
225  See IMF / World Bank (2002b). 
226  See, for example, UNDP (2000a). 
227  See UNDP (2000c) and Kasymov (2001). See also 
World Bank (1999b), p. 78: "Reliable information on 
living standards in Uzbekistan is not available." 
228  The official minimum wage in 1999 was US $ 17 
(official exchange rate) or US $ 9 (market value). See 
EBRD (2001f), p. 211. 
229  See World Bank (2002d), pp. 9 f. 
230  See Kandiyoti (1999), World Bank (1999b) and CER 
(2001). 
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a major role in urban households, owning live-
stock is particularly important in rural areas.231 
An Uzbek government survey shows the sources 
of income available to Uzbek households had in 
the latter half of the 1990s (see Table 29).232 Ow-
ing to the sharp drop in Uzbek real wages, with 
which only the decline in Tajikistan compares in 
                                                     
231  See CER (2001). 
232  The exact definition of the various sources of income, 
e.g. "income from entrepreneurial activity" and "in-
come from individual labor activity" is not given in the 
source document. 
scale (see Table 16), dependent employment is the 
most important source of income, but it contrib-
utes only about one third of household income. 
The slight recovery of real wages since the mid-
1990s is also reflected in Table 29. The second 
most important source of income was entrepre-
neurial activity, followed by income from small 
plots of land used for agricultural purposes and 
government social benefits. However, the survey 
is incomplete in as much as private transfers 
have evidently not been included. According to 
several independent studies, such transfers play 
a major role between Uzbek households and are 
also fixed in the culture through the institution of 
Table 29: Income Structure of Uzbek Households, 1996-1999 (in %)  
 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Dependent employment 30.6 33.7 35.3 36.7 
Income from entrepreneurial activity 26.5 29.3 25.2 25.8 
Pensions and other social benefits 13.6   8.3   9.2 12.1 
Income from assets   1.8   0.7   0.4   0.3 
Subsistence agriculture 20.1 17.1 18.7 16.5 
Income from individual labour activity   1.1   5.2   6.4   6.4 
Other   6.3   5.7   4.8   2.2 
Source:  UNDP (2000) 
Table 30: Real per capita GDP (US$ PPP) by Region, Uzbekistan 1997-1999 
 1997 1998 1999 
Uzbekistan, total  100.0  100.0  100.0 
Northern Uzbekistan 
- Karakalpakstan 
- Khorezm 
 81.0 
 59.8 
 105.2 
 81.9 
 63.1 
 103.3 
 85.1 
 67.6 
 105.1 
Central Uzbekistan 
- Bukhara 
- Djizzak 
- Navoi 
- Samarkand 
- Syrdarja 
 92.9 
 102.6 
 76.4 
 154.0 
 69.9 
 114.7 
 93.8 
 113.3 
 72.5 
 129.0 
 80.4 
 94.7 
 99.7 
 129.0 
 76.1 
 131.9 
 82.3 
 103.5 
Southern Uzbekistan 
- Kashkadarja 
- Surkhandarja 
 87.3 
 104.3 
 66.1 
 87.2 
 94.3 
 78.3 
 78.6 
 82.1 
 74.3 
Eastern Uzbekistan 
- Andijan 
- Namangan 
- Ferghana 
- Tashkent 
- City of Tashkent 
 109.5 
 96.1 
 71.8 
 108.8 
 109.8 
 171.5 
 111.1 
 94.5 
 65.1 
 102.2 
 109.7 
 186.9 
 110.1 
 93.4 
 65.6 
 103.7 
 105.7 
 185.2 
Source:  UNDP (2000) 
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gaps and gashtaks – social gatherings that also act 
as ROSCAs.233 
From the information available it can be con-
cluded that there are considerable social dispari-
ties between the urban and rural population in 
Uzbekistan.234 Table 30 also shows the significant 
differences revealed by an examination of per 
capita income by wiloyat (region).235 While east-
ern Uzbekistan, where the capital, Tashkent, is 
situated, was in the best position in the period 
considered, with a per capita income well above 
the average for the country as a whole, followed 
by central Uzbekistan with its urban centre, Buk-
hara, southern Uzbekistan experienced a relative 
decline in incomes in the late 1990s, even falling 
behind northern Uzbekistan, with its problem 
region, Karakalpakstan. 
This level of geographical aggregation should not, 
however, be allowed to conceal the major differ-
ences among the various regions. In the best posi-
tion were the capital, Tashkent (185.2 %), and the 
mining region, Navoi (131.9 %), which borders 
Kazakhstan. The regions with the lowest per cap-
ita income in 1999 were, at 65.6 %, 67.6 % and 
74.3 %, respectively, Namangan, which borders 
Kyrgyzstan, the Autonomous Republic of Kara-
kalpakstan on the Aral Sea and the region of 
Surkhandarja, which borders Afghanistan. Table 
30 also reveals the sometimes substantial changes 
in the relative positions of the regions observed 
over a period of a mere three years. After a seri-
ous drought that affected northern Uzbekistan in 
2000 the situation in Karakalpakstan is now espe-
cially critical. It suffered not only serious losses of 
harvest but also shortages of drinking water owing 
to the drying up of the Amu-Darja and the in-
                                                     
233 See Kandiyoti (1999). See also Coudouel / McAuley / 
Micklewright (1997). 
234  See World Bank (1999b). UNDP (2000a) reports that 
the differences between urban and rural areas concern 
life expectancy (71.6 vs 69.5 years), literacy rate 
(99.7 % vs 98.8 %), average school attendance (14.0 vs 
9.2 years) and current school and university attendance 
(80.4 % vs 65.7 % of the relevant age group). 
235  See also Coudouel et al. (1997) and World Bank 
(1999b). 
creased incidence of typhoid, hepatitis A and diar-
rhoea. According to ADB estimates, 50 to 70 % of 
the population of the Autonomous Republic of 
Karakalpakstan are today affected by poverty and 
20 % by extreme poverty.236  
There is documentary evidence of the Uzbek 
population being badly affected by income pov-
erty in the late 1980s (see Table 14) and suffering 
massive reductions in real wages in the 1990s (see 
Table 16).237 According to a recent estimate by 
the IMF and World Bank, the poverty problem 
in Uzbekistan has worsened since the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and is very deep-seated to-
day; average spending by the poor, for example, is 
38 % below the poverty line.238 Income inequality 
also increased in the first decade of independence: 
according to estimates by the Uzbek government, 
the Gini coefficient rose from 0.26 (1991) to 0.37 
(1999).239 No up-to-date information on the scale 
and regional distribution of income poverty in 
Uzbekistan is available. The latest National Hu-
man Development Report notes, however, that 
Uzbekistan faces many complex challenges in 
the area of human development in the 21st cen-
tury.240 
5 Social Policy and Poverty Reduction in 
Central Asia 
As the indicators discussed in Chapter 4 will have 
made clear, the first decade of Central Asia's in-
dependence saw not only an increase in income 
poverty but also regression in a number of the 
main dimensions of human development. In the 
health and education sectors in particular there are 
                                                     
236  See ADB (2001), p. 1. 
237  See also Table 14. 
238  See IMF / World Bank (2002b), p. 33. See also Table 
14. 
239  UNDP (2000a). See, however, Pomfret / Anderson 
(1997), p. 6: "Official statistics are subject to large 
margins of error, or doubt." 
240  UNDP (2000a), p. 34. 
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signs of advancing erosion, although the quality of 
the available data indicates the need for some 
caution, especially when intertemporal compari-
sons are made. The decline in access to primary 
medical care and education is closely linked to the 
rise in income poverty, since dwindling family 
budgets often leave no room for newly introduced 
user fees to be paid, for winter clothing and 
schoolbooks to be bought for the children or for 
the latter to be excused from helping out on the 
farm (see also Chapters 5.2.3 and 5.2.4). At the 
same time, however, cutbacks can also be seen in 
the provision of health care and education, reflect-
ing the reduction in fiscal room for manoeuvre 
with which Central Asia was confronted in the 
post-Communist decade. The fiscal dimension of 
social policy in Central Asia will be considered in 
greater depth in the next chapter, before a number 
of different social policy areas are discussed. Fi-
nally, a number of more comprehensive poverty 
reduction initiatives in Central Asia are presented. 
5.1 Fiscal Scope for Social Policy 
The transition from planned to market economy, 
which was accompanied by a serious economic 
crisis and high rates of inflation (see also Tables 4 
and 5), resulted in serious fiscal imbalances in all 
transition countries.241 As Table 31 shows, how-
ever, these imbalances were particularly pro-
nounced in Central Asia. In the early 1990s all 
Central Asian countries except Turkmenistan and 
Kazakhstan had two-digit budget deficits. In Taji-
kistan the budget situation turned particularly 
serious at the beginning of the civil war: from 
1991 to 1993 the Tajik budget deficit averaged 
24 % of GDP. All Central Asian countries except 
Kyrgyzstan have been able to reduce their budget 
deficits significantly in the last few years. Yet 
none of them – apart from Turkmenistan – has 
managed to balance its budget in any year.242 
The major fiscal imbalances are primarily due to 
the difficulty of mobilizing government revenue 
under transformation conditions, under which the 
planned-economy premises of the existing system 
of generating revenue have become obsolete.243 
Under Communism wage tax was collected at 
                                                     
241  See Tanzi (1995) and Craig (1999). 
242  Craig (1999), p. 20, argues, however, that the Turkmen 
data are not very revealing: "Interpretation of the fiscal 
position [...] is complicated by the partial coverage of 
the general government budget and the existence of 
sizeable quasi-fiscal deficits financed through public 
financial institutions by means of government-
mandated directed credits. Less than 50 percent of cur-
rent spending seem to pass through the formal budget." 
243  See Bönker (2002). 
Table 31: General Government Balances during the Transformation Process (in % of GDP)  
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Kazakhstan 1.4 -7.9 -7.3 -4.1 -7.7 -3.4 -5.3 -7.0 -8.0 -5.2 -1.0 -1.1 
Kyrgyzstan n.a. n.a. n.a. -14.4 -8.6 -17.3 -9.5 -9.1 -9.4 -11.8 -9.6 -6.0 
Tajikistan -3.0 -20.2 -30.5 -20.9 -4.6 -3.3 -5.8 -3.3 -3.8 -3.1 -0.6 -0.1 
Turkmenistan 1.7 3.0 -9.4 -4.1 -2.3 -2.6 0.3 0.0 -2.6 0.0 0.4 0.8 
Uzbekistan -1.1 -3.6 -18.3 -10.4 -6.1 -4.1 -7.3 -2.4 -3.0 -2.7 -1.2 -0.5 
CISa -0.2 -4.8 -15.9 -15.6 -8.9 -6.5 -6.3 -5.4 -4.8 -4.6 -0.9 -1.8 
South-Eastern  
Europea 
-7.1 -9.9 -10.1 -9.5 -5.3 -4.0 -6.0 -4.6 -4.9 -5.0 -3.7 -4.6 
Central Europe/ 
Baltic statesa 
1.0 -1.1 -4.9 -2.8 -2.2 -2.5 -2.3 -2.0 -2.8 -4.1 -3.3 -3.4 
a  Unweighted average 
Source:  EBRD (2002) 
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source, and the taxation of the few large state-
owned enterprises did not require a separate tax 
authority. The challenges which the transition 
from planned to market economy represented for 
the generation of public revenue were exacerbated 
in Central Asia by the coincidence of the systemic 
change and the emergence of independent nation 
states. The trend in the Central Asian public reve-
nue ratios in the 1990s is shown in Table 32. 
During their first decade of independence all Cen-
tral Asian countries suffered a sharp decline in 
general government revenue. At its lowest point it 
amounted to only 12.0 % of GDP in Tajikistan, 
12.8 % in Turkmenistan, 13.2 % in Kazakhstan 
and 16.7 % in Kyrgyzstan (see Table 32). Only in 
Uzbekistan, where the economic setbacks had so 
far been limited in scale (see Table 4), was it pos-
sible to keep public revenue as a proportion of 
GDP at an almost constant level, and in a regional 
comparison it was at its highest there. In contrast, 
Tajikistan, where the government monopoly of 
power was badly eroded during the civil war, 
was confronted with a loss of more than 60 % of 
its previous public revenue from 1992 to 2000. 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan have 
succeeded in slowly raising the public revenue 
ratio in recent years.244 In general, the public 
revenue ratios in Central Asia are well below the 
                                                     
244  See also Betley (2003) and Summers / Baer (2003). 
average figures for central and South-Eastern 
Europe and the Baltic states; Tajikistan achieves 
just a third of the average for this group of coun-
tries. On the other hand, extractive capacity – the 
ability to generate public revenue – has slumped 
in the past decade throughout the CIS.245 
On their way to becoming independent nation 
states, however, the Central Asian countries faced 
not only the implications of the change of eco-
nomic system but also the cessation of the exten-
sive intra-Soviet financial transfers (see Chapter 
3.1). It is reported that in 1989 the grants from 
Moscow amounted to 12 % of Kazakhstan's GDP, 
20 % of Uzbekistan's national budget and almost 
50 % of Tajikistan's public revenue.246 Despite 
their considerable scale, however, the resources 
flowing to Central Asia seemed inadequate to 
contemporary observers. In 1990, for example, it 
was argued "that the social situation that is already 
intolerable in Central Asia today – widespread 
poverty and unemployment, ubiquitous housing 
shortages and crises in the education and health 
sectors – will assume catastrophic proportions 
                                                     
245  For the concept of "extractive capacity" see Bönker 
(2002). For the link between public revenue, govern-
ment capacity and governance see also Bräutigam 
(2002). 
246  See Deutschland (1993), McAuley (1994), Capisani 
(2000) and Murthi / Pradhan / Scott (2002). 
Table 32: General Government Revenue during the Transformation Process (in % of GDP) a 
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Kazakhstan 27.6 25.5 21.1 18.5 16.9 13.2 13.5 18.2 17.4 21.7 
Kyrgyzstan 22.4 16.7 25.1 26.8 24.8 23.9 23.9 24.4 24.0 25.7 
Tajikistan n.a. 35.2 37.3 47.6 17.5 13.2 13.7 12.0 13.5 13.6 
Turkmenistan 38.2 42.2 12.8 16.9 20.5 16.6 25.4 22.0 19.4 25.8 
Uzbekistan 30.6 31.5 35.3 29.2 34.6 34.3 30.1 32.4 30.5 31.1 
CISb n.a n.a. n.a. 32.3 24.3 23.5 25.5 25.6 25.1 25.2 
South-eastern Europeb n.a n.a. n.a. 35.1 33.5 23.1 29.9 33.0 34.8 37.9 
Central Europe/ Baltic 
statesb 
n.a n.a. n.a. 42.3 41.6 40.8 40.8 40.5 39.9 38.8 
a Consolidated revenue of public budgets and social insurance funds 
b Unweighted average 
Source:  EBRD (2001f) and Bönker (2002).  
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unless Moscow adopts a generous economic de-
velopment and investment programme for Central 
Asia in the very near future."247 Rather than the 
transfer of resources being increased, however, it 
came to an abrupt end with the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The cessation of the transfers had 
been urged by Russian intellectuals some time 
before: "We don't have the strength for the pe-
ripheries either economically or morally."248 
The erosion of public revenue in Central Asia was 
bound to have an impact on expenditure, and so-
cial spending was no exception. Although the 
available data are incomplete and incoherent, 
there are general indications of a sharp reduction 
in expenditure in the areas of health, education 
and retirement pensions.249 Table 33 shows the 
major cuts in expenditure that were made in all 
the Central Asian countries in the first half of the 
1990s and must have had a particularly far-
                                                     
247  Ahlberg (1990), p. 1170, referring to a study by a Rus-
sian sociologist on Central Asia that had been pub-
lished in 1989. Gumpel (1990), p. 1183, however, was 
already advancing the view at this time that "the re-
sources needed to solve the Central Asian problem" 
were not available from the Soviet budget.  
248  From an essay by Alexander Solzhenitsyn, quoted in 
Rashid (1994), p. 39. The following Solzhenitsyn quo-
tation from the same source is similarly revealing: 
"Russia [will] only be strong once it has shed the oner-
ous burden of the Central Asian underbelly" [sic!]. 
249 See, for example, UNICEF (2001), Linn (2002), Pom-
fret (2002), UNDP (2002) and World Bank (2002f). 
reaching effect since the denominator – GDP – 
shrank dramatically in the period considered (see 
Table 4). The reduction in public spending on 
health, education and social security that was 
made in the space of only a few years ranged from 
27.5 % (education in Uzbekistan) to 93.3 % (pen-
sions in Tajikistan). Most of the cuts amounted to 
more than two thirds of 1991 expenditure. The 
comparatively smallest reductions were made in 
Kyrgyzstan, the most extensive in Tajikistan. 
The drastic reduction in social spending gave rise 
to major intraregional disparities in spending lev-
els within a few years (see Table 33). In Uzbeki-
stan the largest items of expenditure in percentage 
terms were education and health, while Kyr-
gyzstan spent most on retirement pensions. 
Spending on health and retirement pensions was 
lowest in Tajikistan; in spending on education 
Turkmenistan took last place. UNICEF data re-
veal a further decline in the level of spending on 
the health sector in most of the Central Asian 
countries in the late 1990s; in Tajikistan it 
amounted to no more than 0.4 % of GDP in 1999. 
In the education sector Turkmenistan and Kazakh-
stan increased expenditure, while Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan made further cuts; no data are available 
on Uzbekistan.250 According to comparative UNDP 
data, all the Central Asian countries except Uz-
bekistan are currently spending less on health and 
                                                     
250  See UNICEF (2001). 
Table 33: Social Spending in Central Asia (in % of GDP) 
Education Health care Social security  
1991 1996 ∆ (%) 1991 1996 ∆ (%) 1991 1996 ∆ (%) 
Kazakhstan  7.6 3.2 -57.9 4.4 2.7 -38.6  4.9  0.6 -87.8 
Kyrgyzstan  8.0a 5.4 -32.5 5.0 2.9 -42.0  5.5  3.8 -30.9 
Tajikistan  11.1b 3.3 -70.3 6.0 1.1c -81.7  3.0b  0.2d -93.3 
Turkmenistan  9.6 2.8 -70.8 5.0 1.5c -70.0  3.2  0.8 -75.0 
Uzbekistan  10.2b 7.4 c -27.5 5.9 3.1 -47.5  7.7  2.5 -67.5 
a  1990 
b 1992 
c  1995 
d  1997 
Source:  Pomfret (2002); author's own calculations 
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education than on total debt servicing – a rela-
tively new item of expenditure (see also Chapter 
3.2.2).251 
In view of the rapid population growth in Central 
Asia (see Table 11), the reductions that have been 
described entail particularly far-reaching cuts in 
social services, which are unparalleled on this 
scale in other transition countries. Table 34 shows 
the trend in expenditure in US $ per capita in the 
second half of the 1990s. In all the areas of social 
policy considered, per capita expenditure was 
highest in Kazakhstan, followed by Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan. In contrast, social spending per 
inhabitant in Tajikistan was, at US $ 2 (health) 
to US $ 4 (education), extremely low in 1999. 
Turkmenistan could not be included in this com-
parison, however. Viewing social spending in 
Central Asia from this angle reveals the consider-
able and growing disparities and the continuing 
cuts in social services in the region, the scale of 
which the World Bank too has now criticized: 
"Social sector spending by governments is very 
low by international standards and in comparison 
                                                     
251  See UNDP (2002), pp. 236 f. The data given in this 
source can, however, provide no more than a rough in-
dication of the composition of government spending in 
Central Asia. Strictly speaking, they are not comparable 
since they do not concern the same years and spending 
on education is measured as a percentage not of gross 
national product but of gross domestic product. The in-
creasing crowding out of other expenditure items by the 
burden of the Central Asian countries' debt service is 
also noted by Gupta et al. (2001), however. 
with countries in Central Europe and even Rus-
sia."252 
5.2 Selected Social Policy Areas 
The increase in income poverty and the massive 
cuts in social services to be seen in Central Asia in 
the 1990s are currently in danger of exacerbating 
each other, engendering a downward spiral that 
affects – in OECD/DAC terminology – the eco-
nomic, human and protective capabilities of the 
people (see Chapter 2.1). In view of the wide va-
riety of risks to which the Central Asian popula-
tion was exposed in the past decade from the 
macro, meso and micro levels and for which it 
was totally unprepared, the potential that govern-
ment social policy has to offer should not, how-
ever, be ignored. As was shown in Table 2, it can 
help to prevent, mitigate and eliminate many risks 
to which those affected or threatened by poverty 
are exposed. This is bound to be particularly true 
of the post-Soviet region, where there was a uni-
versal social system only ten years ago and where 
                                                     
252  Linn (2002), p. 3. In contrast, the status quo ante in 
Central Asian social policy was considered financially 
untenable by some western observers once the intra-
Soviet transfers had stopped; see, for example, 
McAuley (1994). Until recently the IMF was also criti-
cal of the "extensive public education and health sys-
tems and elaborate [...] social security arrangements" 
to be found in Central Asia; see Craig (1999), p. 16. 
See, on the other hand, IMF / World Bank (2002d), p. 7: 
"the social safety net has deteriorated greatly, mainly 
because of the limited resources available for poverty 
reduction." 
Table 34: General Government Social Expenditure in Central Asia (US$ per capita) 
Education Health Pensions Other social expendi-
tures 
 
1995 1999 1995 1999 1995 1999 1995 1999 
Kazakhstan  n.a. 40 n.a.  29  n.a.   87a  n.a.  10 
Kyrgyzstan  21 12 12  6  24  14  3  5 
Tajikistan  4  4   3  2  2  3  2  3 
Uzbekistan  33 27 16  10  23  36  15  10 
a  Includes social security and welfare payments 
Source:  Linn (2002) 
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much the same has been expected of the state 
during the transformation process.253 Although 
the main axis of Communist social policy – full 
employment – has long been a thing of the past, 
many social policy institutions still exist and can 
be used as the basis for reform efforts. The core 
areas – social assistance, pensions, health and 
education – are discussed in the following. The 
practical measures that have been taken in the five 
Central Asian countries since they gained inde-
pendence are, however, far from being well-
documented. No more than a general overview of 
the most important problem areas for social policy 
can therefore be given below. 
5.2.1 Social Assistance 
Owing to the poverty problem described in Chap-
ter 4, income transfers in the form of social assis-
tance seem appropriate in all Central Asian coun-
tries. It should be pointed out that in Soviet times 
the subsidized or free supply of the most impor-
tant everyday goods and services (primarily food-
stuffs, rents, electricity and water) largely re-
placed such transfers to specific target groups. 
Some of these subsidies continue to be permanent 
items on the political agendas and in the national 
budgets in Central Asia, and especially Turkmeni-
stan. Such universal subsidies often have a regres-
sive effect, however, and it is argued that mone-
tary transfers directed to the most needy are supe-
rior.254 In practice, however, this is true only if the 
monetary transfers actually reach the poorest peo-
ple. In most transition countries this has not al-
ways been the case. Instead, a sharp rise in the 
cost of living has occurred, while the assistance 
provided is not enough to ensure subsistence. 
Ideally, social assistance should be available to all 
individuals or households unable to ensure their 
own subsistence. The design of the transfer pro-
gramme should be such that the benefit is of a 
                                                     
253  See Schmähl (1994). 
254  See, for example, Chu / Gupta (1993), IMF (1995), 
Alderman (2002) and Rodriguez / Vashakmadze 
(2002). 
subsidiary nature and the need for assistance is not 
perpetuated.255 In the Central Asian context, how-
ever, funding is a key problem. As shown in 
Chapter 5.1, insufficient budget funds are avail-
able, especially in the resource-poor Central Asian 
countries, to protect the whole population against 
income poverty and undernourishment. This is 
particularly true of Tajikistan, where poverty is a 
widespread phenomenon and there are therefore 
strict limits to redistribution. Furthermore, calls 
from the international financial institutions for a 
contractive fiscal policy limit the scope for social 
policy in almost all Central Asian countries to-
day.256 In view of the shortage of financial re-
sources, social assistance payments are therefore 
currently restricted to a relatively small proportion 
of the needy or the legally entitled, as is shown in 
Box 4. 
A basic challenge closely associated with that 
mentioned above is targeting.257 While available 
financial resources define the framework for the 
potential group of recipients, the aim should be to 
identify the poorest people with the most accurate 
mechanisms possible. On the whole, targeting is 
hampered in the Central Asian context by the fact 
that, as hardly any up-to-date surveys of the social 
situation are available, there is no precise back-
ground information on the poverty of particularly 
hard hit groups and their geographical distribution 
(see Chapter 4.3). In addition, income testing in 
Central Asia is difficult because of the variety and 
lack of transparency of the types and sources of 
income (see Tables 19, 23, 25 and 29). In the case 
of proxy means testing, on the other hand, needs 
are assessed on the basis of household features 
which are relatively easy to observe, e.g. rights of 
disposal over land, water and electricity supply, 
ownership of consumer durables, occupation and 
family structure. A simpler, but less accurate 
method is categorical targeting on the basis of 
certain features of the household or individual. 
Where it is principally the elderly, children, 
                                                     
255  See Barr (1998). 
256  Turkmenistan is not at present subject to the interna-
tional financial institutions’ conditionalities. 
257  See World ank (2000d), pp. 114 ff., and Tabor (2002). 
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women and disabled people who are affected by 
poverty, transfer payments can be concentrated on 
households in which these risk groups are strongly 
represented. Another possible method is self-
targeting, which can be operationalized, for ex-
ample, by means of job creation programmes in 
which the participants receive less than the market 
wage or are even rewarded in kind (food-for-
work).258 
                                                     
258  The intention here is to keep wages low enough for 
these programmes to appeal only to those who cannot 
find any other work. However, it excludes people who 
are unable to do physical work. See FES (1996). 
Community-based targeting, which is often men-
tioned in this context, is not, strictly speaking, a 
targeting mechanism but the decentralization of 
the allocation of social benefits, with advantage 
taken of locally available social capital.259 The 
practical success of this approach depends on the 
ability of a local community to mobilize the nec-
essary information, to ensure effective monitoring 
of the implementation of the programme and to 
prevent corruption. A prominent example of 
community-based targeting is to be found in Uz-
bekistan, where the allocation of social assistance 
was completely decentralized in 1994 and dele-
                                                     
259  See Conning / Kevane (2002). 
Box 4: The Uzbek mahallas and the Allocation of Social Benefits 
The mahalla is a social association in a residential quarter and comprises some 150 to 1,500 households. It is led by 
a council of elders presided over by an oqsoqol ("white beard"). As a traditional organizational form of social life 
in Uzbekistan, the mahalla emerged from the clan structures and, though remaining largely intact even in Soviet 
times, it was complemented by the makhallinskiy komitet, or kengash. This parallel administrative structure persists 
in the mahalla to this day. The representatives of the kengash, who are almost always men, are elected by the 
members of the mahalla and confirmed by the provincial administration. They organize neighbourhood assistance 
and religious festivals, settle disputes and help to enforce traditional, patriarchal norms and values. In 1993 the 
tasks of the mahalla were extended by law, the institution thus being significantly upgraded by government in order 
to promote the constitution of a national identity through traditional institutions. In 1999, as part of its campaign 
against Islamic fundamentalism, the Uzbek government created in each mahalla the post of "defender of the peo-
ple", whose task it is to look into all suspicious activities and to cooperate with the police, this being seen as further 
proof of the political instrumentalization of the mahallas in Uzbekistan. 
In October 1994 the 12,000 or so mahallas took over the administration of a new social programme for low-income 
families. The funds are transferred by the Finance Ministry to the account of each mahalla every year and distrib-
uted to the neediest households in the form of transfer payments initially limited to three months and amounting to 
1.5 to 3 times the minimum wage. Social monitoring within the mahalla forms the most important information base 
for the targeting of social assistance by the council of elders, visits to households also being made. In the assess-
ment of the social situation not only is account taken of monetary income: proxy means testing is also undertaken. 
In this the detailed rules laid down by the Uzbek Employment Ministry on the filing and approval of applications is 
combined with some discretionary leeway. Since 1997 an income-related child allowance has also been disbursed 
by the mahallas, and in 1999 this was joined by a parental allowance for non-working mothers of children up the 
age of 2 and by non-cash benefits for pensioners living on their own. 
The delegation of targeting to informed local institutions reduces the administrative effort and the information 
asymmetries. As the allocation of funds by the Finance Ministry is, however, based on the total number of house-
holds in the mahalla, regardless of their social situation, the programme as it is currently designed can only allevi-
ate local welfare disparities: it cannot guarantee that scarce resources will be used to benefit Uzbekistan's poorest 
people or help to reduce regional disparities. Maintaining the real value of the annual fund allocations is also caus-
ing problems at a time of two-digit rates of inflation. Nor can the abuse of the available discretionary leeway (by 
corruption, clientelism or discrimination against ethnic or religious minorities, for example) be ruled out. In the late 
1990s an Employment Ministry official, whose task it is to help with the running of the social programmes, was 
therefore assigned to each mahalla, but the presence of this government representative again changes the nature of 
the mahalla. 
 
Source:  Berg (1998); Coudouel / Marnie (1999); Coudouel / Marnie / Micklewright (1999); World Bank (1999b); 
Berg (2000); Coudouel / Marnie (2000); UNDP (2000c); Bektemirov / Rahimov (2001); Herrfahrdt (2001) 
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gated to the mahallas, the local self-help organiza-
tions (see Box 4). As initial studies of the effec-
tiveness of the poverty allocation measures dele-
gated to the mahallas arrived at favourable con-
clusions, most donors welcome this unconven-
tional allocation mechanism. The traditional na-
ture of the mahallas seems, however, to have 
changed significantly in the past decade as a result 
of central government intervention. A recent study 
therefore even refers to "grassroots absolutism".260 
In Kyrgyzstan a social assistance programme was 
introduced in 1995, and the means testing that 
forms part of it has since been reformed on sev-
eral occasions. Since 1998 the aiyl okmotu (vil-
lage councils) have been involved in benefit ad-
ministration.261 Previously the payment of benefits 
had been the responsibility of local post office 
officials, some of which are reported to have en-
riched themselves.262 Furthermore, the social assis-
tance hitherto paid out had lost so much of its real 
value that some of those entitled went without. 
The benefits were often paid months after they 
were due or completely replaced with payments in 
kind, such as cooking oil and flour.263 In Kazakh-
stan the only means-tested transfer programmes in 
existence in the 1990s related to child and hous-
ing allowances, up to two thirds of claimants in 
rural areas and in the east and south of the country 
receiving no benefits because of the lack of finan-
cial resources.264 In 2000 a universal entitlement 
to social assistance entered into force. The pov-
                                                     
260  See Sievers (2002), p. 152. 
261  See Alymkulov / Kulatov (2001) and Kyrgyz Republic 
(2001). 
262  See Rysakova et al. (2002). 
263  Andrews / Ringold (1999) argue that, although cash 
transfers are theoretically superior to the handing out of 
payments in kind, the latter are better protected against 
losses of real value at a time of high inflation. They are 
also regarded as an appropriate self-targeting instru-
ment; see World Bank (2000a). The claimants them-
selves were, however, loath to accept payments in kind: 
"Now we have so much oil in our house, there is no ex-
tra room to store it." Quoted in Rysakova et al. (2002), 
p. 288. 
264  See Murthi / Pradhan / Scott (2002). 
erty line on which it was based was, however, 
well below subsistence level.265 
In 1996 Tajikistan introduced an entitlement to 
social assistance that was confined to four target 
groups: children under the age of 8 living in fami-
lies with a per capita income less than twice the 
minimum wage; families with children under 16 
who have lost at least one parent and are receiv-
ing an orphan's allowance; disabled and non-
working pensioners whose income is less than 
the minimum pension; and students attending 
vocational schools and universities. In 1998, how-
ever, only 15 % of those deemed to be eligible 
actually received the monthly benefit.266 In the 
absence of compensation for inflation it had lost 
so much of its purchasing power that it was only 
enough to buy two loaves of bread. It is reported 
that community-based targeting in Tajikistan, 
where almost everyone is affected by poverty and 
one person in two is undernourished, has overex-
tended the local self-governing institutions – 
jamoat, shura aksakal, mahalla.267 In Gorno-
Badakhshan in particular the uniform distribution 
of aid led to fewer intra-community conflicts than 
when an attempt was made to identify especially 
needy recipients. Experience of job creation pro-
grammes based on self-targeting appears, how-
ever, to be favourable.268 
                                                     
265  For 2002 the poverty line was fixed at 40 % of the 
minimum subsistence level. In 2001 it had been set at 
only 38 % of the minimum subsistence level. See Re-
public of Kazakhstan (2002) and World Bank (1998). 
See also Chapter 4.3.1. 
266  This is equivalent to less than 3 % of the Tajik popula-
tion, although, according to the legal criteria, some 
17 % of the population were entitled to social assis-
tance. See World Bank (2000d), pp. 108 f. 
267  For an overview of the various Tajik self-governing 
institutions see Ilolov / Khudoiyev (2001) and Freizer 
(2002). The institution of the mahalla is a common 
Uzbek-Tajik legacy; see Coudouel / Marnie (1999). 
268  See Lambert (1998) and World Bank (2000d). 
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5.2.2 Retirement Pensions 
The old-age security schemes that exist in Central 
Asia are a further source of monetary transfers. 
While pension payments are, strictly speaking, an 
insurance benefit rather than an instrument explic-
itly intended for reducing poverty, it cannot be 
denied that pensions play an important part in the 
usually multigenerational households of Central 
Asia. The available data show that retirement 
benefits make a far larger contribution to house-
hold incomes than social assistance payments and 
are also of greater consequence in fiscal terms 
than other social spending (see Chapters 4.3 and 
5.1). In the course of the 1990s, however, pen-
sions lost much of their purchasing power, not 
least because of the sharp drop in contribution 
receipts at a time of declining real wages and open 
unemployment. Many pensioners therefore con-
tinue to be gainfully employed, are supported by 
their relatives and/or are affected by poverty. As 
the high employment ratios in Soviet times mean 
that almost all the elderly are currently entitled to 
a pension, the existing retirement pension schemes 
can be regarded as an implicit variant of categori-
cal targeting.269 
The optimum design of retirement pension 
schemes is the subject of an international debate, 
which largely focuses on the question whether 
pay-as-you-go financing or full funding is more 
appropriate.270 In pay-as-you-go schemes contri-
butions are used to finance pension payments in 
the same period. Apart from equalization reserves, 
a stock of capital is not formed. Pay-as-you-go 
financing is based on an intergenerational con-
tract, with the gainfully employed ensuring the 
financing of retirement pensions through their 
pension insurance contributions. In so doing, they 
also acquire pension rights of their own, which 
then have to be financed by a future generation of 
                                                     
269  See, however, Milanovic (1998), p. 108: "[...] if the 
average level of pension in a country is relatively low, 
pensioners will tend to be poor. The poorer the pen-
sioners, the better targeted pension spending will ap-
pear simply because most pensions will be received by 
the poor." 
270 See, for example, Ribhegge (1999) and Breyer (2000). 
workers. In contrast, under the funded system the 
individual's contributions are saved until he or she 
reaches pensionable age. The pension is then paid 
from the accumulated capital stock and the in-
come earned on it. An intergenerational contract is 
not needed in the case of the funded system since 
there are no intergenerational transfers. Apart 
from the question of financing, there are other 
important design decisions to be taken on the or-
ganization of retirement pension schemes.271 In the 
debate on pension policy, however, a highly con-
densed classification of retirement pension 
schemes has gained acceptance. A pay-as-you-go 
scheme is usually associated with government 
sponsorship and redistribution, funded systems 
with private sponsorship and the absence of redis-
tribution.272 The debate on the economic advan-
tages and disadvantages of pay-as-you-go vs fund-
ing is often overshadowed by a fundamental nor-
mative disagreement, primarily as regards the 
roles of the state, the market and the individual 
within the retirement pension scheme. 
Representatives of the "new pension orthodoxy", 
who want to see retirement pension schemes pri-
vatized, like to refer to the 1981 Chilean pension 
reform, the first to replace a public pay-as-you-go 
scheme with a private funded system.273 Accord-
ing to its proponents, a complete or partial change 
to the funded system increases aggregate saving 
and investment, makes the capital market more 
dynamic and contributes significantly to the 
growth of the economy. They also claim that the 
role of the state in the retirement pension scheme 
is greatly reduced, which is thought to ease the tax 
                                                     
271 A pension insurance scheme can, for example, be or-
ganized on a private or public basis, membership of an 
existing scheme can be compulsory or voluntary, ele-
ments of redistribution may be incorporated into it, and 
its design may be tax-funded or contribution-funded. 
272 See Queisser (1993). 
273  For the "new pension orthodoxy", which is propagated 
first and foremost by the World Bank and other interna-
tional financial institutions, see Müller (1999), Müller 
(2001) and Müller (2002b). For the Chilean pension re-
form see Queisser (1993) and Uthoff (2001). 
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burden.274 These postulates are increasingly criti-
cized today.275 Nonetheless, the privatization of 
retirement pension schemes continues to be a 
leading recommendation and one that has fallen 
on fertile soil in the transition countries in particu-
lar.276 
Kazakhstan changed completely to the funded 
system on the Chilean model in 1998, although 
not every design element of the South American 
precedent was adopted. In view of limited state 
regulatory competence and the rudimentary nature 
of the capital market, the international assessment 
of the Kazakh reform, which was initiated with 
technical expertise provided by the ADB and 
USAID, has been largely critical (see Box 5).277 
Kazakh pensioners too were highly dissatisfied, 
since the problem of outstanding pension pay-
ments was not solved until years after the radical 
reform. Following the Kazakh precedent, other 
countries in the Central Asian region also showed 
an interest in a Chilean-style reform, but it is gen-
erally agreed that their capital markets are even 
less well equipped for a reform of this nature.278 In 
this respect, their reform efforts were concentrated 
on the parameters of the public pay-as-you-go 
system. 
                                                     
274  See World Bank (1994). The programmatic title of the 
prominent World Bank study ("Averting the Old Age 
Crisis. Policies to Protect the Old and Promote 
Growth") already made it clear that a global pension 
crisis scenario was to be countered with a strategy 
which was not only motivated by social policy but also 
pursued growth policy intentions. 
275  For a critique of the assumptions of the "new pension 
orthodoxy“ see Orszag / Stiglitz (2001) and Barr 
(2002). 
276  From 1998 to 2002 Hungary, Poland, Latvia, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Estonia, Macedonia and Lithuania decided to 
make a partial change to the funded system. Romania, 
Slovakia and Ukraine too currently have plans for a 
multi-pillar system with a compulsory funded compo-
nent. See Müller (2002a). 
277  See Flassbeck / Zwiener (1999) and Ellerman (2001). 
278 See, for example, Dobronogov (2003). In the early 1990s 
Ahmad / Schneider (1993) calculated that a change to a 
funded system would also be unattractive for Central 
Asia on demographic grounds, since it would entail 
higher contributions than under pay-as-you-go financing. 
In Central Asia, as in other transition countries, 
the retirement pension systems inherited from the 
Soviet era needed to be reformed to restore their 
financial stability, which had been seriously im-
paired during the initial years of transformation.279 
The greatest challenge for the contribution-funded 
systems in the Central Asian context is the steady 
fall in employment in the formal sector, which 
will result in a sharp rise in system dependency 
ratios and the erosion of what has hitherto been 
almost universal entitlement. Pension experts 
agreed that raising the pensionable age, adopting 
stricter conditions for early retirement and invalid-
ity pensions, abolishing sectoral privileges and 
separating pension insurance from other branches 
of social insurance are among the measures that 
need to be taken, but they are politically sensitive 
and only some of them have been implemented. 
The introduction of indexing rules and the punc-
tual payment of pensions – i.e. measures to pre-
vent benefit erosion – is often precluded by a fis-
cal argument. Much the same is true of abandon-
ing a relatively compressed pension structure for 
closer contribution-payment equivalence, which 
might increase the incentive to pay contributions. 
In 1997 the Kyrgyz reformers opted in this con-
text for the integration of a virtual defined-
contribution principle into the existing pay-as-
you-go schemes (notional defined contribution 
scheme).280 The implementation deficiencies that 
have so far occurred in this context are not sur-
prising, this innovative reform measure being, 
                                                     
279  For the Soviet pension system see Chandler (2000) and 
Castel / Fox (2001). 
280 Notional defined contribution schemes imitate the logic 
of funded systems. The pension insurance fund records 
the contributions received in individual accounts. When 
payments are calculated, the indexed total of the indi-
vidual contributions are divided by the remaining life 
expectancy. Systems of this kind are also to be found in 
Latvia, Poland, Sweden and Mongolia. As they are 
suitable as an intermediate step towards pension priva-
tization, they are also supported by the World Bank to-
day – as in Kyrgyzstan's case. See Anderson / Becker 
(1999), IMF (1999) and Kyrgyz Republic (2001). 
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after all, a highly ambitious project in terms of 
administrative capacity.281 
5.2.3 Health Policy 
In the health sector too an international compari-
son reveals a wide variety of organizational forms 
differing primarily in the roles allotted to the state, 
the market and the individual.282 The three most 
important basic types are presented in the follow-
ing as a classificational basis on which to examine 
                                                     
281  See Dobronogov (2003), p. 17: "… the Kyrgyz Repub-
lic may have overreached itself by attempting an ad-
ministratively complex notional defined contribution 
reform." 
282  See FES (1996) and Barr (1998). 
the current situation of the health sector in Central 
Asia. 
• Public health services: This is tax-funded 
health care which is open to the whole popula-
tion at no additional cost. As the medical fac-
tors of production are state-owned, there is no 
purchaser/provider split. Owing to the hierar-
chical allocation of resources, the patient's 
freedom of choice is limited, and health ser-
vices are rationed. This organizational form 
exists, for example, in Spain and the United 
Kingdom (National Health Service). 
• Social insurance model: This model is charac-
terized by compulsory insurance linked to 
employment relationships in the formal sec-
tor. The contributions vary with income and 
are usually shared by the employer and em-
ployee. They also give the members of the in-
sured person's family health insurance cover. 
Box 5: Pension Privatization in Kazakhstan 
The state pension insurance scheme in Kazakhstan came in for public criticism in the mid-1990s because pensions 
were not inflation-indexed and were, moreover, paid out several months late so as to ease the pressure on the ex-
penditure side. Outstanding pension payments were estimated at no less than 2 % of GDP at the end of 1996. Those 
affected vainly tried to claim their rights by taking part in country-wide protests and hunger strikes. Against this 
background the Kazakh government decided to take a drastic step: the existing pay-as-you-go scheme was closed 
and replaced with a funded retirement pension scheme. At that time every insured person had to choose one of 
twelve competing pension funds, the contributions being collected in an individual pension account. Investment 
companies are now placing these compulsory savings in the capital market. 
Most Kazakh pension funds are operated by private owners, but there is also a state pension fund, which canvasses 
for business with a conservative investment profile. Contrary to the reformers' expectations, the vast majority of 
Kazakhs initially opted for the state fund, because it seemed to them to be the most trustworthy, despite the lower 
returns. In the meantime, the private pension funds' share of the monthly contribution receipts has risen from 20 % 
(1998) to 70 % (2001), and the state fund is also to be privatized in the near future. As the Kazakh capital market 
has few investment opportunities to offer the new, rapidly growing financial institutions, a substantial proportion of 
the capital, estimated at US $ 1.1 billion in October 2001, is invested in government securities. Their share of the 
portfolio fell only slightly from an average of 92 % in 2000 to 62 % in 2001. 
While a pension contribution of 25.5 % was collected until the reform, the insured now pay only 10 % to the pen-
sion fund of their choice. For the time being, however, their employers still have to make a 15 % contribution to 
cover the transition costs resulting from the reform, which was partly financed with a World Bank loan of US $ 300 
million. Pension entitlements acquired until the end of 1997 were recognized and declared to be national budget 
liabilities. The transitional generation will therefore receive both a state and a private pension. If the total should be 
very small, it will be topped up by the Kazakh government to the level of the minimum pension (70 % of the mini-
mum subsistence level). Those who do not satisfy the minimum qualifying requirements will receive a modest 
social pension. Recent studies by the Kazakh Finance and Social Ministry indicate the likelihood of a significant 
decrease in replacement rates, since most contributors have a very low income. As they will make no more than 
small contributions over the years and as there is as yet no annuity market in Kazakhstan, the question is how dis-
bursements will be made in the pension fund sector. Currently, only one-off payments are made, since the capital 
saved in less than five years is not enough for life-long monthly pension payments. 
 
Source: Baldridge (1999); Flassbeck / Zwiener (1999); Orenstein (2000); Andrews (2001); Ellerman (2001); 
Berniyazova (2002); IMF (2002b) 
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Health insurance funds and public-sector pro-
viders of medical services may be joined by 
private insurers and service providers. This 
pluralist form of organization, which may be 
combined with a purchaser/provider split, is 
found, for example, in Germany and Canada. 
• Private-sector model: Where the health sector 
is organized in this way, not only are the 
health insurance funds private enterprises 
charging premiums that depend on risks, but 
the providers of medical services too. Insur-
ance is not as a rule compulsory. It is thus left 
to the individual or his employer to pay for 
medical care. A variant of this organizational 
form, which similarly makes a purchaser/ 
provider split possible, has been adopted in 
the USA. 
In Soviet times the health system was dominated 
by the goal enshrined in the constitution of guar-
anteeing the whole population access to free 
medical care.283 On gaining their independence, 
the Central Asian countries inherited a tax-funded 
public health service. In the past ten years most 
countries of the region have attempted to reorgan-
ize the existing health system, but so far the re-
sults have been mixed (see Box 6).284 Health ex-
perts estimate that substantial cost savings could 
be achieved if the range of services was redes 
igned. The Soviet health system featured, for ex-
ample, a high level of specialization among the 
doctors, long periods of hospitalization, a large 
number of beds and a generous staff-to-patient 
ratio.285 From this it can be inferred that the severe 
cutbacks in staff and hospital beds to be seen in 
most Central Asian countries (see Table 12) need 
not necessarily lead to a deterioration of the care 
                                                     
283 In the case of out-patient care, however, a contribution 
sometimes had to be made towards the cost of medi-
cines. For the Soviet legacy see Klugman / Schieber 
(1996), Savas / Gedik (1999) and Field (2002). 
284  A comprehensive, up-to-date analysis of the Central 
Asian health sector and detailed proposals for reforms 
are provided by McKee / Healy / Falkingham (2002). 
285  See, for example, Falkingham (1999c), Staines (1999) 
and World Bank (2000c). This is not true of Tajikistan; 
see Box 6. 
provided. As, however, salaries are well below the 
average and so inadequate, some medical staff 
have more than one full-time post, which is toler-
ated by the state, but results in reduced attend-
ance. It is, moreover, in the hospitals' interests to 
show that they have as many staff as possible so 
as to maximize the funds allocated to them. It is 
estimated that some 20 % of medical staff are 
currently inactive (e.g. recipients of invalidity or 
retirement pensions).286 
If greater emphasis was placed on primary care, 
e.g. through the introduction of the family doctor 
model, and if out-patient care was given prefer-
ence over in-patient treatment, considerable cost 
saving would, however, be possible, especially as 
the hospital sector accounts for two thirds to three 
quarters of the state health budget in all the Cen-
tral Asian countries except Uzbekistan.287 The 
whole system of budgeting and financing health 
services in Central Asia should, moreover, be so 
reorganized as to create incentives inherent in the 
system to improve performance and keep costs 
under control.288 Experience in other transition 
countries shows that, if complex institutional 
reforms in the health sector are to have a chance 
of succeeding, the most important stakeholders 
must be involved. 
In the rationalization measures so far taken noth-
ing has been done to ensure that the resources 
saved are reinvested in the health sector. Nor, at a 
time of limited government extractive capacity 
and a growing informal sector, have the attempts 
by some of the Central Asian countries to estab-
lish a health insurance system on the western 
model led to the tapping of substantial financial 
resources (see Box 6). Some even dispute the wis-
                                                     
286  See Healy (2002). 
287  See Healy / Falkingham / McKee (2002) and Vang / 
Hajioff (2002). 
288  This includes, for example, a mix of prospective and 
retrospective payment mechanisms, in which perform-
ance incentives and cost control keep each other in 
check, and a purchaser/provider split. See UNICEF 
(2001), McKee / Healy / Falkingham (2002) and 
Bonilla-Chacin / Murrugarra / Temourov (2003). 
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dom of abandoning a tax-funded public health 
service in Central Asia.289 Per capita government  
spending on health in all the Central Asian coun-
tries except Kazakhstan is so low today that not 
even basic medical care can be guaranteed (see 
Chapter 5.1). The World Bank estimates that at 
least US $ 12 per capita is needed in low-income 
countries and US $ 21.50 in middle-income coun-
tries for minimum medical care comprising no 
more than inoculations, ante- and post-natal care 
                                                     
289  See Savas / Gedik (1999). 
and HIV/AIDS campaigns.290 The current finan-
cial endowment is simply not enough to maintain 
the existing medical infrastructure and to compen-
sate medical staff appropriately. 
At present, patients and their families therefore 
have to make informal payments to be sure of 
medical treatment.291 Though illegal, such pay-
                                                     
290  See IMF / World Bank (2002c), p. 16. 
291  See Lewis (2000), p. v: "Informal payments have be-
come a major impediment to health care access leading 
to both reduced consumption due to unaffordable cost 
Box 6: The State of the Reforms in the Central Asian Health Sector 
Kazakhstan: In 1996 a compulsory health insurance system was introduced by decree. However, as major difficulties 
were encountered in the collection of contributions and the financial resources raised were embezzled, the country 
had to revert to the tax-funding of the health care system a short time later. Informal payments are estimated to ac-
count for a third of total health spending. On the provider side some public health care has been transferred to inde-
pendently administered, financially autonomous enterprises. The administration of the hospitals has also been 
handed over to the oblasts in some cases. Private health providers were authorized in 1991, but they mostly run 
pharmacies and doctors' practices. Most of the medical infrastructure continues to be state-owned. Rural health care 
is in a desperate state. 
Kyrgyzstan: A law introducing a compulsory health insurance system was passed in 1992, but did not enter into 
force until 1997. Contributions are paid by employers, while state subsidies cover the unemployed, pensioners and 
children. At present, 70 % of the Kyrgyz population have health insurance. Owing to major difficulties encountered 
in the collection of contributions and the de facto cross-subsidization of pension insurance, the health sector is 
chronically underfunded and depends on informal payments. Primary care is currently being reorganized with donor 
support. A family doctor model, initially tried out in pilot projects in Issyk-Kul, Bishkek and Chui, is now to be 
introduced throughout the country. The reforms are being undertaken as part of the Manas programme developed 
jointly with WHO. Private health providers have so far focused on pharmacies, but also run some clinics in urban 
areas. 
Tajikistan: The tax-funded public health sector has so far been retained. The services provided are administered 
partly by central government and partly at local level. About a third of the national health budget is financed by 
foreign donors. Informal payments are, however, estimated at two thirds of total health spending. As many doctors 
and nurses left the country during the civil war, considerable importance is currently attached to the training of 
medical staff. Comprehensive reforms are planned – on the Kyrgyz model – as part of the Somoni programme. 
Turkmenistan: The public health sector is still financed primarily from budget resources. In 1996 a state health insur-
ance scheme was introduced. It is based on voluntary contributions, but is not yet self-supporting. Patients are there-
fore required to make substantial formal and informal payments. Buildings and medical equipment are in very poor 
condition. Reforms have so far concentrated on primary health care, although the number of hospitals beds has also 
been reduced. There are also reports that the first private providers of health services, including a hospital, have 
started work. A coordinated approach to reforms was planned as part of the Lukman programme, but the latter was 
suspended before its implementation began. 
Uzbekistan: The public health system has so far been retained. It is still organized along Soviet lines. Although there 
are plans for extensive reforms and the involvement of private providers, a comprehensive reform strategy for the 
health sector has yet to be established. Government health spending is currently supplemented not only by substan-
tial formal and informal payments by patients but also by foreign donors, primarily on a project basis. 
 
Source:  Savas / Gedik (1999); Kulzhanov / Healy (2002); Ilkhamov / Jakubowski / Hajioff (2002); Mamedkuliev / 
Shevkun / Hajioff (2002); Rahminov / Gedik / Healy (2002); Sargaldakova et al. (2002); Savas / Gedik / 
Craig (2002); Bonilla-Chacin / Murrugarra / Temourov (2003) 
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ments were already common in Communist times. 
The attempt to convert them into formal fees as an 
additional source of finance for the health sector 
has largely failed in Central Asia, as in other tran-
sition countries. Formal fees now have to be paid 
as well as informal payments (see Box 6), making 
it far more difficult in the current situation of 
growing income poverty to obtain medical care 
and medicines.292 Studies show that poor people in 
Central Asia spend a larger proportion of their 
income on informal payments than those who are 
materially better off. Furthermore, the rural popu-
lation's private spending on health was higher than 
the urban population's.293 The predominantly in-
formal nature of these payments leaves no room 
for government control, such as the reduction or 
waiving of fees for population groups particularly 
affected by poverty.294 
The changes to the Central Asian health system so 
far appear to have been reflected primarily in an 
erosion of medical care in rural areas, specialist 
clinics in urban areas having been less affected by 
the general underfunding. The available indicators 
point to a deterioration in the health status of the 
Central Asian population in the past decade (see 
also Chapter 4.1). Inadequate medical care and a 
poor health status have an adverse effect not only 
on human and protective capabilities but also on 
economic capabilities, to use OECD/ DAC termi-
nology (see Chapter 2.1). As this gives rise to 
substantial aggregate costs and even greater Edu-
cation policy poverty, a change of trend in Central 
Asian health policy is urgently needed.295 
                                                                                  
and the selling of personal assets to finance care." The 
author points out that the informal payments are dis-
tinct from the gifts with which gratitude is traditionally 
expressed in Central Asia. 
292  See Falkingham (1999c), Savas / Gedik (1999) and 
Falkingham (2002). 
293  See Sari / Langenbrunner (2001). 
294 See UNICEF (2001), p. 59: "Since informal payments 
bypass the official system, they in effect reinforce their 
cause: the scarcity of public financial resources." 
295  For the economic costs of a poor health status see 
UNICEF (2001). 
5.2.4 Education Policy  
Universal access to education and the literacy of 
the entire population were among the accom-
plishments of the Communist era.296 As Table 13 
has shown, however, attendance of nurseries, 
schools and universities fell sharply in the first 
decade of independence in almost all the Central 
Asian countries. The education sector also had to 
contend with some sensitive financial cuts (see 
Chapter 5.1), which had particularly grave conse-
quences at a time of  rapid population growth. As 
salaries today are very low or are paid several 
months late, many teachers have had either to 
change to another occupation or to take on second 
jobs to earn enough to live on. The financial re-
sources available are often insufficient to heat and 
maintain the school building, and schoolbooks can 
no longer be provided in sufficient numbers. Ow-
ing to a shortage of space, especially in rural ar-
eas, tuition is given in two or three shifts. "As 
accumulated human and physical capital is eroded 
through non-investment and low teacher morale, 
commensurate declines in quality and access 
might be expected to follow."297 
The serious cuts in the funding of education have 
resulted in formal and informal payments now 
being on the agenda in this sector too and in ac-
cess to education for the children of poor families 
being far from a matter of course these days (see 
also Box 7). In many cases parents are expected to 
buy teaching materials or to pay a lending charge 
for schoolbooks and, not infrequently, even to 
contribute towards heating costs, necessary repairs 
and salaries. Sometimes teaching staff also expect 
gifts from parents, which the latter hope will re-
sult in their children gaining higher marks. Trans-
port to school is another cost item, and many poor 
families cannot afford school uniforms, warm 
clothing and winter boots. Studies show that the 
two reasons most frequently cited for the failure 
of Central Asian children to attend school are bad 
                                                     
296  See World Bank (2000c). 
297  Klugman (1999), p. 440. 
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weather and lack of clothing.298 An added factor, 
particularly in rural areas, is that children of ele-
mentary school age are already expected to help 
out at home. This affects girls more than boys. The  
                                                     
298  See Falkingham (1999c), World Bank (2000d), Minis-
try of Education of the Republic of Tajikistan (2002) 
and Rysakova et al. (2002). 
lack of access to education in Central Asia thus 
has both a gender component and a geographical 
component, which is further exacerbated by re-
gional disparities in the allocation of resources. 
However, failure to attend school may also be due 
to supply-side factors when the quality of the edu-
Box 7: The Situation in the Central Asian Education Sector 
Kazakhstan: Pre-school education capacities have been reduced by almost 80 % in the last decade. As the fees for the 
remaining nursery schools are prohibitively high, public education institutions will now be offering a free pre-school 
programme for 5- and 6-year old children. Capacities have also been reduced at the primary and secondary school 
levels in recent years. New kinds of secondary schools, such as special, grammar and private schools, are currently 
emerging, but the fees they charge are very high. Many public vocational schools have been closed, while a number 
of private institutions in this field have opened their doors. At university level too, it is primarily the private institu-
tions that are expanding. The Kazakh constitution guarantees all citizens a compulsory, free education. The badly and 
irregularly paid teachers, however, cannot guarantee a high-quality education. New schoolbooks have been intro-
duced since the 1997/98 academic year. 
Kyrgyzstan: In the first decade of independence pre-school education capacities were reduced by 75 %. There are 
virtually no all-day schools left. According to surveys, formal and informal payments are now expected of 99.3 % of 
all schoolchildren. With the support of the ADB the Kyrgyz government is trying to provide schoolbooks and other 
services for socially disadvantaged children, but they are already receiving far less education. The quality of educa-
tion in schools has fallen sharply, especially in rural areas. At university level the number of private institutions is 
growing, and although they charge fees, they are known for having more innovative syllabi than public universities. 
Tajikistan: Pre-school education capacities have fallen by 44 % in the last decade, the rural areas suffering the most 
serious cuts. As the quality of care provided in the remaining public nursery schools has deteriorated sharply owing 
to the difficult material situation, most parents prefer company-owned nursery schools or home care. The quality of 
education in schools has also declined sharply. During the civil war years many teachers left the country. Today the 
roofs of many school buildings leak, window-panes are missing, and the electricity supply is irregular. In addition, 
there is a shortage of Tajik-language schoolbooks and other teaching materials. Schools are administered at local 
level and are chronically underfunded. Major parental contributions of a formal and informal nature are therefore 
expected, although under the Tajik constitution the first nine years of education are free and compulsory. In rural 
areas, however, there is often no more than an elementary school near where children live, and attendance of the 
more distant secondary schools, as of the universities, is usually confined to the sons of the families. Since 1994 
grammar schools and private education institutions have also been authorised. Many international donors are cur-
rently supporting reforms in the Tajik education sector. 
Turkmenistan: The Turkmen constitution guarantees all citizens a free education, and three quarters of the population 
have at least secondary education. Nursery school attendance has fallen in the last decade, however, and UNICEF 
figures also reveal a significant decline in elementary school attendance. Some school buildings are in poor condition, 
and in some cases there is a shortage of teaching materials. At university level stringent admission restrictions mean 
that only a small proportion of the population is able to study today. Apart from the public institutions there are cur-
rently only a few educational facilities in mixed ownership. In the next few years 12,000 new teachers will be needed 
annually because of the high birth rates, and with present capacities there is no way that they can be trained. 
Uzbekistan: Nursery school attendance has fallen by more than half in the last decade, especially in the rural areas. At 
elementary school level there has also been a sharp decline, and the universities are now attended by only a small 
minority of Uzbekistan's population. In 1997 the Uzbek government adopted a comprehensive reform programme for 
the education sector, which was largely welcomed by the World Bank. Up-to-date information on the stage reached 
in its implementation is unavailable, however. 
Source: World Bank (1999b); World Bank (2000d); Ammaniyazova (2001); Koichumanova (2001); Mukham-
madieva (2001); Musabekov (2001); World Bank (2001d); UNESCO / UNICEF (2002) 
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cation provided is very poor and teachers are ab-
sent.299 
Formal tuition fees are now charged at the public 
colleges and universities, and informal payments 
are also widespread when students are admitted 
and take examinations.300 The newly established 
private colleges, on the other hand, confine them-
selves to charging formal tuition fees. Thus the 
gradual pluralization of providers is not entirely to 
blame for the increasing social stratification of the 
education system. In the public education sector 
too, formal and informal payments lead to the 
exclusion of children from the often large families 
in the lower income brackets, even, increasingly, 
from literacy courses. Studies show that the pro-
portion of income spent on education in Central 
Asian households rises as per capita household 
consumption falls.301 As in the health sector, the 
informal nature of most payments precludes gov-
ernment control, such as the reduction or waiving 
of fees. 
The available studies show that access to educa-
tion is particularly important for the children of 
poor families. Inadequate education reduces their 
chances of earning a reasonable living and in-
creases the risk of poverty.302 The literature on 
human capital sees investment in education as a 
way of improving human productivity, while 
UNICEF emphasizes its importance for the cohe-
sion of society, especially in the transformation 
context.303 In Central Asia the decline in nursery, 
primary and secondary school attendance and the 
closure of many facilities, especially company-
owned ones, are also likely to have implications 
                                                     
299  See Falkingham (2003). 
300  See Burnett / Cnobloch (2003), p. 25: "The use of 
informal payments has begun to create situations in 
which grades and admissions can be bought rather 
than earned." 
301  See World Bank (2000c), p. 237. 
302  See Vandycke (2001). 
303  See Barr (1998) and UNICEF (2001). The human 
capital approach has also been applied to the health sec-
tor. For a critical description see Breyer / Zweifel 
(1999). 
for the health and nutritional status of children, 
since preventive medical care and hot and cold 
meals have traditionally been provided by school 
and pre-school care facilities. With income pov-
erty growing, it must be assumed that resources at 
home cannot compensate for the loss of such ser-
vices.304 
It is generally agreed that, when resources are 
scarce, primary and secondary education should 
have absolute priority, whereas opinions on the 
importance of pre-school care differ.305 At a time 
of high youth unemployment (see Chapter 3.2.2) 
vocational education is also very important, al-
though there is very little demand for it at present. 
The aim should therefore be to tailor vocational 
school curricula to the requirements of the market 
economy and newly emerging occupational areas 
and to make them attractive to young women too. 
The educational reforms pending in Central Asia, 
however, also extend to redesigning schoolbooks 
and curricula and teaching interactive, less fact-
centred teaching methods and new syllabi, for 
which comprehensive teacher training will be 
necessary. 
The Central Asian education-policy-makers must 
also face up to the reality of a multiethnic popula-
tion that is to be found in all the Central Asian 
countries (see Chapter 3.2.1). As Russian is in-
creasingly ousted as the lingua franca in admin-
istration, business and academia and the language 
of the titular ethnic group begins to be used as the 
official language, problems arise for the other 
ethnic groups.306 They may go so far as renewed 
                                                     
304 See Ismail / Micklewright (1997) and UNICEF (2001). 
305  Falkingham (1999c) and Vandycke (2001) criticise the 
sharp decline in nursery school attendance, which 
makes it difficult for women in financially weak fami-
lies to pursue a gainful activity or for the brothers or 
sisters of children of pre-school age to attend school. 
Children from poor families should not, moreover, have 
less favourable opportunities. Different assessments can 
be found in World Bank documents; see World Bank 
(2000b) and World Bank (2000d). 
306  See Akiner (2002), p. 25. In Kazakhstan Russian has 
been retained as the official language of the administra-
tion; in Kyrgyzstan it was reintroduced as the official 
language in 2000. 
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illiteracy as a result of the change of alphabet, as 
has happened in Uzbekistan.307 In most of the 
Central Asian countries ethnic minorities account 
for a considerable proportion of the population, 
ranging from 27 % in Turkmenistan to 60 % in 
Kazakhstan. As there are hardly any dictionaries, 
language courses or schoolbooks for these minori-
ties, the multilinguality of the Central Asian re-
gion also poses challenges for education policy.308 
5.3 Other Initiatives to Prevent or 
Reduce Poverty 
Although social policy can make a major contri-
bution to the prevention, mitigation and manage-
ment of risks relevant to poverty, it is not disputed 
today that the multidimensionality of poverty calls 
for complex problem-solving approaches, which 
must extend beyond the conventional areas of 
social policy action (see Chapter 2). This chapter 
will therefore refer to a number of more compre-
hensive strategies that have been developed of late 
to prevent or reduce poverty in Central Asia. They 
include the recently launched international donor 
initiative for the CIS-7 countries, among them 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the na-
tional poverty strategies developed by the Kazakh 
and Kyrgyz governments and the PRSP process 
launched in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (see Chap-
ter 2.2). On the other hand, it has hitherto been 
declared government policy particularly in Turk-
menistan, but also in Uzbekistan, to forgo the 
establishment of an explicit poverty reduction 
strategy and instead to prevent the occurrence of 
income poverty by undertaking as gradual a trans-
formation process as possible and retaining price 
controls and subsidies (see also Chapter 3.2.2).309 
                                                     
307  For a number of years the Latin rather than the Cyrillic 
alphabet has been used for the Uzbek language. 
308  See Cimera / FES (2002). 
309  As, however, no reliable poverty indicators are avail-
able in these two countries (see Chapter 4), it is diffi-
cult to judge how successful these gradual strategies 
have been. 
5.3.1 National Poverty Programmes 
Convinced that taking social measures to cushion 
the negative effects of structural adjustment pro-
grammes cannot be enough in itself to reduce and 
prevent poverty, the World Social Summit in Co-
penhagen appealed in its Programme of Action for 
the formulation and implementation of national 
poverty plans (see also Chapter 2.2). The idea was 
to identify the structural causes of poverty and to 
combat them with comprehensive strategies. Be-
sides an accurate analysis of the problems, "tar-
gets, timetables, budgets and organizations" are 
considered to be particularly important if there is 
to be more than mere declarations of intent.310 
Kyrgyzstan was one of the first CIS countries to 
present a poverty programme of its own. Early 
1998 saw the adoption of the National Programme 
on Overcoming Poverty, known as Araket.311 The 
objectives set in this programme were the elimina-
tion of income poverty and the raising of living 
standards. The underlying strategy is based on 
helping the poor to help themselves and is de-
signed to combine labour-intensive growth, in-
vestment in human development and a safety net 
for the poorest of the poor. According to an 
evaluation carried out by UNDP in 1999, how-
ever, Araket did not have its own budget and over-
lapped other social programmes. Another major 
constraint was the lack of capacity at national and 
local level for implementing a comprehensive 
poverty programme.312 
In Kazakhstan poverty reduction already formed 
part of the long-term "Kazakhstan 2030" strategy 
adopted in late 1997.313 A separate poverty pro-
gramme, the State Program for Poverty Reduc-
tion, 2003-2005, has, however, been in prepa-
ration only since 2001 in a participatory pro-
cess financed by a loan from the ADB, the 
                                                     
310  UNDP (2000c), p. 32. 
311  UNDP (2000c), p. 119. The Kyrgyz word araket trans-
lates as "effort, endeavour". 
312  See UNDP (2000c). 
313  See UNDP (2001a). 
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World Bank and UNDP.314 The programme was to 
have been signed by the Kazakh President by the 
end of 2002. The drafts hitherto presented show 
that the poverty reduction strategy developed for 
Kazakhstan will include the following key ele-
ments: economic growth that benefits the poor 
(pro-poor growth); the further development of the 
social sphere to give the poor access to health 
care, education and social assistance; improve-
ments to infrastructure to make for better access to 
clean drinking water, sanitary facilities and com-
munications; targeted regional development 
strategies to alleviate poverty in rural areas, small 
towns and areas affected by environmental pollu-
tion; and measures to improve participation and to 
develop civil society.315 To use OECD/DAC ter-
minology, not only economic and human capabili-
ties but also political capabilities will thus be ad-
dressed (see Chapter 2.1). 
5.3.2 Poverty Programmes between 
Donorship and Ownership 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are so far the only 
countries in the region to have presented Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).316 The Uzbek 
government has meanwhile similarly declared its 
willingness to participate in the PSRP process.317 
As mentioned in Chapter 2.2, the PRSP, created in 
1999, is an instrument that provides for a country 
to establish, on its own responsibility and with 
civil society participating, a multidimensional, 
long-term poverty reduction strategy geared to 
partnership with donors.318 The establishment of a 
PRSP recognized by the IMF and World Bank is 
                                                     
314  Background information can be found on the website 
of the Kazakh poverty reduction programme: http:// 
www.antipoverty.nursat.kz/poverty_eng.htm, 2 Febru-
ary 2003. See also Dhar (2002). 
315  See Republic of Kazakhstan (2002). 
316  Kyrgyzstan was also a CDF pilot country, and Tajiki-
stan too has meanwhile established a CDF. 
317  See World Bank (2002d), p. 22. 
318  Background information on the PRSP process provided 
by the World Bank can be found on http://www.world-
bank.org/poverty/strategies/, 21 August 2002. 
now a requirement for debt cancellation under 
HIPC II and for concessionary PRGF loans.319 
While attention has so far been focused primarily 
on the establishment of the PRSPs, the challenges 
of the future will be posed by the implementation 
of the proclaimed strategies.320 
In Tajikistan an Interim Poverty Reduction Strat-
egy Paper (I-PRSP) was presented as early as 
October 2000.321 I-PRSPs represent an intermedi-
ate stage in the PRSP process, enabling access to 
be gained to concessionary financing. Contrary to 
current practice, the Tajik government had already 
been promised a PRGF in June 1998, i.e. before 
the PRSP process began, on condition that macro-
economic reforms were implemented under the 
aegis of the IMF and World Bank.322 These re-
forms comply with a detailed Policy Matrix, 
2000-2003, set out in the I-PRSP and include not 
only fiscal measures but also sweeping structural 
reforms.323 Normally, a "full PRSP" should be 
presented not later than twelve months after the I-
PRSP.324 However, the Tajik government did not 
complete this document until June 2002, after pub-
lishing the I-PRSP in three languages (Tajik, Rus-
sian and Uzbek) and discussing it with civil soci-
ety.325 The aims of the poverty reduction strategy 
outlined in the PRSP are to increase real incomes, 
to achieve a fair distribution of the benefits of 
growth and to ensure a rise in the living standards 
of the poorest population groups.326 The strategy 
                                                     
319  Some background information on the PRGF ca be 
found on the IMF's website: http://www.imf.org/ exter-
nal/np/exr/facts/ prgf.htm, 21 August 2002. 
320  See Development Committee (2002). 
321  See Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (2000). 
322   See IMF (2002c). 
323  See Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (2000), 
Annex I. 
324  According to the World Bank's website: http:// 
www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/overview.htm, 
21 August 2002. 
325 See Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (2002) 
and IDA / IMF (2002). 
326  See Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (2002), 
p. 11. 
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consists of the following four key elements: en-
couragement of accelerated, socially fair and la-
bour-intensive growth with the emphasis on ex-
ports; efficient and fair provision of basic social 
services; targeted support for the poorest popula-
tion groups; efficient governance and improved 
security.327 The social policy measures for which 
the programme provides are geared primarily to 
reforms in the education and health sectors with a 
view to reducing poverty, the existing transfer 
programmes (social assistance and pensions) also 
being seen as important instruments for achieving 
this goal. It is admitted in this context that these 
four areas of social policy currently suffer from 
serious underfunding. The Tajik government is 
hoping that the international financial institutions 
and other donors will help to reduce the large 
foreign debt, thus releasing resources for poverty 
reduction. 
The Kyrgyz I-PRSP, entitled "Interim National 
Strategy for Poverty Reduction", was presented in 
June 2001.328 A few months later the IMF's Ex-
ecutive Board adopted a PRGF arrangement for 
Kyrgyzstan, which was linked to a macro-
economic reform programme.329 In December 
2002 the full PRSP was presented in the shape of 
the National Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(NPRS).330 Not long before, an IMF mission had 
criticized the NPRS concept for poverty reduction 
as being very ambitious and pressed for a revision 
of the cost side of the planned programme.331 In 
conceptual terms the PRSP process is dovetailed 
with the CDF programme that has similarly been 
launched in Kyrgyzstan and is seen as the first 
phase of a long-term development strategy.332 The 
aim of the Kyrgyz NPRS is to expand the oppor-
tunities for citizens to enjoy an adequate and equi-
                                                     
327  See Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (2002), 
p. 12. 
328 See Kyrgyz Republic (2001). 
329  See IMF (2002a). 
330  See Kyrgyz Republic (2002). 
331  See IMF (2002a), p. 15. 
332  The Kyrgyz CDF was formulated for the period up to 
2010; see Kyrgyz Republic (2001). 
table standard of living.333 If this goal is to be 
achieved, it will be necessary above all to improve 
government efficiency, to develop a fair society, 
to ensure sustainable economic growth, to pro-
mote regional development and to increase secu-
rity.334 To reduce poverty, social policy instru-
ments are also to be used: social assistance based 
on targeting and the pension, education and health 
systems, which are, however, currently suffering 
from serious underfunding.335 For the NPRS im-
plementation phase the Kyrgyz government is 
hoping for internal and external sources of fi-
nance.336 At a consultative meeting of bi- and 
multilateral donors held in Bishkek in October 
2002 the Kyrgyz government was promised US $ 
700 million, half in the form of grants.337 
5.3.3 Donor-coordinated Poverty 
Reduction 
In February 2002 the IMF, World Bank, EBRD 
and ADB launched an international initiative for 
the seven low-income CIS countries. All of the 
countries of the CIS-7 group – Armenia, Azerbai-
jan, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan – are located in Central Asia or 
the Caucasus except Moldova.338 Most are re-
source-poor land-locked countries which were 
very badly affected by the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union and some of which are still suffering 
under internal armed conflict. According to the 
initiators' analysis of the problems, inadequate 
structural and institutional reforms in these coun-
tries have been among the main obstacles to the 
involvement of foreign donors and investors.339 
                                                     
333  See Kyrgyz Republic (2002), p. 5. 
334  See Kyrgyz Republic (2002), pp. 1 f. 
335  See Kyrgyz Republic (2002), pp. 10 ff. 
336  See Kyrgyz Republic (2002), pp. 24 f. 
337  See Anonymous (2002). 
338  CIS stands for "Commonwealth of Independent States". 
See IMF / World Bank (2002a), IMF / World Bank 
(2002c) and http://www.cis7.org, 29 January 2003. 
339 See IMF / World Bank (2002c), p. 3. 
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The aims of the initiative are to improve the repu-
tation of the CIS-7 countries by purposefully inte-
grating them into a donor-coordinated framework 
and to strengthen internal forces for reform. The 
international financial institutions are to act as 
"honest brokers" in this process, but ownership and 
political commitment are expected of the CIS-7 
countries themselves.340 Both bilateral and multi-
lateral activities are to be possible within the 
framework of the initiative. 
In practical terms the initiative for the CIS-7 
countries is meant to help them to reduce poverty, 
achieve an economic growth path and engage in 
regional cooperation in the areas of water, energy 
and trade.341 While the intraregional trade barriers 
affect both Central Asia and the Caucasus, the 
water and energy issue is largely confined to Cen-
tral Asia. In Soviet times Kyrgyzstan and Tajiki-
stan supplied the Central Asian republics with 
water when it was needed for agricultural pur-
poses, receiving supplies of energy from Kazakh-
stan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in the winter. 
With the transition to world market prices for oil 
and natural gas, these barter transactions no longer 
proceed smoothly. Kyrgyzstan, for example, now 
pays more for energy imports than it receives for 
its water exports and is forced to use its reservoirs 
of water to generate hydroelectric power. This, 
however, is jeopardizing the supply of water to 
Kyrgyzstan's neighbours. 
A key role in the initiative for the CIS-7 countries 
is to be played by the PRSPs they will submit or 
have already submitted.342 In addition, all the CIS-
7 countries except Uzbekistan are currently under-
taking Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) in 
cooperation with the World Bank with a view to 
increasing transparency and setting priorities in 
                                                     
340  IMF / World Bank (2002a), pp. 1 f. The idea here is 
that not only should the various governments gear 
themselves to reforms but that the public should also be 
made aware of the need for market-oriented reforms: 
"Reforms are unlikely to be effective without broad-
based ownership." 
341  IMF / World Bank (2000d) and Rasizade (2002). 
342  IMF / World Bank (2002a). 
public spending.343 The originators of the CIS-7 
Initiative emphasize that a wide range of fiscal, 
structural, social and institutional reforms and 
sustainably high economic growth rates will be 
needed if poverty in the region is to be success-
fully combated.344 Five countries in the group, 
known as the CIS-5, were already heavily in-
debted by the end of the first decade of their inde-
pendence; provision has been made for the re-
scheduling of their debts to be negotiated with the 
Paris Club.345 The first negotiations of this kind 
were concluded for Kyrgyzstan in March 2002.346 
6 Conclusions and Recommendations for 
Development Policy 
For the Central Asian republics established in 
1991, none of which had previously been an inde-
pendent state, the first decade of transformation 
brought major challenges. Remodelling the econ-
omy was far more difficult in the former Soviet 
periphery than in other transition countries and 
was accompanied by sweeping economic changes, 
very high rates of inflation, extensive job losses 
and a serious decline in real wages. After seven 
decades of a de facto guarantee of full employ-
ment the coping strategies available to the popula-
tion were limited, and any diversification of 
sources of income outside wage labour could only 
emerge slowly  amid the fundamental economic 
                                                     
343  Background information on the PERs can be found at 
the following World Bank website: http://www.world-
bank. org/publicsector/pe/p1pers.htm, 21 August 2002. 
344  IMF / World Bank (2002a), p. 12. This is based on a 
multidimensional definition of poverty. 
345  Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan, being less affected by 
indebtedness because of their export earnings (oil and 
gas or cotton), do not belong to the CIS-5. 
346 On 7 March 2002 Kyrgyzstan agreed with Denmark, 
Germany, France, Japan, Russia and Turkey on a non-
concessional flow rescheduling of the Kyrgyz public 
sector debt, providing to total cash relief of about US $ 
147 million; see IMF (2002a), p. 7. Georgia has also 
been able to conclude a debt rescheduling agreement 
with the Paris Club; see Wagstyl (2002). 
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changes. Substantial income poverty is therefore 
to be seen throughout Central Asia today, and in 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in particular it has be-
come a mass phenomenon. The data available 
indicate that the populations of Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan, both rich in natural resources, are 
somewhat better off, although they too feature 
major regional disparities.347 The abrupt end to the 
generous budget contributions from Moscow and 
the limited extractive capacity of the new admini-
strations have resulted in government transfers 
being provided on only a limited scale to alleviate 
the income poverty. 
The severe financial cuts suffered by the existing 
social policy institutions have resulted in non-
income-related dimensions of poverty also being 
observed in the region on an unprecedented scale. 
Thus access to education and medical care, once 
universal, is now being rapidly eroded because of 
serious supply-side reductions and the effects on 
the demand side of the spread of formal and in-
formal payments. At the same time, teachers and 
doctors, whose salaries are well below the na-
tional average wage and thus below subsistence 
level, are unlikely to devote themselves fully to 
the pupils or patients in their care. The benefits 
paid out by the pension insurance schemes, an 
important source of monetary income for house-
holds, are very modest at present. The signs are, 
moreover, that the people of Central Asia will 
have far less access to a formal retirement pension 
scheme in the future because of the rapid infor-
malization of the labour market. As only about 
half the working population pay contributions at 
the moment, the still universal entitlement to a 
retirement pension will soon be a thing of the past 
in Central Asia. 
The worsening of income poverty and the savage 
cuts in social services that have been occurring in 
Central Asia for a decade are currently in danger 
of causing a downward spiral affecting all five of 
the dimensions of human well-being distinguished 
                                                     
347  The inadequacy of the data does not currently permit 
any well-founded statements to be made about the scale 
of poverty in Uzbekistan. 
by the OECD's Development Assistance Commit-
tee.348 The deficiencies in the case of economic 
and human capabilities exacerbate one another: 
people with a low income in the Central Asian 
countries currently do not have sufficient access 
to education and health care. Poor education and 
health, however, reduce their chances of earning 
an adequate income. There is also considerable 
interaction between health status and level of edu-
cation.349 The two dimensions referred to above 
are closely linked to two others, since people af-
fected by poverty, illness and poor education have 
fewer opportunities to participate in the life of 
society as respected members (socio-cultural ca-
pabilities). Nor, in many cases, are they in a posi-
tion to withstand economic and external shocks 
(protective capabilities), which in turn has reper-
cussions for economic and human capabilities. 
Furthermore, the people of all the Central Asian 
countries currently suffer from major human 
rights violations and a lack of opportunities for 
political participation (political capabilities). 
As, then, the various dimensions of the poverty in 
Central Asia are exacerbating each other at pre-
sent, there is an urgent need for action. A key role 
in this will be played by the fight against income 
poverty and a reform of the existing social policy 
institutions. As will have become clear, this will 
primarily necessitate the mobilization of addi-
tional financial resources. In the Central Asian 
case this is admitted by the international financial 
institutions, whose discourse was initially focused 
on cuts in the transition countries' social budgets. 
At present, however, the available budget re-
sources plus the contributions and informal pay-
ments that can be mobilized are far from enough, 
especially in the resource-poor Central Asian 
countries, to protect the population against income 
poverty and to maintain universal access to the 
formal social policy institutions. This is particu-
larly true of Tajikistan, where almost the whole 
population has been affected by poverty since the 
civil war, leaving very little scope for redistribu-
tion within society. 
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If the serious underfunding of the core areas of 
social policy – social assistance, retirement pen-
sions, health and education – is not to be perpetu-
ated, the only solution in the short term is external 
transfers. The resources required should be mobi-
lized as part of an internationally coordinated 
donor initiative. A possible forum for this is the 
recently launched CIS-7 Initiative of bi- and mul-
tilateral donors, in which the Central Asian coun-
tries with low per capita incomes (Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) are involved. As most 
of the Central Asian countries have small popula-
tions, a major impact can be achieved with a com-
paratively minor injection of external resources. 
The external transfers should, however, be subject 
to an explicit time-limit, since the real challenge is 
to create a sustainable financial base for the Cen-
tral Asian social policy institutions. However, this 
objective can be achieved only in the medium 
term, since the basic requirement is a distinct im-
provement in extractive capacity of government in 
Central Asia. Steps should also be taken to pre-
vent the increasing crowding out of social spend-
ing by the growing debt servicing or by military 
spending, of which there are clear signs in the 
region at present. 
Greater efficiency in the use of available resources 
could be achieved by strengthening the currently 
modest administrative capacities.350 In keeping 
with social institution-building, the aim in this 
context should be to develop, train and equip a 
functioning service-providing administration. It 
might also be considered in this context whether 
the serious problems currently encountered in the 
disbursement of monetary transfers (social assis-
tance, pensions) could be overcome through the 
introduction of a cheque card system. This model, 
which enables transfers to be made through cash 
dispensers, has proved very successful elsewhere. 
It should be considered whether it might be a 
practicable alternative in the Central Asian con-
text, especially as universal electrification is part 
of the Soviet legacy. In the short term the irregu-
larities that occur in disbursement might be coun-
teracted by the creation of a new system whereby 
                                                     
350  See Dobronogov (2003). 
ombudsmen accept and examine complaints made 
by claimants. 
If the effectiveness of Central Asia's social policy 
institutions is to be increased, the flow of informa-
tion will need to be improved, both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. A periodic evaluation of living 
conditions is already undertaken in Kazakhstan, 
and it is also important for the other Central Asian 
countries to have up-to-date information on their 
social situation. In Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in 
particular the last surveys were conducted several 
years ago, and it was 2001 before the Uzbek gov-
ernment permitted the first living standards survey 
to be carried out in accordance with international 
rules. In the political dialogue it should be made 
clear that the social situation cannot be improved 
if the poverty problem is treated as a taboo. Where 
living standards surveys based on international 
rules do not satisfy the technical and professional 
requirements, it is important that they be im-
proved within the framework of technical coop-
eration. Local ownership in poverty reduction is 
conceivable in the medium term only if the ca-
pacities needed for the periodic measurement of 
poverty exist locally. Here again, coordination 
with other donors is essential if methodological 
disputes are to be settled promptly and duplication 
of effort is to be avoided. The World Bank is par-
ticularly active in the measurement of living stan-
dards. The suitability of its methodology for the 
Central Asian region is not, however, undisputed; 
the DfID and UNDP are currently working on 
methodological innovations. 
Donor-coordinated technical cooperation also has 
an important role to play in the area of advice on 
social policy. At present, the World Bank, the 
ADB and WHO are particularly involved in this 
sphere. There is, however, still a major need for 
the existing social policy institutions to be re-
formed, as will have become clear. In the four 
core areas – social assistance, retirement pensions, 
health and education – there is a wealth of interna-
tional experience, from which the Central Asian 
countries can benefit; but there are very few pa-
tent remedies. The goal should rather be to begin 
with a careful analysis of the specific economic 
and socio-cultural environment and then to under-
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take reforms capable of increasing the effective-
ness of the social policy institutions in the Central 
Asian countries. Special  attention should be paid 
in this context to reducing interregional disparities 
and to population groups particularly affected by 
poverty, such as children, the elderly, refugees 
and the rural population. As a reversion to no-
madism is evident in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 
in particular, social instruments tailored to the 
specific needs of those concerned, such as the use 
of mobile medical units and an intensive school 
programme in the winter camps, should be devel-
oped. The multilinguality of the Central Asian 
region similarly poses specific educational chal-
lenges. 
The results of the reform initiatives so far under-
taken and documented have tended to be mixed. It 
is reported that the allocation of social benefits by 
the Uzbek mahallas, having at first been appraised 
positively, has meanwhile resulted in these tradi-
tional institutions being coopted by the Karimov 
regime. Whether community-based targeting is 
appropriate in other Central Asian countries de-
pends on the ability of local communities to mobi-
lize the necessary information, to ensure effective 
monitoring of programme implementation and to 
prevent corruption.351 Where retirement pensions 
are concerned, the appropriateness of Kazakh 
pension privatization is highly contentious. Other 
countries in the region will have to forgo taking 
this radical step in the near future not least be-
cause they lack capital markets. Reforms within 
the existing current-income financing systems are 
all the more urgently needed if they are to be re-
stored to financial stability. In the health sector 
the Kazakh and Kyrgyz attempt to change from a 
tax-funded public health service to the contribu-
tion-based health insurance model has initially 
failed because of limited government extractive 
capacity and mismanagement. 
The contribution-funded social insurance schemes 
that already exist in the area of retirement pen-
                                                     
351 For an examination of local institutions, social capital 
and possible donor strategies in the Central Asian con-
text see World Bank (2002e). 
sions and are currently being introduced in the 
health sectors of some of the Central Asian coun-
tries face major challenges in the regional context. 
With employment in the formal sector steadily 
falling, they are in danger of resulting in greatly 
restricted access to old-age security and medical 
care. Contribution-funded systems are considered 
to be more incentive-compatible than the various 
tax-funded model variants (basic pension and 
public health service), but given the current ex-
pansion of the informal sector in Central Asia, the 
tax-funded alternatives should be carefully exam-
ined since they may be capable of preventing the 
stratification of access to social policy institutions 
in Central Asian. 
When it is being decided what form pension and 
health systems should take in the future, the moral 
concepts and ideas of justice held by the Central 
Asian people should be taken into account. Ex-
perience in other transition countries, the transfer-
ability of which could be verified by means of 
opinion polls, shows that it is felt to be unjust for 
wealthy members of society to enjoy better health 
care than poor people, and yet an income-related 
retirement pension is clearly preferred to a basic 
pension model. The institutional legacy may be 
primarily responsible for this apparent paradox: 
although everyone formally had equal access to 
the health system, some population groups were 
able to obtain privileged treatment even in Com-
munist times, contrary to the rules. Under the 
Soviet retirement pension scheme, on the other 
hand, the amount of pension received was based 
in the normal way on the individual's final earn-
ings and years of insurance – even though the 
pension structure was in fact highly compressed, 
reflecting the relatively limited differences in 
wages and salaries. 
Should insurance models be adopted for the pen-
sion and health sectors, it will be essential to de-
velop suitable social policy instruments for those 
who do not have access to a formal employment 
relationship. Some experience has already been 
gained in this area at international level in recent 
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years.352 A great deal might also be gained from 
examining the private transfers and support pay-
ments which are common in Central Asia, mainly 
in the context of extended families and existing 
social networks, and are, in some cases, enshrined 
in Islamic tradition to see whether they provide 
for locally appropriate social institutions. 
Social policy can and should make a major contri-
bution in the Central Asian context to the preven-
tion, mitigation and management of risks relevant 
to poverty. Yet in this region too the multidimen-
sionality of poverty requires complex problem-
solving approaches that go beyond conventional 
areas of social policy action. Some Central Asian 
governments have therefore recently developed 
broader concepts for poverty reduction, some-
times at the suggestion or with the support of in-
ternational donors. Although the detail of their 
priorities differs, the need for a broad agenda of 
economic, structural and institutional reforms to 
be pursued in the Central Asian countries is em-
phasized both in the national poverty programmes 
and PRSPs submitted and in the CIS-7 Initiative. 
The ten goals of the Federal German government's 
Programme of Action 2015 rely, however, on an 
even more comprehensive poverty reduction strat-
egy, which would be fully justified in Central 
Asia: to increase the economic dynamism of the 
poor and safeguard the right to food, to create fair 
trade opportunities and reduce indebtedness, to 
strengthen social security and restore an intact 
environment, to ensure respect for human rights 
and gender equality, to strengthen responsible 
governance and resolve conflicts peacefully.353 
Compared to this comprehensive strategy, the 
agenda pursued by German development coopera-
tion in Central Asia has been rather modest.354 
The priorities recently set – the development of 
                                                     
352 See, for example, Freiberg-Strauss / Meyer (1999), van 
Ginneken (1999), Loewe et al. (2001), Ortiz (2001) 
and Marduch / Sharma (2002). 
353  See BMZ (2001a). 
354 See BMZ (2001b), BMZ (2001d), BMZ (2002b) and 
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democratic structures governed by the rule of law, 
support for economic reforms and poverty reduc-
tion and the promotion of cross-border coopera-
tion, especially with regard to water and the envi-
ronment – are very much to be welcomed, al-
though, when it comes to practical implementa-
tion, declarations of intent and individual projects 
abound.355 The federal government is, however, 
determined to cooperate more closely with the 
Central Asian countries. In this context the present 
study has sought to put forward some suggestions 
for the systemically oriented promotion of social 
policy by German development cooperation, with 
a view to reducing poverty in Central Asia. 
 
                                                     
355  See BMZ (2001d). 
  
 
 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 69 
Map of Central Asia 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70 Katharina Müller 
Map of Kazakhstan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 71 
Map of Kyrgyzstan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
72 Katharina Müller 
Map of Tajikistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 73 
Map of Turkmenistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74 Katharina Müller 
Map of Uzbekistan 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 75 
Bibliography 
Ackland, R. / J. Falkingham (1997): A Profile of Poverty in 
Kyrgyzstan, in: J. Falkingham et al. (eds.), Household 
Welfare in Central Asia, Houndmills and London, pp. 
81-99 
Adam, J. (1991): Social Contract, in: J. Adam (ed.), Eco-
nomic Reforms and Welfare Systems in the USSR, Po-
land and Hungary. Social Contract in Transformation, 
Houndmills and London, pp. 1-25 
ADB (Asian Development Bank) (2001): Proposed Grant 
Assistance to the Republic of Uzbekistan for the Sup-
porting Innovative Poverty Reduction in Karakal-
pakstan Project, JFPR: UZB 35447, Manila 
Aghion, P. / S. Commander (1999): On the dynamics of 
inequality in the transition, in: Economics of Transition, 
Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 275-298 
Ahlberg, R. (1990): Armut in der Sowjetunion, in: Osteuro-
pa, Vol. 40, No. 12, pp. 1159-1174 
Ahmad, E. et al. (eds.) (1991): Social Security in Develop-
ing Countries, Oxford 
Ahmad, E. / J.-L. Schneider (1993): Alternative Social 
Security Systems in CIS Countries, IMF Working Paper 
No. WP/93/8, Washington, D.C. 
Akbarzadeh, S. (2001): Political Islam in Kyrgyzstan and 
Turkmenistan, in: Central Asian Survey, Vol. 20, No. 4, 
pp. 451-465 
Akiner, S. (2002): History and politics in Central Asia: 
change and continuity, in: M. McKee / J. Healy / J. 
Falkingham (eds.), Health care in Central Asia, Buck-
ingham and Philadelphia, pp. 12-30 
Alam, A. / A. Banerji (2000): Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. A 
Tale of Two Transition Paths, World Bank Policy Re-
search Working Paper No. 2472, Washington, D.C. 
Alderman, H. (2002): Subsidies as a Social Safety Net: 
Effectiveness and Challenges, SP Discussion Paper No. 
0224, Washington, D.C. 
Allnut, L. / J. Druker / J. Tracy (2001): Commonwealth of 
Independent States, in: R. Hodess / J. Banfield / T. 
Wolfe (eds.), Global Corruption Report 2001, Berlin, 
pp. 109-123 
Alymkulov, E. / M. Kulatov (2001): Local Government in 
the Kyrgyz Republic, in: I. Munteanu / V. Popa (eds.), 
Developing New Rules in the Old Environment. Local 
Governments in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and 
Central Asia, Budapest, pp. 521-600 
Amanniyazova, L. (2001): Family Welfare in Turkmenistan: 
Trends and Indicators, Background paper prepared for 
the Regional Monitoring Report No.. 8, Florence 
Amnesty International (2001): Central Asia: No Excuse for 
Escalating Human Rights Violations, http://web.amnes-
ty.org/ai.nsf/Index/EUR040022001, 21 August 2002 
Anand, S. / A. Sen (1997): Concepts of Human Develop-
ment and Poverty: A Multidimensional Perspective, in: 
UNDP Human Development Papers, 1991, pp. 1-19 
Anderson, K.H. / C.M. Becker (1999): Post-Soviet Pension 
Systems, Retirement, and Elderly Poverty: Findings 
from the Kyrgyz Republic, in: MOCT-MOST, Vol. 9, 
No. 4, pp. 459-478 
Andrews, E.S. (2001): Kazakhstan: An Ambitious Pension 
Reform, SP Discussion Paper No. 0104, Washington 
D.C. 
Andrews, E. / D. Ringold (1999): Safety Nets in Transition 
Economies: Toward a Reform Strategy, SP Discussion 
Paper No. 9914, Washington, D.C. 
Anonymous (2002): Donors promise 700 million, half as 
grant, in: The Bishkek Observer, 15 October 2002, pp. 1 
and 8 
Atkinson, A.B. (1998): Poverty in Europe, Oxford 
Atkinson, A.B. / J. Micklewright (1992): Economic trans-
formation in Eastern Europe and the distribution of in-
come, Cambridge 
Auty, R.M. (1999): The IMF Model and Resource-Abundant 
Transition Economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, 
UNU/WIDER Working Paper No. 169, Helsinki 
Baldridge, W. (1999): Pension Reform in Kazakhstan, in: 
UNDP (ed.), Central Asia 2010. Prospects for Human 
Development, New York, pp. 176-181 
Bauer, A. et al. (1998): A Generation at Risk. Children in the 
Central Asian Republics of Kazakstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
Manila 
Barr, N. (1998): The Economics of the Welfare State, Ox-
ford et al. 
– (2002): Reforming Pensions: Myths, Truths, and Policy 
Choices, in: International Social Security Review, Vol. 
55, No. 2, pp. 3-36 
Bektemirov, K. / E. Rahimov (2001): Local Government in 
Uzbekistan, in: I. Munteanu / V. Popa (eds.), Develop-
ing New Rules in the Old Environment. Local Govern-
ments in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central 
Asia, Budapest, pp. 469-520 
Berg, A. (1998): Lokale Netzwerke und kommunale Verwal-
tungsstrukturen in Usbekistan, Diplomarbeit, Freie Uni-
versität Berlin 
– (2000): The Uzbek Mahalla – Function and Fiction. A 
Critical Perspective on Neighborhood-Networks and 
Self-Government, paper presented at the VIIth Congress 
of the European Society for Central Asian Studies, Vi-
enna, 27.-30.10.2000 
Berniyazova, M. (2002): Pension Reform in Kazakhstan: 
Critical review of its welfare implications, MA Disser-
tation, University of Manchester 
76 Katharina Müller 
Betley, M. (2003): Public Expenditure in the CIS-7, Paper 
prepared for the Lucerne Conference of the CIS-7 Ini-
tiative, January 20-22, Lucerne, Switzerland, http:// 
www.cis7.org/, 30 January 2003 
BKA (Bundeskriminalamt) (2002): Rauschgiftjahresbericht 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland 2001, Wiesbaden, http:// 
www.bka.de/lageberichte/rg/2001/rg2001.pdf, 21 August 
2002 
BMZ (Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammen-
arbeit und Entwicklung) (1992): Hauptelemente der 
Armutsbekämpfung, BMZ aktuell, No. 020, Bonn 
– (1999): Förderung sozialer Sicherungssysteme in Entwick-
lungsländern, BMZ spezial, No. 098, Bonn 
– (2000): Kopenhagen + 5: Materialien zur Nachfolgekon-
ferenz des Weltsozialgipfels von 1995, BMZ spezial, 
No. 10, Bonn 
– (2001a): Armutsbekämpfung – eine globale Aufgabe. Akti-
onsprogramm 2015: Der Beitrag der Bundesregierung 
zur weltweiten Halbierung extremer Armut, Bonn 
–  (2001b): Asien-Konzept, Bonn 
– (2001c): Für globale soziale Gerechtigkeit. Materialien zur 
VN-Sondergeneralversammlung in Geneva in June 
2000 (Kopenhagen + 5), Bonn 
–  (2001d): Zentralasien-Konzept, Bonn 
– (2002): Beyond the Review: Sustainable Poverty Alle-
viation & PRSP, Eschborn 
– (2002a): Förderung sozialer Sicherheit und sozialer Siche-
rungssysteme in Entwicklungsländern, BMZ Spezial, 
Nr. 069, Bonn 
– (2002b): Medienhandbuch Entwicklungspolitik 2002, Bonn 
Bönker, F. (2002): Ursachen und Konsequenzen der Ent-
wicklung der Staatseinnahmen in den osteuropäischen 
Transformationsländern, in: Berliner Debatte Initial. 
Zeitschrift für sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskurs, Vol. 
13, No. 3, pp. 27-37 
Bonilla-Chacin, M.E. / E. Murrugarra / M. Temourov 
(2003): Health Care During Transition and Health Sys-
tems Reform: Evidence from the Poorest CIS Countries, 
Paper prepared for the Lucerne Conference of the CIS-7 
Initiative, January 20-22, Lucerne, Switzerland, 
http://www.cis7.org/, 30 January 2003 
Boltvinik, J. (1999): Poverty Measurement Methods: An 
Overview, UNDP Social Development and Poverty 
Elimination Division, Poverty Reduction Series, 
http://www.undp.org/poverty/publications/pov_red/, 21 
August 2002 
Bräutigam, D. (2002): Building Leviathan: Revenue, State 
Capacity, and Governance, in: IDS Bulletin, Vol. 33, 
No. 3, pp. 10-20 
Breyer, F. (2000): Kapitaldeckungs- versus Umlagever-
fahren, in: Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 1, 
No. 4, pp. 383-405 
Breyer, F. / P. Zweifel (1999): Gesundheitsökonomie, Berlin 
Brill Olcott, M. (2001): The New Geopolitics of Central 
Asia, in: East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 10, 
No. 4, pp. 103-107 
Bundesregierung (2001): Lebenslagen in Deutschland. Der 
erste Armuts- und Reichtumsbericht der Bundes-
regierung, Berlin 
– (2002): Zentralasienkonzept der Bundesregierung, Berlin 
Burnett, N. / R. Cnobloch (2003): Public Spending on 
Education in the CIS-7 Countries, Paper prepared for 
the Lucerne Conference of the CIS-7 Initiative, January 
20-22, Lucerne, Switzerland, http://www.cis7.org/, 30 
January 2003 
Capisani, C.R. (2000): The Handbook of Central Asia. A 
Comprehensive Survey of the New Republics, London 
and New York 
Castel, P. / L. Fox (2001): Gender Dimensions of Pension 
Reform in the Former Soviet Union, in: R. Holzmann / 
J.E. Stiglitz (eds.), New Ideas about Old Age Security. 
Toward Sustainable Pension Systems in the 21st Cen-
tury, Washington, D.C., pp. 424-451 
CER (Center for Economic Research) (2001): Survey of 
Living Standards in the Ferghana Region. Synthesis 
Report on Quantitative Research Results, SDRC Proj-
ect, Tashkent 
Chandler, A. (2000): The Elderly in a Revolutionary Soci-
ety: the Soviet Pension System, 1917-1956, paper pre-
sented at the 32nd Congress of the American Associa-
tion for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Denver, 9 
to 12 November 2000 
Cheterian, V. (2001): Spannungen und Wandel zwischen 
Pamir und Ural, in: Eine Welt, No. 4, December 2001, 
pp. 6-11 
Chu, K. / S. Gupta (1993): Der Schutz der Armen: Soziale 
Sicherungsnetze in der Übergangsperiode, in: Finanzie-
rung & Entwicklung, June 1993, pp. 24-27 
Chu, K. / S. Gupta (1996): Social Protection in Transition 
Countries: Emerging Issues, IMF Paper on Policy 
Analysis and Assessment, Washington, D.C. 
Cimera / FES (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung) (2002): Bilingual 
Education and Conflict Prevention, Bishkek 
Conway, T. / A. Norton (2002): Nets, Ropes, Ladders and 
Trampolines: The Place of Social Protection within 
Current Debates on Poverty Reduction, in: Development 
Policy Review, Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 533-540 
Cornia, G.A. (1996): Public Policy and Welfare Conditions 
During the Transition: An Overview, in: MOCT-MOST, 
Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 1-17 
Cornia, G.A. / R. Jolly / F. Stewart (eds.) (1987): Adjust-
ment with a Human Face. Volume 1: Protecting the 
Vulnerable and Promoting Growth, Oxford 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 77 
Coudouel, A. / S. Marnie (1999): From Universal to Tar-
geted Social Assistance: An Assessment of the Uzbek 
Experience, in: MOCT-MOST, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 443-
458 
– / – (2000): Social assistance in Uzbekistan. Can the mahal-
las target state support on the most vulnerable?, in: 
S. Hutton / G. Redmond (eds.), Poverty in Transition 
Economies, London and New York, pp. 51-69 
Coudouel, A. / S. Marnie / J. Micklewright (1997): Trans-
fers and Exchange between Households in Uzbekistan, 
in: J. Falkingham et al. (eds.), Household Welfare in 
Central Asia, Houndmills and London, pp. 202-220 
– / – / – (1999): Targeting Social Assistance in a Transition 
Economy: The Example of the Mahalla Scheme in Uz-
bekistan, in: J. Freiberg-Strauß / K. Meyer (eds.), The 
Real World of Social Policy. An anthology of project 
experience, Eschborn, pp. 40-60 
Coudouel, A. et al. (1997): Regional Differences in Living 
Standards in Uzbekistan, in: J. Falkingham et al. (eds.), 
Household Welfare in Central Asia, Houndmills and 
London, pp. 100-117 
Craig, J. (1999): Fiscal Adjustment, in: E. Gürgen et al., 
Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, IMF Occa-
sional Paper No. 183, Washington, D.C., pp. 16-22 
Deutschland, I. (1993): Die zentralasiatischen GUS-Republi-
ken Kirgistan, Usbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadschiki-
stan. Ausgangssituation und Ansatzpunkte für die Ent-
wicklungszusammenarbeit, GDI, Berlin 
Development Committee (1999): Building Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategies in Developing Countries, DC/99-29, 
Washington, D.C. 
– (2002): Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) – Pro-
gress in Implementation, DC2002-0016, Washington, 
D.C. 
Devereux, S. (2001): Sen’s Entitlement Approach: Critiques 
and Counter-critiques, in: Oxford Development Studies, 
Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 245-263 
– (2002): Can Social Safety Nets Reduce Chronic Poverty?, 
in: Development Policy Review, Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 657-
675 
DfID (Department for International Development) (2000): 
Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Strategy Paper, 
London 
Dhar, P. (2002): Speaking Out, in: ADB Review, March-
April 2002, p. 9 
Dobronogov, A. (2003): Social Protection in Low Income 
CIS Countries, Paper prepared for the Lucerne Confer-
ence of the CIS-7 Initiative, January 20-22, Lucerne, 
Switzerland, http://www.cis7.org/, 30 January 2003 
Dschalalow, A. (1999): Nationale Identität unterstützt Demo-
kratisierung, in: Wostok-Spezial, No. 1/1999, pp. 14-16 
Eberlei, W. (2001): Armutsbekämpfung als Testfall für 
Global Governance, in: R. Mutz / U. Ratsch / B. Schoch 
(eds.), Friedensgutachten 2001, Münster, pp. 124-132 
– (2002): Poverty Reduction Strategies between Global Gov-
ernance and National Politics, in: Nord-Süd aktuell, 3rd 
quarter 2002, pp. 432-436 
Eberlei, W. / T. Fues (2001): Bundesregierung beschließt 
Programm zur Armutsbekämpfung: Konzept im Kampf 
der Ressorts verwässert, in: E+Z – Entwicklung und Zu-
sammenarbeit, No. 5, May 2001, pp. 140-141 
EBRD (European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment) (2001a): Kazakhstan Investment Profile 2001, 
London 
– (2001a): Uzbekistan Investment Profile 2001, London 
– (2001b): Kyrgzystan Investment Profile 2001, London 
– (2001c): Tajikistan Investment Profile 2001, London 
– (2001d): Turkmenistan Investment Profile 2001, London 
– (2001f): Transition Report 2001, London 
– (2002): Transition Report 2002, London 
Ellerman, D. (2001): Vouching Towards Kazakhstan: 
Sounding the Alarm on Neo-Chilean "Pension Re-
forms", Washington, D.C. 
Ellman, M. (2000): The Social Costs and Consequences of 
the Transformation Process, in: Economic Commission 
for Europe (ed.), Economic Surveys of Europe 2000, 
No. 2-3, New York & Geneva, pp. 125-145 
Elson, D. (2001): Social Policy and Macroeconomic Per-
formance: Integrating "the Economic" and "the Social", 
in: UNRISD News, No. 24, pp. 5-6 
Eurostat / Europäische Kommission (2002): Die soziale 
Lage in der Europäischen Union, Brussels 
Falkingham, J. (1999a): Measuring Household Welfare: 
Problems and Pitfalls with Household Surveys in Cen-
tral Asia, in: MOCT-MOST, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 379-393 
– (1999b): Poverty in Central Asia, in: UNDP (ed.), Central 
Asia 2010. Prospects for Human Development, New 
York, pp. 66-77 
– (1999c): Welfare in Transition: Trends in Poverty and 
Well-being in Central Asia, CASE Paper No. 20, Lon-
don 
– (2000): A Profile of Poverty in Tajikistan, CASE Paper No. 
39, London 
– (2002): Poverty, affordability and access to health care, in: 
M. McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health 
care in Central Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, 
pp. 42-56 
Falkingham, J. (2003): Inequality & Poverty in the CIS7, 
Paper prepared for the Lucerne Conference of the CIS-7 
Initiative, January 20-22, Lucerne, Switzerland, 
http://www.cis7.org/, 30 January 2003 
78 Katharina Müller 
Falkingham, J. / J. Micklewright (1997): Surveying House-
holds in Central Asia, in: J. Falkingham et al. (eds.), 
Household Welfare in Central Asia, Houndmills and 
London, pp. 42-60 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations) (2001): The State of Food Insecurity in the 
World, Rome 
Ferge, Z. (1994): Zur Reform der Sozialpolitik in den postto-
talitären Ländern: Anmerkungen zu verschiedenen Re-
formstrategien, in: IVSS (Internationale Vereinigung 
für Soziale Sicherheit) (ed.): Umstrukturierung der so-
zialen Sicherheit in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Trends – Po-
litiken – Optionen, Geneva, pp. 15-32 
FES (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung) (1996): Soziale Sicherung 
in der internationalen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Ein 
Beratungsmanual der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn 
Field, M.G. (2002): The Soviet legacy: the past as prologue, 
in: M. McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health 
care in Central Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, 
pp. 67-75 
Flassbeck, H. / R. Zwiener (1999): The State of Kazakstan’s 
Pension Reform, in: Kazakstan Economic Trends, Oc-
tober-December 1999, pp. 1-9 
Freedom House (2001): Freedom in the World. Country 
Ratings, 1972-73 to 2000-01, http://www.freedomhouse. 
org/research/freeworld/FHSCORES.xls, 21 August 2002 
– (2002): The World’s Most Repressive Regimes 2002. A 
Special Report to the 58th Session of the United Nations 
Commission on Human Rights, New York 
Freiberg-Strauß, J. / K. Meyer (eds.) (1999): The Real 
World of Social Policy. An anthology of project experi-
ence, Eschborn 
Freizer, S. (2002): Tajikistan local self-governance: a poten-
tial bridge between government and civil society? Lon-
don 
Giese, E. (2002): Wasserverknappung, Wassernutzungskon-
flikte und Wassermanagement in Trockengebieten Zent-
ralasiens, in: Spiegel der Forschung, Vol. 19, No. 1, pp. 
50-56 
Gleason, G. (2001): "Asian Values" and the Democratic 
Transition in Central Asia, in: Harvard Asia Quarterly, 
Winter 2001, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/haq/ 
200101/0101a002.htm, 21 August 2002 
Götting, U. (1998): Transformation der Wohlfahrtsstaaten in 
Mittel- und Osteuropa. Eine Zwischenbilanz, Opladen 
Götz, R. / U. Halbach (1996): Politisches Lexikon GUS, 
Munich 
Government of the Republic of Tajikistan (2000): Interim 
Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, Dushanbe 
Grub, M. / O. Suprinovic (2002): Poverty and Inequality in 
Russia during the 1990s. An Empirical Investigation, 
FIT Discussion Paper 02/02, Frankfurt (Oder) 
Gsänger, H. (1993): Soziale Sicherungssysteme für arme 
Bevölkerungsgruppen, GDI, Berlin 
– (1996): Weltkonferenzen und nationale Umsetzung: Der 
Weltsozialgipfel und sein Folgeprozeß am Beispiel Ma-
lawi und Philippinen, GDI, Berlin 
GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft für technische Zusammen-
arbeit) (1998): Armut: Definitionen, Konzepte und In-
dikatoren. Eine kurze Übersicht zusammengestellt 
durch das Pilotprojekt Armutsbekämpfung, Eschborn 
Gumpel, W. (1990): Zur ökonomischen Lage in den Turk-
gebieten der UdSSR, in: Osteuropa, Vol. 40, No. 12, 
pp. 175-1184 
Gupta, S. et al. (2001): Transition Economies: How Appro-
priate Is the Size and Scope of Government? IMF 
Working Paper No. WP/01/55, Washington, D.C. 
Gürgen, E. et al. (1999): Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbe-
kistan, IMF Occasional Paper No. 183, Washington, 
D.C. 
Halbach, U. (2002): Islam und islamistische Bewegungen in 
Zentralasien, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. B 
3-4/2000, pp. 24-31 
Hamilton, E. (1989): The Social Contract and Well-Being in 
the USSR: A Comparison of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, 
and the Donets-Dnieper Region, in: Soviet Geography, 
Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 109-129 
Handrahan, L.M. (2001): Gender and ethnicity in the ‚tran-
sitional democracy‘ of Kyrgyzstan, in: Central Asian 
Survey, Vol. 20, No. 4, pp. 467-496 
Healy, J. (2002): Health care systems in transition, in: M. 
McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health care in 
Central Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, pp. 179-
193 
Healy, J. / J. Falkingham / M. McKee (2002): Poverty, 
affordability and access to health care, in: M. McKee / 
J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health care in Central 
Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, pp. 42-56 
Hedtkamp, G. (1995): Die soziale Sicherung als Vorbedin-
gung für den erfolgreichen Übergang zur Marktwirt-
schaft, Osteuropa-Institut, Diskussionspapier, No. 175, 
Munich 
Heidbrink, K. / S. Paulus (2000): Nachhaltigkeitsstrategien 
im Dickicht nationaler Planungsprozesse. Von der Kon-
vergenz des Denkens zur Kohärenz des Handelns in der 
Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Bonn and Eschborn 
Heinrich, G. (2000): Fundamental Economic and Social 
Change. The Case of Kyrgyzstan 1993-97, UNU/WIDER 
Working Paper No. 174, Helsinki 
Heitzmann, K. / R.S. Canagarajah / P.B. Siegel (2002): 
Guidelines for Assessing the Sources of Risk and Vul-
nerability, SP Discussion Paper No. 0218, Washington, 
D.C. 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 79 
Heller, P.S. / C. Keller (2001): Social Sector Reform in 
Transition Countries, IMF Working Paper No. WP/ 
01/35, Washington, D.C. 
Hellman, J.S. / D. Kaufmann (2001): Confronting the Chal-
lenges of State Capture in Transition Economies, in: Fi-
nance and Development, Vol. 38, No. 3, http:// 
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2001/09/, 21 August 
2002 
Hellman, J.S. / G. Jones / D. Kaufmann (2000): "Seize the 
State, Seize the Day". State Capture, Corruption, and 
Influence in Transition, World Bank Policy Research 
Working Paper No. 2444, Washington, D.C. 
Herr, H. / J. Priewe (2001): The Macroeconomic Frame-
work of Poverty Reduction – An Assessment of the 
IMF/World Bank Strategy, Berlin 
Herrfahrdt, E. (2001): Von Hausherren und Hausfrauen: 
Geschlechter-Konzepte in Usbekistan, Diplomarbeit, 
Universität Trier 
Hofmann, M. (2001): Aktionsprogramm 2015: Klare Aus-
sagen zur Armutsbekämpfung, in: E+Z – Entwicklung 
und Zusammenarbeit, No. 7/8, July/August 2001, pp. 
212-213 
Holzmann, R. (2001): Risk and Vulnerability: The Forward 
Looking Role of Social Protection in a Globalizing 
World, SP Discussion Paper No. 0109, Washington, 
D.C. 
Holzmann, R. / S. Jørgensen (1999): Social Protection as 
Social Risk Management: Conceptual Underpinnings 
for the Social Protection Sector Strategy Paper, SP Dis-
cussion Paper No. 9904, Washington, D.C. 
– / – (2000): Social Risk Management: A new conceptual 
framework for Social Protection, and beyond, SP Dis-
cussion Paper No. 0006, Washington, D.C. 
Howell, J. (1998): Poverty, Children and Transition in Kyr-
gyzstan: Some Reflections from the Field, in: Journal of 
International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 131-144 
IDA (International Development Association) / IMF (In-
ternational Monetary Fund) (2002): Republic of Taji-
kistan: Joint Staff Assessment of the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper, Washington, D.C. 
Ilkhamov, F.A. / E. Jakubowski / S. Hajioff (2002): Uzbe-
kistan, in: M. McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), 
Health care in Central Asia, Buckingham and Philadel-
phia, pp. 210-213 
ILO-CEET (International Labour Organization – Central 
and Eastern European Team) (1995): Social Expendi-
ture in Central and Eastern Europe Under Challenge: 
Financing A Decent Society Or Cutting Corners? In: 
ILO-CEET Newsletter, June 1995, pp. 8-10 
Ilolov, M. / M. Khudoiyev (2001): Local Government in 
Tajikistan, in: I. Munteanu / V. Popa (eds.), Developing 
New Rules in the Old Environment. Local Governments 
in Eastern Europe, in the Caucasus and Central Asia, 
Budapest, pp. 601-648 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) (1995): Social Safety 
Nets for Economic Transition: Options and Recent Ex-
periences, IMF Paper on Policy Analysis and Assess-
ment No. PPAA/95/3, Washington, D.C. 
– (1999): Kyrgyz Republic: Recent Economic Developments, 
IMF Staff Country Report No. 99/31, Washington, D.C. 
– (2002a): Kyrgyz Republic: First Review Under the Three-
Year Arrangement Under the Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility, IMF Country Report No. 02/150, 
Washington, D.C. 
– (2002b): Republic of Kazakhstan: Selected Issues and 
Statistical Appendix, IMF Country Report No. 02/64, 
Washington, D.C. 
– (2002c): Tajikistan – Staff Monitored Program – Letter of 
Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Poli-
cies and Technical Memorandum of Understanding, 
Washington, D.C. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) / IDA (International 
Development Association) (1999): Heavily Indebted 
Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative – Strengthening the 
Link between Debt Relief and Poverty Reduction, 
Washington, D.C. 
IMF (International Monetary Fund) / World Bank 
(2001): Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, 
and Tajikistan: External Debt and Fiscal Sustainability, 
Washington, D.C. 
– / – (2002a): A New Initiative for the CIS 7, Washington, 
D.C. 
– / – (2002b): Country Notes: Debt Sustainability and Policy 
Priorities to Ensure Growth in the CIS7 Countries, in: 
IMF / World Bank, Poverty Reduction, Growth and 
Debt Sustainability in Low-Income CIS Countries, 
Washington, D.C., Annex 1, pp. 1-37 
– / – (2002c): Poverty Reduction, Growth and Debt Sustain-
ability in Low-Income CIS Countries, Washington, 
D.C. 
– / – (2002d): Review of the PRSP Experience, Washington, 
D.C. 
Ismail, S. / J. Micklewright (1997): Living Standards and 
Public Policy in Central Asia: What Can Be Learned 
from Child Anthropometry? Innocenti Occasional Pa-
per, Economic and Social Policy Series No. 62, Flor-
ence 
Izvorski, I. (1999): Prereform Setting and Conditions, in: E. 
Gürgen et al., Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan, Kyr-
gyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbeki-
stan, IMF Occasional Paper No. 183, Washington, D.C., 
pp. 6-15 
Jaffe, A. (1999): Unlocking the Assets: Energy and the Fu-
ture of Central Asia and the Caucasus, in: UNDP (ed.), 
Central Asia 2010. Prospects for Human Development, 
New York, pp. 22-33 
80 Katharina Müller 
Jakobeit, C. (1999): Die Weltbank und "Menschliche Ent-
wicklung". Ein neuer strategischer Ansatz aus Washing-
ton, in: E+Z – Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit, No. 
5, May 1999, pp. 124-125 
Jones Luong, P. (2003): Political Obstacles to Economic 
Reform in Uzbekistan, Kyrggyzstan, and Tajikistan: 
Strategies to Move Ahead, Paper prepared for the Lu-
cerne Conference of the CIS-7 Initiative, January 20-22, 
Lucerne, Switzerland, http://www.cis7.org/, 30 January 
2003 
Kanbur, R. / L. Squire (2001): The Evolution of Thinking 
about Poverty: Exploring the Interactions, in: G.M. 
Meier / J.E. Stiglitz (eds.), Frontiers of Development 
Economics. The Future in Perspective, Oxford, pp. 183-
226 
Kandiyoti, D. (1999): Poverty in Transition: An Ethno-
graphic Critique of Household Surveys in Post-Soviet 
Central Asia, in: Development and Change, Vol. 30, pp. 
499-524 
Kangas, R.D. (1999): The Importance of Political and Social 
Stability for Economic Revival, in: UNDP (ed.), Central 
Asia 2010. Prospects for Human Development, New 
York, pp. 34-39 
Kasymov, A. (2001): Uzbekistan In Denial Over Poverty, in: 
Reporting Central Asia, No. 52, 18 May 2001 
Kausch, I. et al. (1994): Arbeitsmarktpolitik in Transforma-
tionsländern. Der Fall Kirgistan, GDI, Berlin 
Keller, C. / P.S. Heller (2001): Social Sector Reform in 
Transition Countries, in: Finance & Development, Vol. 
38, No. 3, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/ 
2001/09/, 21 August 2002 
Kerkow, U. (2000): Die 20:20 Intiative: Magere Bilanz nach 
den ersten fünf Jahren, in: entwicklungspolitik online 
Specials: Kopenhagen+5, http://www.epo.de/specials/ 
kopenhagen+5.html, 21 August 2002 
Klemp, L. (1992): Soziale Sicherheit in Entwicklungslän-
dern, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, No. B 50/92, 
pp. 47-54 
Klugman, J. (1999): Financing and Governance of Educa-
tion in Central Asia, in: MOCT-MOST, Vol. 9, No. 4, 
pp. 423-442 
Klugman, J. / G. Schieber (1996): A Survey of Health 
Reform in Central Asia, World Bank Technical Paper 
No. 344, Washington, D.C. 
Klugman, J. et al. (1997): The Impact of Kindergarten Di-
vestiture on Hausehold Welfare in Central Asia, in: J. 
Falkingham et al. (eds.), Household Welfare in Central 
Asia, Houndmills and London, pp. 183-201 
Koichumanova, K. (2001): Family and Child Welfare in the 
Transition Period in Kyrgyzstan, Background paper 
prepared for the Regional Monitoring Report No.. 8, 
Florence 
Kolodko, G.W. (1999): Equity Issues in Policymaking in 
Transition Economies, in: V. Tanzi / K. Chu / S. Gupta 
(eds.), Economic Policy and Equity, Washington, D.C., 
pp. 150-188 
Konning, J. / M. Kevane (2002): Community-Base Target-
ing Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets: A Critical Re-
view, in: World Development, Vol. 30, No. 3, pp. 375-
394 
Kopits, G. (1994): Soziale Sicherheit in Volkswirtschaften 
im Übergang, in: IVSS (Internationale Vereinigung für 
Soziale Sicherheit) (ed.): Umstrukturierung der sozialen 
Sicherheit in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Trends – Politi-
ken – Optionen, Geneva, pp. 69-87 
Kornai, J. (1986): The Soft Budget Constraint, in: Kyklos, 
Vol. 39, No. 1, pp. 3-30 
Kreutzmann, H. (2002): Gorno-Badakhschan: Experimente 
mit der Autonomie – Sowjetisches Erbe und Transfor-
mation im Pamir, in: Internationales Asienforum, Vol. 
33, No. 1-2, pp. 31-46 
Krumm, K. / B. Milanovic / M. Walton (1995): Transfers 
und der Übergang von der zentralen Planung, in: Finan-
zierung & Entwicklung, September 1995, pp. 27-30 
Kudabaewa, S. (2001): Frauen in hohen Positionen in Kirgi-
sistan, Vortrag im Haus der Kulturen der Welt, Berlin, 
13.4.2002 
Kulzhanov, M. / J. Healy (2002): Kazakhstan, in: M. 
McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health care in 
Central Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, pp. 197-
201 
Kyrgyz Republic (2001): Interim National Strategy for 
Poverty Reduction, 2001-2003, Bishkek 
– (2002): Expanding the Country’s Capacities. National 
Poverty Reduction Strategy, 2003-2005, Bishkek 
Lambert, R. (1998): Zukunft ohne Armut, in: akzente, No. 
4/98, pp. 38-41 
Lanjouw, P. (1997): How Important is a Poverty Line in the 
Central Asian Context?, in: J. Falkingham et al. (eds.), 
Household Welfare in Central Asia, Houndmills and 
London, pp. 61-77 
Lewis, M. (2000): Who is Paying for Health Care in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia? World Bank Human Devel-
opment Sector Unit, Washington, D.C. 
Linn, J. (2002): Central Asia: Ten Years of Transition. Talk-
ing Points for Central Asia Donors’ Consultation Meet-
ing, Berlin, Germany, March 1, 2002 
Loewe, M. et al. (2001): Improving the Social Protection of 
the Urban Poor and Near-Poor in Jordan. The Potential 
of Micro-Insurance, GDI, Bonn 
Malashenko, A. (2002): Islam im postsowjetischen Raum, 
in: Osteuropa, Vol. 52, No. 5, pp. 549-563 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 81 
Mamedkuliev, C. / E. Shevkun / S. Hajioff (2002): Turk-
menistan, in: M. McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham 
(eds.), Health care in Central Asia, Buckingham and 
Philadelphia, pp. 207-209 
Mason, D.S. / J.R. Kluegel (2000): Marketing Democracy. 
Changing Opinion About Inequality and Politics in East 
Central Europe, Lanham et al. 
Mayhew, B. / R. Plunkett / S. Richmond (2000): Central 
Asia, Melbourne et al. 
McAuley, A. (1994): Poverty and Anti-poverty Policy in a 
Quasi-developed Society: The Case of Uzbekistan, in: 
Communist Economies & Economic Transformation, 
Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 187-201 
McGee, R. / G. Barnard (2001): Poverty Reduction Strate-
gies: A Part for the Poor?, in: IDS Policy Briefing, No. 
13, April 2001, http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/bookshop/ 
briefs/brief13.html, 21 August 2002 
McKee, M. / L. Chenet (2002): Patterns of health, in: 
M. McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health care 
in Central Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, pp. 57-
66 
McKinnon, R. (2003): Social Risk Management and the 
World Bank: Resetting the „Standards“ for Social Secu-
rity?, forthcoming in: Journal of Risks Research 
Mee, W. (2001): Women in the Republic of Uzbekistan, 
ADB Country Briefing Paper, Tashkent 
Meier, G.M. (2001a): Introduction: Ideas for Development, 
in: G.M. Meier / J.E. Stiglitz (eds.), Frontiers of Devel-
opment Economics. The Future in Perspective, Oxford, 
pp. 1-12 
– (2001b): The Old Generation of Development Economists 
and the New, in: G.M. Meier / J.E. Stiglitz (eds.), Fron-
tiers of Development Economics. The Future in Per-
spective, Oxford, pp. 13-50 
Menzel, U. (1995): 40 Jahre Entwicklungsstrategie = 
40 Jahre Wachstumsstrategie, in: D. Nohlen / F. Nu-
scheler (eds.), Handbuch der Dritten Welt, Band 1: 
Grundprobleme, Theorien, Strategien, Bonn, pp. 131-
155 
Mikhalev, V. / G. Heinrich (1999): Kyrgyzstan: A Case 
Study of Social Stratification, UNU/WIDER Working 
Paper No. 164, Helsinki 
Milanovic, B. (1998): Income, Inequality, and Poverty dur-
ing the Transition from Planned to Market Economy, 
Washington, D.C. 
– (2001): Inequality During the Transition: Why Did It In-
crease?, in: O. Havrylyshyn / S.M. Nsouli (eds.), A 
Decade of Transition: Achievements and Challenges, 
Washington, D.C., pp. 251-267 
Ministry of Education of the Republic of Tajikistan 
(2002): Monitoring Learning Achievement in Primary 
School in Tajikistan and Problems of Non-Attendance, 
Dushanbe 
Moder, K.-H. (2002): Kein Ende der demokratischen Eiszeit 
in Zentralasien, in: Osteuropa, Vol. 52, No. 1, pp. 14-37 
Morduch, J. / M. Sharma (2002): Strengthening Public 
Safety Nets from the Bottom Up, in: Development Pol-
icy Review, Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 569-588 
Morley, S. (2000): La Distribución del Ingreso en América 
Latina y el Caribe, Santiago de Chile 
Mukhhammadieva, B. (2001): Child and Family Welfare in 
Tajikistan: The Main Trends and Indicators, Back-
ground paper prepared for the Regional Monitoring Re-
port No.. 8, Florence 
Müller, K. (1998): Postsozialistische Sozialpolitik: Der Fall 
der Alterssicherung, in: Berliner Debatte Initial. Zeit-
schrift für sozialwissenschaftlichen Diskurs, Vol. 9, 
No. 2/3, pp. 159-169 
– (1999): The Political Economy of Pension Reform in Cen-
tral-Eastern Europe, Cheltenham and Northampton 
– (2001): Die neue Rentenorthodoxie in Lateinamerika und 
Osteuropa, in: J. Jäger / G. Melinz / S. Zimmermann 
(eds.), Sozialpolitik in der Peripherie. Entwicklungs-
muster und Wandel in Lateinamerika, Afrika, Asien und 
Osteuropa, Frankfurt am Main and Vienna, pp. 239-255 
– (2002a): Pension Reform Paths in Central-Eastern Europe 
and the Former Soviet Union, in: Social Policy and 
Administration, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 156-175 
– (2002b): Privatising Old-Age Security: Latin America and 
Eastern Europe Compared, Research Report, Frankfurt 
(Oder) 
– (2002c): Transformation als Peripherisierung, in: Berliner 
Debatte Initial. Zeitschrift für sozialwissenschaftlichen 
Diskurs, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 17-26 
Murthi, M. / M. Pradhan / K. Scott (2002): Poverty and 
Economic Transition in Kazakhstan, published in: L. 
Aiguo / M.F. Montes (eds.), Poverty, Income Distribu-
tion and Well-Being in Asia during the Transition, 
Houndmills 
Musabekov, E. (2001): Child and Family Welfare: Trends 
and Indicators in the Republic of Kazakhstan, Back-
ground paper prepared for the Regional Monitoring Re-
port No.. 8, Florence 
Narayan, D. et al. (2000a): Can Anyone Hear Us? Voices of 
the Poor, New York 
– (2000b ): Crying Out for Change. Voices of the Poor, New 
York 
Narayan, D. / P. Petesch (eds.) (2002): From Many Lands. 
Voices of the Poor, New York 
Norton, A. / T. Conway / M. Foster (2002): Social Protec-
tion: Defining the Field of Action and Policy, in: De-
velopment Policy Review, Vol. 20, No. 5, pp. 541-567 
Nove, A. / J.A. Newth (1966): The Soviet Middle East. A 
Communist Model for Development, New York and 
Washington, D.C. 
82 Katharina Müller 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) (1996): Shaping the 21st Century: The 
Contribution of Development Co-operation, Paris 
– (2001): DAC Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, Paris 
– (2002): Die DAC-Leitlinien Armutsbekämpfung, Paris 
Offe, C. (1994): Der Tunnel am Ende des Lichts. Erkundun-
gen der politischen Transformation im Neuen Osten, 
Frankfurt/Main and New York 
Orenstein, M. (2000): How Politics and Institutions Affect 
Pension Reform in Three Postcommunist Countries, 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2310, 
Washington, D.C. 
Orszag, P.R. / J.E. Stiglitz (2001): Rethinking Pension 
Reform: Ten Myths About Social Security Systems, in: 
R. Holzmann / J.E. Stiglitz (eds.), New Ideas about Old 
Age Security. Toward Sustainable Pension Systems in 
the 21st Century, Washington, D.C., pp. 17-62 
Ortiz, I.D. (ed.) (2001): Social Protection in Asia and the 
Pacific, Manila 
Paci, P. (2002): Gender in Transition, Washington, D.C. 
Pastor, G. / T. Damjanovic (2001): The Russian Financial 
Crisis and its Consequences for Central Asia, IMF 
Working Paper No.. WP/01/169, Washington, D.C. 
Pomfret, R. (1998): The Transition to a Market Economy, 
Poverty and Sustainable Development in Central Asia, 
University of Adelaide Seminar Paper No. 98-08, Ade-
laide 
– (1999): Living Standards in Central Asia, in: MOCT-
MOST, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 395-421 
– (2002): Macroeconomic pressures, in: M. McKee / J. Healy 
/ J. Falkingham (eds.), Health care in Central Asia, 
Buckingham and Philadelphia, pp. 31-41 
Pomfret, R. / K.H. Anderson (1997): Uzbekistan: Welfare 
Impact of Slow Transition, UNU/WIDER Working Pa-
per No. 135, Helsinki 
– / – (1999): Poverty in Kyrgyzstan, in: Asia-Pacific Devel-
opment Journal, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 73-91 
Powell, D.E. (2002): Death as a Way of Life: Russia’s 
Demographic Decline, in: Current History, Vol. 101, 
No. 657, pp. 344-348 
Queisser, M. (1993): Vom Umlage- zum Kapital-
deckungsverfahren: die chilenische Rentenreform als 
Modell für Entwicklungsländer?, Munich et al. 
Rahminov, R. / G. Gedik / J. Healy (2002): Tajikistan, in: 
M. McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health care 
in Central Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, pp. 204-
206 
Rashid, A. (1994): The Resurgence of Central Asia. Islam or 
Nationalism? Karachi, London and New Jersey 
– (2002): Dictators, Islamists, Big Powers and Ordinary 
People. The New "Great Game" in Central Asia, in: 
Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, No. 3/2002, pp. 
90-106 
Ravallion, M. (1994): Poverty Comparisons, http://www. 
Worldbank.org/wbiep/povertyanalysis/resources.htm, 
10 June 2002 
– (2002): Growth, Inequality and Poverty: Looking Beyong 
Averages, Paper prepared for the Annual Bank Confer-
ence on Development Economics (ABCDE-Europe 
2002), June 24-26, Oslo, Norway, http://wbln0018. 
worldbank.org/EURVP/web.nsf/Pages/ABCDE+2002-
Papers, 21 August 2002 
Republic of Kazakhstan (2002): State Program for Poverty 
Reduction In the Republic of Kazakstan In 2003-2005, 
http://www.antipoverty.nursat.kz/program/program_eng.
htm, 21 August 2002 
Ribhegge, H. (1999): The Controversy between the Pay-As-
You-Go System and the Fully-Funded System in Old-
Age Security, in: K. Müller / A. Ryll / H.-J. Wagener 
(eds.), Transformation of Social Security: Pensions in 
Central-Eastern Europe, Heidelberg, pp. 61-77 
Richelle, K. (2001): Attacking poverty between ownership 
and donorship: lessons learnt and directions for the fu-
ture, in: BMZ / GTZ (eds.), Mainstreaming Armuts-
bekämpfung: Strategien und Wirkungen, Bonn, pp. 11-19 
Robb, C. (2000): How the Poor Can Have a Voice in Gov-
ernment Policy, in: Finance & Development, Vol. 37, 
No. 4, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2000/ 
12/, 21 August 2002 
Rodriguez, P.L. / E.T. Vashakmadze (2002): Note on 
Fiscal Adjustment and Public Expenditure Reform for 
Growth and Poverty Reduction Prepared for the Consul-
tative Group Meeting for the Kyrgyz Republic, World 
Bank, Bishkek 
Roland-Holst, D. / F. Tarp (2002): New Perspectives on 
Aid Effectiveness, Paper prepared for the Annual Bank 
Conference on Development Economics (ABCDE-
Europe 2002), June 24-26, Oslo, Norway, http:// 
wbln0018.worldbank.org/EURVP/web.nsf/Pages/ABC
DE+2002-Papers, 21 August 2002 
Rowntree, B.S. (1901): Poverty: A Study of Town Life, 
London 
Rysakova, J. et al. (2002): Kyrgyz Republic – Crumbling 
Support, Deepening Poverty, in: D. Narayan / P. Petesch 
(eds.), From Many Lands. Voices of the Poor, New York, 
pp. 275-300 
Sachs, J. (1996): Der lange Schatten des Kommunismus, in: 
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 31 January 1996, p. VII 
Sachs, J.D. / A.M. Warner (1997): Natural Resource Abun-
dance and Economic Growth, Cambridge MA 
Sange Agency (2001): Listening to the Poor, Almaty 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 83 
Sargaldakova, A. et al. (2002): Kyrgyzstan, in: M. McKee / 
J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health care in Central 
Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, pp. 201-204 
Sari, N. / J.C. Langenbrunner (2001): Consumer out-of-
pocket spending for pharmaceuticals in Kazakhstan: 
implications for sectoral reform, in: Health Policy and 
Planning, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 428-434 
Sautter, H. / R. Schinke (1994): Die sozialen Kosten wirt-
schaftlicher Reformen – ihre Ursachen und die Mög-
lichkeiten einer Abfederung, IAI Diskussionsbeiträge 
No. 63, Göttingen 
Savas, S. / G. Gedik (1999): Health Care Reforms in Central 
Asia, in: UNDP (ed.), Central Asia 2010. Prospects for 
Human Development, New York, pp. 144-161 
Savas, S. / G. Gedik / M. Craig (2002): The reform process, 
in: M. McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health 
care in Central Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, pp. 
79-91 
Schatz, E. (2002): Islamism and Anti-Americanism in Cen-
tral Asia, in: Current History, Vol. 101, No. 657, pp. 
337-343 
Schmähl, W. (1994): Zur ökonomischen Bedeutung sozialer 
Sicherung und ihrer Ausgestaltung im Transforma-
tionsprozeß, in: Gesellschaft für Versicherungs-
wissenschaft und -gestaltung (ed.), Probleme der Um-
wandlung der Sozialordnungen der Staaten Mittel- und 
Osteuropas, Bergisch Gladbach, pp. 47-75 
Schmid, M. (2001): Wo Granatäpfel blühen und das Elend 
wächst: Einst Stolz der Sowjetunion, ist Tadschikistan 
heute das Armenhaus Zentralasiens, in: Eine Welt, No. 
4, December 2001, pp. 16-18 
Schmidtkunz, F. (2002): Armutsbekämpfung der Bretton 
Woods-Institutionen und das Beispiel Bolivien, in: 
Journal für Entwicklungspolitik, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, pp. 
105-118 
Sen, A. (1981): Poverty and Famines. An Essay on Entitle-
ment and Deprivation, Oxford 
–. (1999): Development as Freedom, Oxford 
Sievers, E.W. (2002): Usbekistan’s Mahalla: From Soviet to 
Absolutist Residential Community Associations, in: 
Journal of International and Comparative Law at Chi-
cago-Kent, Vol. 2, pp. 91-158 
Social Protection Unit (2000): Spectrum. Sector Strategy 
Launch Issue, World Bank, Washington, D.C. 
Staines, V. (1999): A Health Sector Strategy for the Europe 
and Central Asia Region, World Bank Health, Nutri-
tion, and Population Series, Washington, D.C. 
Streeten, P. et al. (1981): First Things First: Meeting Basic 
Needs in Developing Countries, New York 
Summers, V. / K. Baer (2003): Revenue Policy and Admin-
istration in the CIS-7: Recent Trends and Future Chal-
lenges, Paper prepared for the Lucerne Conference of 
the CIS-7 Initiative, January 20-22, Lucerne, Switzer-
land, http://www.cis7.org/, 30 January 2003 
Tabor, S.R. (2002): Assisting the Poor with Cash: Design 
and Implementation with Social Transfer Programs, SP 
Discussion Paper No. 0223, Washington, D.C. 
Tanzi, V. (ed.) (1995): Fiscal Policies in Economies in Tran-
sition, Washington, D.C. 
Temesgen, T. (2001): No.tes on Income Sources and Their 
Contribution in Kyrgyz Republic, in: World Bank, Kyr-
gyz Republic: Poverty in the 1990s in the Kyrgyz Re-
public, Washington, D.C., Annex 4, pp. 1-8 
Thorbecke, E. (2000): The evolution of the development 
doctrine and the role of foreign aid, in: F. Tarp (ed.), For-
eign Aid and Development. Lessons Learnt and Direc-
tions for the Future, London and New York, pp. 17-47 
Uthoff, A. (2001): La reforma del sistema de pensiones en 
Chile: desafíos pendientes, in: CEPAL, Serie Financia-
miento del Desarrollo No. 112, Santiago de Chile 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) (1993): 
Human Development Report 1993, New York and Ox-
ford 
– (1998): Poverty in Transition?, New York 
– (2000a): Human Development Report, Uzbekistan 2000, 
Tashkent 
– (2000b): Kyrgystan: National Human Development Report 
for 2000, Bishkek 
– (2000c): Overcoming Human Poverty. Poverty Report 
2000, New York 
– (2000d): Tajikistan Human Development Report 2000, 
Dushanbe 
– (2001a): Human Development Report Kazakstan 2000, 
Almaty 
– (2001b): Human Development Report 2001, New York and 
Oxford 
– (2001c): Kyrgystan: National Human Development Report 
for 2001, Bishkek 
– (2002): Bericht über die menschliche Entwicklung 2002, 
Bonn 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) et al. 
(1998): Implementing the 20/20 Initiative. Achieving 
global access to basic social services, New York 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) /  
UNFPA (United Nations Population Fund) (2000): 
Second country cooperation framework for Turkmeni-
stan (2000-2004), DP/CCF/TUK/2, Geneva 
UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization) / UNICEF (United Nations 
Children’s Fund) (2002): Girls’ Education in Tajiki-
stan: Education, Problems and Solutions, Dushanbe 
 
84 Katharina Müller 
UNICEF (United Nations Children’s Fund) (1995): Pov-
erty, Children and Policy: Responses for a Brighter Fu-
ture. Central and Eastern Europe in Transition – Public 
Policy and Social Conditions. Economies in Transition 
Studies, Regional Monitoring Report No. 3, Florence 
– (2001): A Decade of Transition. The MONEE Project 
CEE/CIS/Baltics, Regional Monitoring Report No. 8, 
Florence 
UNTUK (The United Nations System in Turkmenistan) 
(2000): Common Country Assessment, http://www. un-
tuk.org/publications/reports/cca/index.html, 21 August 
2002 
Vandycke, N. (2001): Access to Education for the Poor in 
Europe and Central Asia. Preliminary Evidence and 
Policy Implications, World Bank Technical Paper No. 
511, Washington, D.C. 
van Ginneken, W. (ed.) (1999): Social security for the ex-
cluded majority. Case studies of developing countries, 
Geneva 
Vang, J. / S. Hajioff (2002): Rationalizing hospital services, 
in: M. McKee / J. Healy / J. Falkingham (eds.), Health 
care in Central Asia, Buckingham and Philadelphia, pp. 
151-164 
VENRO (Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nicht-
Regierungsorganisationen) (2001): Armut bekämpfen 
– Gerechtigkeit schaffen. Folgerungen der internatio-
nalen Debatte über Armutsbekämpfung für die deutsche 
Entwicklungspolitik, Bonn 
Veser, R. (2002): Die grausam gute Herrschaft des Erben 
Timurs. Das usbekische Regime unter Präsident Kari-
mow verfolgt zwar nicht den Islam, dafür aber Gläu-
bige, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5 July 2002, 
p. 3 
von Gumppenberg, M.-C. (2001): Hüterinnen des Herdes? 
Zur politischen Partizipation und Selbstorganisation von 
Frauen in Kazachstan, in: Berliner Osteuropa Info, 
12/1999, pp. 4-5 
– (2002a): Deutsches und europäisches Engagement in Zent-
ralasien. Ein Beitrag zur Stabilisierung der Region?, 
KAS Arbeitspapier No. 85/2002, Sankt Augustin 
– (2002b): Staats- und Nationsbildung in Kazachstan, Opla-
den 
Wagstyl, S. (2002): Debt relief urged for the poorest seven 
former Soviet countries, in: Financial Times, 19 Febru-
ary 2002 
Weidnitzer, E. (1998): Soziale Sicherungssysteme und 
Reformansätze in arabischen Ländern unter besonderer 
Berücksichtigung islamischer sozialer Institutionen, 
GDI, Berlin 
Wodon, Q. (2000): Poverty and Policy in Latin America and 
the Caribbean. World Bank Technical Paper No. 467, 
Washington, D.C. 
Wolfensohn, J.D. / S. Fischer (2000): The Comprehensive 
Development Framework (CDF) and Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers (PRSP), http://www.imf.org/external/ 
np/prsp/pdf/cdfprsp.pdf, 21 August 2002 
World Bank (1994): Averting the Old Age Crisis. Policies to 
Protect the Old and Promote Growth, Washington, D.C. 
– (1995): The Kyrgyz Republic: Poverty Assessment and 
Strategy, Report No. 14380-KG, Washington, D.C. 
– (1998): Kazakhstan: Living Standards During the Trans-
ition, Report No. 17520-KZ, Washington, D.C. 
– (1999a): Kyrgyz Republic: Update on Poverty in the Kyr-
gyz Republic, Report No. 19425-KG, Washington, D.C. 
– (1999b): Uzbekistan: Social and Structural Policy Review, 
Report No. 19626, Washington, D.C. 
– (2000a): Balancing Protection and Opportunity. A Strategy 
for Social Protection in Transition Economies, Wash-
ington, D.C. 
– (2000b): Hidden Challenges to Education Systems in Tran-
sition Economies, Washington, D.C. 
– (2000c): Making Transition Work for Everyone. Poverty 
and Inequality in Europe and Central Asia, Washington, 
D.C. 
– (2000d): Republic of Tajikistan: Poverty Assessment, 
Report No. 20285-TJ, Washington, D.C. 
– (2001a): Comprehensive Development Framework: Meet-
ing the Promise? Early Experience and Emerging Is-
sues, Washington, D.C. 
– (2001b): Kyrgyz Republic: Poverty in the 1990s in the 
Kyrgyz Republic, Washington, D.C. 
– (2001c): Social Protection Sector Strategy. From Safety Net 
to Springboard, Washington, D.C. 
– (2001d): Turkmenistan: A Profile of Living Standards in 
Turkmenistan, Washington, D.C. 
– (2001e): World Development Report 2000/2001: Attacking 
Poverty, New York 
– (2002a): Global Development Finance 2002. Financing the 
Poorest Countries, Washington, D.C. 
– (2002b): Kyrgyz Republic: Enhancing Pro-poor Growth, 
Report No. 24628-KG, Washington, D.C. 
– (2002c): Transition – The First Ten Years. Analysis and 
Lessons for Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Un-
ion, Washington, D.C. 
– (2002d): Memorandum of the President of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the Interna-
tional Development Association and the International 
Finance Corporation to the Executive Directors on a 
Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Uz-
bekistan, Report No. 23675-UZ, Washington, D.C. 
Poverty and Social Policy in the Central Asian Transition Countries 85 
– (2002e): The Context for Community Driven Development 
in Central Asia: Local Institutions and Social Capital in 
Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, First 
Phase Report: CDD Experience and Lessons to Date, 
Washington, D.C. 
– (2002f): World Development Indicators 2002, Washington, 
D.C. 
– (2003): Memorandum of the President of the International 
Development Association to the Executive Directors on 
a Country Assistance Strategy for the Republic of Taji-
kistan, Report No. 25329-TJ, Washington, D.C. 
 
  
